Meaning and reference › When a Sense Does and Does Not Lead to a Reference

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated May 19, 20262 min read
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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 98Meaning and reference › When a Sense Does and Does Not Lead to a Reference
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Frege uses proper name broadly for expressions that purport to designate a single object. It can take several words to specify the point where two lines meet. The fact that an expression has several words does not by itself prevent the phrase from working as a name in Frege's broad sense. His account also leaves open the possibility that we understand a phrase that fails to designate something. Frege, pp. 26–28

Grasping one way of specifying an object gives a limited perspective. Suppose you know how to identify the intersection of the first two lines but haven't checked how the third line is drawn. You might grasp the description involving the third line without being able to tell whether its point is the same. The issue is which sense, if another is given, leads to the same bearer. Knowing what the words of a description mean is compatible with needing evidence to decide whether the two names co-refer. It is also compatible with the description failing to name anything. Frege, pp. 27–28

A whole declarative sentence has a thought as its sense. Where the sentence has its ordinary reference, Frege identifies that reference with its truth value. He distinguishes the True from the False, so true sentences can have the same reference while expressing very different thoughts. In this part of the essay the relevant claim concerns declarative sentences, not every command, question, or fragment of reported speech. Frege examines clauses that do other jobs later in the paper. Frege, pp. 32–35 and 36–39

Common Misconception

Frege's sense is not a mental image or a subjective idea. A mental image of the morning star is private to the individual; Frege's sense is objective and shareable. Two people looking at Venus in the morning can have different visual images while grasping the same sense, the same cognitive content, of "the morning star."

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