Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice: A Critique of Rawlsian Liberalism

Michael BrenndoerferNovember 1, 202613 min read

Michael Sandel's 1982 study of the priority of justice in Rawls, asking how a theory of the person can account for shared goods and attachments.

PhilosophyAll chapters
Reading tools Notes & comments
Notes & comments
Part 10 of 12Justice and Political Authority
Chapter 123Community and the person who chooses › A Commitment You Can Discover
Reading the full chapter · 8 sections · 13 min8 sections · 13 min

All 8 sections · 13 min read

Community and the person who chooses › A Commitment You Can DiscoverFull chapter · Sections in this chapter1 / 8 ↓

A Commitment You Can Discover

Suppose an adult considers whether to take responsibility for a family undertaking. No contract obliges them to do it. Looking at their options, they might decide that the undertaking is one among several things they could value. They might also conclude that a relationship in which they already stand is giving them a reason. In the second account, part of the reflection consists in finding out what the relationship means to them. A subsequent decision can then express something they have discovered about themselves.

Michael Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, first published in 1982, asks what political philosophy has to assume about people if justice is to have the priority John Rawls gives it. The distinction between choosing a commitment and recognizing one helps bring that question into view. Both describe intelligible kinds of deliberation. One issue is whether the same account of a person can make adequate sense of both.

Sandel addresses a particular form of liberalism. In the Introduction, he calls it deontological liberalism. It gives justice, fairness, and individual rights a central place and takes its starting point from a tradition influenced by Kant. The point of the label is to identify the theory Sandel wants to examine. His target is the role that priority plays in the account, and the conception of a person needed to support it.

What It Means for the Right to Have Priority

Imagine citizens with different views about whether a religious practice, a profession, or political involvement makes a life go well. They need rules about how a government treats them, and those rules may protect their freedom to pursue different ends. On the liberal view Sandel describes in the Introduction, the rightness of the basic terms of cooperation is independent of assuming any one of those particular goods as the end of society. The principles give people a framework within which to pursue their aims. A gain in aggregate satisfaction need not justify a departure from those principles.

The distinction matters in a case where one form of life is popular. A majority might want institutions to favor it because they believe that wider adoption would be good for the whole society. A defender of the priority of the right can ask what entitles this majority to use public coercion to advance that end. The value the majority finds in the end does not decide the issue. The freedom of those who do not share it is itself part of what must be secured.

Sandel's first chapter asks how Rawls can make justice primary in this way. He is concerned with the place justice has in the theory as much as the particular principles selected. Even someone sympathetic to equal rights can ask whether all political reasoning about their justification can proceed independently of the ends by which people understand themselves. This is an argument about what a defense of rights needs to include.

Who Chooses in the Original Position?

In A Theory of Justice, §§3–4 and 24, Rawls imagines parties choosing principles for the basic structure of a society under fair restrictions. The parties do not know their particular social place, talents, or aims. They have general information, and they can reason about goods useful in many plans of life. The agreement is hypothetical. Its purpose is to bring out which reasons would count if no one could design the basic rules around a position they knew to be theirs.

The parties are choosing principles for institutions. They are not choosing a religion or family or deciding what their whole life will mean. Sandel's question is what makes their choice an appropriate representation of people for that particular task. If each person's claims can be adequately represented by putting their ends to one side, it may look as though the person could always be identified independently of the ends. Sandel argues that this possibility matters to the priority Rawls gives to justice. It determines what the parties can present as a claim that another person ought to take into account.

The distinction between the hypothetical procedure and the people it represents is especially important here. Abstracting from a fact during a decision does not establish that the fact has no bearing on a person's identity. People can sit on a jury without bringing their personal relationships into the judgment. They do not have to stop being the people those relationships help make them. A defense of Rawls can make an analogous point. Sandel's objection has to show that an abstraction useful for one purpose carries consequences that are too strong for the political theory.

Rawls gives the parties reasons to care about primary goods. It would be a mistake to attribute to him the view that they have no information or motivations at all. The harder question is whether the particular standpoint available to them models enough about citizens for the claims of justice. A basic liberty can protect people with many ends. To establish that this protection is enough, one still has to know which interests or forms of agency could be affected by the rule.

Possession and the Difference Principle

The disagreement becomes sharper in chapter 2, “Possession, Desert, and Distributive Justice”. Sandel examines whether the account of the person implicit in the original position fits a principle that regulates advantages from economic cooperation. Rawls's difference principle requires social and economic inequalities to work to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, within his other constraints. How should a theory of distinct persons explain why the distribution of natural talents and their benefits matters to those who do not have the same talents?

Consider someone with a capacity that earns more under one set of public rules than another. A theory might explain the income as a return that naturally belongs to that person before any question about institutions arises. Rawls instead asks which public rules should shape returns from citizens' cooperation. He regards the distribution of talents as a resource whose benefits can be shared through institutions. This concerns how returns are organized. It does not say that one citizen has a claim to own another citizen's talent.

Sandel asks what view of possession and community can justify that move. Suppose people are conceived as separate holders of attributes whose identity can be specified before any social ends are taken into account. The theory then has to explain how the deployment of those attributes belongs to a common undertaking whose advantages can be divided. Merely noting that a talent was unearned leaves open which people have claims to its benefits and why. The chapter's opening sets this as a test of how Rawls's conception of the person fits his distributive principle. Sandel compares it with Nozick's position to show that a dispute about what people should receive also depends on what it means for an attribute or benefit to be theirs.

One answer is that the relevant income would already depend on public institutions. A professional benefits from a system that recognizes credentials, enforces contracts, and makes cooperation reliable. The people who maintain the system have claims on its terms even if they need not share the professional's aims. The question for the exchange with Sandel is whether this institutional explanation does enough by itself, or whether the kind of undertaking envisaged already relies on something more shared. Framing the dispute this way leaves room to agree with the principle's conclusion and still disagree about its justification.

What an Agreement Can Establish

Sandel raises another question in chapter 3, “Contract Theory and Justification”. Even if the parties in the original position would pick the principles Rawls describes, why does that make the principles just? With an actual promise, a person's act can help explain why they have an obligation they previously lacked. Nobody has made such a promise in the original position. The justification needs another account of why the considerations allowed in the hypothetical choice are the appropriate ones.

Rawls can answer that the original position is an attempt to represent fairness, and that it can be tested alongside considered judgments. The method of reflective equilibrium lets a philosopher revise the description of the choice, a general principle, or a judgment about a case when they no longer fit. The hypothetical choice is then part of an argument with several moving parts. The question Sandel presses is how the contract and that mutual adjustment relate to each other. If considered judgments already supply some of the reason for describing the choice as fair, the agreement does not provide a foundation entirely independent of them.

An everyday example helps separate the issues. A neighborhood council says it has imagined what participants would choose if none knew their own address. That removes an obvious source of favoritism. It may still matter whether people need the bus to reach work, whether some have limited mobility, and whether the service is already unequally distributed. An appropriate description of the choice would establish which considerations can enter it, but that appropriateness is itself open to argument. The agreement that follows cannot settle every dispute over how the question was posed.

Reflection, Community, and the Good

In chapter 4, “Justice and the Good”, Sandel considers how Rawls's account of the good fits his account of the subject. A person can take a commitment seriously while being capable of reconsidering it. The issue is whether reconsideration always takes the form of standing back from an attachment and choosing to retain it. In the opening example, the person who takes responsibility can understand their family relationship more clearly through the deliberation. Seeing a responsibility in that relationship changes how they understand the choice in front of them.

A shared practice can play a similar role. A community might be useful to people because it helps them achieve aims they have picked independently. It can also help them see purposes they would scarcely have recognized apart from participating in it. Consider people who learn to care for a public space by organizing with their neighbors to keep it usable. The value of the undertaking may become part of how they understand their role in that place. The fact that they might later object to the group's decisions does not make this influence on their aims disappear.

This also leaves a hard question for appeals to community. Suppose members disagree about what a tradition requires, with some arguing that arrangements taken for granted have long excluded them. Their attachments can supply reasons to stay and contest the practice. The same attachments give us no assurance that the familiar interpretation deserves their deference. Showing that a commitment helps make a person who they are tells us something about deliberation. It leaves open what a defensible public rule ought to be. Sandel registers his unease with the blanket communitarian label in the preface to the 1998 second edition. The debate contains more than one question, and the label does not settle his answer to each.

A public library offers a variation on this distinction. One reason to support it is that each user gains access to something they want. The benefits can be counted even if no two users share an aim. Another reason concerns the practice that develops when people sustain a place where anyone can learn, ask for help, and contribute what they know. Some of the people involved may come to value the practice through participation in it. The second account introduces a reason the first does not describe, even if both favor the same decision about funding.

Part of the dispute is how such a shared good could bear on politics. A library committee could make a service genuinely public by asking who is still unable to use it and what their exclusion does to the undertaking. Calling the service a common good does not automatically make it so. Some participants may speak as though established members' interests are the only ones at stake. A defensible description of what is shared needs to leave room for questions about those people as well. They may care about aspects of the library that regular users have taken for granted. To find out what counts as public use, the organizers have to listen to those perspectives.

Conversely, people may value a common practice and still want a legal boundary around how far its organizers may dictate their lives. A person who learns to value public discussion has gained a reason to defend it. They have not thereby given the group authority over everything they say. The disagreement about the place of justice concerns how to describe both considerations at once. A theory that recognizes commitments and collective goods still needs to say how people can question their terms. A theory that protects individuals still needs to explain what kind of joint life its protections make possible.

Rawls's Later Distinction

In “Justice as Fairness: Political, Not Metaphysical”, published in 1985, Rawls distinguishes a citizen's public identity from an account of all the ends and attachments that matter in their life. The original position is a way to represent fair relations among citizens. Its artificial description does not provide a theory of the essence of human persons. A citizen can undergo a deep change in belief and retain the same standing in public institutions. The theory's ability to describe that continuity does not require saying that the change meant little to the citizen.

That response narrows the issue. The relevant question is how far political justification can draw only on a conception of people as citizens. Sandel's closing chapter added for the second edition explicitly returns to the revised account in Political Liberalism. It helps to keep the time sequence in view. The book's original critique addresses the conception Sandel finds in A Theory of Justice. The later exchange addresses a political account intended to answer some of the worries raised about that conception. A person could find the representation adequate for deciding terms of legal cooperation while still asking whether it leaves enough room for shared purposes in other parts of public life.

The distinction shows why the dispute cannot be settled simply by pointing out that most people value belonging. Both sides can acknowledge the reality of attachments. The sharper question is what role those attachments can play in assessing the grounds, limits, and priority of justice. If one asks only for a procedure that bars special pleading, some abstraction appears welcome. If the question is why a set of terms counts as the terms of a shared undertaking, the excluded material may matter again. The point of the exchange is to say which question is being asked and what conception of a person the answer needs.

Reading Sandel

Begin with the published previews of the Introduction and Conclusion for the argument about the primacy of justice. In the full second edition, chapters 2 and 3 bring the difference principle, possession, and the problem of justification together. Read Rawls's 1985 account of the original position beside Sandel's new final chapter for the later exchange.

Join the discussionAsk a question or share what you learned.

Comments

Add to the conversation

A question, a correction, or an example from your own work.

No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!

A different angle
All writing
Philosophy

Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia: Libertarian Justice

Robert Nozick's 1974 defense of the minimal state, tracing its possible emergence and asking what makes holdings just and communities voluntary.

13 min read
Philosophy

Plato's Republic: The Architecture of Justice

A guide to Plato's most ambitious dialogue, exploring justice in the soul and the state, the nature of reality, and why philosophers should rule, with insights for how we live today.

21 min read
Philosophy

Sen's The Idea of Justice: Beyond Ideal Theory

Amartya Sen's 2009 alternative to Rawlsian ideal theory, focusing on reducing injustice and comparing actual social arrangements rather than designing perfect institutions.

13 min read

About the author

Reference

Citation details

Cite or share this article.

BIBTEXAcademic
@misc{brenndoerfer2026sandels, author = {Michael Brenndoerfer}, title = {Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice: A Critique of Rawlsian Liberalism}, year = {2026}, url = {https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/sandel-liberalism-limits-justice-communitarian-critique-guide}, organization = {mbrenndoerfer.com}, note = {Accessed: 2026-11-19} }
APAAcademic
Michael Brenndoerfer (2026). Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice: A Critique of Rawlsian Liberalism. Retrieved from https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/sandel-liberalism-limits-justice-communitarian-critique-guide
MLAAcademic
Michael Brenndoerfer. "Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice: A Critique of Rawlsian Liberalism." 2026. Web. November 19, 2026. <https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/sandel-liberalism-limits-justice-communitarian-critique-guide>.
CHICAGOAcademic
Michael Brenndoerfer. "Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice: A Critique of Rawlsian Liberalism." Accessed November 19, 2026. https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/sandel-liberalism-limits-justice-communitarian-critique-guide.
HARVARDAcademic
Michael Brenndoerfer (2026) 'Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice: A Critique of Rawlsian Liberalism'. Available at: https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/sandel-liberalism-limits-justice-communitarian-critique-guide (Accessed: November 19, 2026).
SimpleBasic
Michael Brenndoerfer (2026). Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice: A Critique of Rawlsian Liberalism. https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/sandel-liberalism-limits-justice-communitarian-critique-guide
Newsletter

Stay up to date

Get new articles, book updates, and notes on AI and technology.

Unsubscribe at any time. Privacy policy