Danto's The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: What Makes Art Art?

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated September 7, 202614 min read

Arthur Danto's 1981 development of the 'artworld' concept for analytic aesthetics, asking what makes something art when it's indistinguishable from ordinary objects.

PhilosophyAll chapters
Reading tools Notes & comments
Notes & comments
Part 12 of 12Art, Beauty, and Interpretation
Chapter 142What makes something a work of art › A room full of red squares
Reading the full chapter · 5 sections · 14 min5 sections · 14 min

All 5 sections · 14 min read

What makes something a work of art › A room full of red squaresFull chapter · Sections in this chapter1 / 5 ↓

A room full of red squares

Imagine an exhibition in which every picture appears to be the same expanse of red. One is a historical painting of the Israelites crossing the Red Sea. Its artist explains the absence of figures by saying that the crossing is already over and the Egyptians have drowned. Beside it hangs Kierkegaard’s Mood, the work of an imaginary portraitist. There are also two pictures both called Red Square. One depicts a place in Moscow. The other is geometrical abstraction. Farther along, a canvas coated in red was to be the ground for an unrealized painting by Giorgione. Another panel is just a red-painted surface. If a color photograph of each surface looked the same, the exhibition catalogue could still describe things of quite different kinds. Chapter 1, “Works of Art and Mere Real Things,” anthology extract, pp. 35–36.

This is how Arthur C. Danto begins The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, published in 1981. The joke about the Red Sea comes from Kierkegaard. Danto builds an imagined gallery around it in order to ask what can make one red rectangle a historical painting, another an abstraction, and another a mere painted surface. The cases put two questions next to each other. How does a work differ from an ordinary thing that looks like it? How do two works differ from each other when they are made from surfaces that look alike? An answer to the first question should help with the second. Knowing merely that each belongs somewhere in the art category would still leave the important differences within the exhibition unexplained. Chapter 1, anthology extract, pp. 35–36 and 1981 volume, table of contents.

That makes the setup a test for explanations. If two surfaces share a visible quality, the quality alone cannot explain why just one presents a narrative or why just one is a work. The ability to see the quality remains important. A viewer who cannot locate the area of red misses something of what the artist used. The further question is what role that area plays. The perceptual description is common to the cases, and the part it plays in an account of the work can vary. A photograph preserving the color and dimensions can therefore preserve what the works visibly share without settling what there is to understand about any one of them.

The cases of Giorgione and J

The canvas prepared by Giorgione has a provenance that would interest an art historian. It can give information about material, studio practice, or the intended work. The work that he would have painted on it never came into existence in Danto’s example. Treating the prepared canvas as evidence of an artist’s activity leaves room for the distinction between what he did and the painting he never made. An object can inherit interest from its place in someone’s practice without inheriting the identity of the work that practice was meant to produce. The example also complicates a simple rule that whatever the artist puts into a gallery is an artwork. In the thought experiment several objects share a location while serving very different purposes within the display. Chapter 1, anthology extract, pp. 35–37.

A visitor Danto calls J objects to the exhibition’s apparent injustice. The red-painted surface has the same appearance as its neighbors. Why should it receive a lesser status? J paints a further red canvas and insists on its inclusion as a work. Danto allows it into the show and calls it empty in the sense of lacking artistic richness. That is different from saying a crate is empty because its contents were removed. It is also different from remarking that a bare red surface has nothing painted over it. Criticism of J already treats the canvas as a work that can have a point and try to accomplish something. Calling it a thin work is one way to take its proposal seriously enough to assess it. Chapter 1, anthology extract, pp. 36–37.

J’s work also helps separate judgments of classification from judgments of merit. Two people might agree which exhibit is meant to be a work and disagree about whether it is any good. They could point to the same red coating for different reasons. One thinks the severe restriction makes the protest exact. The other thinks the gesture has left the protest too thinly developed. The disagreement is intelligible because they are assessing the same broad enterprise. The color description alone leaves the enterprise unstated. What interests Danto is how someone gets from that description to an identification of what the thing is doing.

Danto makes the use of a title part of the example. J calls the work Untitled, which can itself indicate how a viewer is being asked to approach it. The designation differs from a registrar saying that a title is unknown or was never assigned. J says the painting is about nothing. Danto considers several ways of understanding that answer. A work could take absence as its subject, or it could be presented in a way intended to discourage the assignment of a subject at all. A bare thing lacks a subject in a further sense. The similarities in how these cases can be described conceal the differences between a particular subject, a choice about how a work is to be taken, and an object for which there is no such choice to explain. Chapter 1, anthology extract, pp. 36–37.

J eventually declares the original bare expanse a work of art, following the precedent of Duchamp’s selections. Danto grants that the declaration succeeds in the example. The same thing that had been included for comparison can now have a part in a new artistic act. What has changed needs to be explained. J’s touch alone would not settle the matter, since he can paint a fence simply to give it a new coat. The case helps distinguish the ability to do something on a particular historical occasion from the proposition that those words would have the same effect in any setting. Chapter 1, anthology extract, p. 37.

How a line acquires a role

Danto worked on that question in his earlier essay “The Artworld,” published in 1964. He calls attention to the is of artistic identification. Consider a listener who hears someone point at a dark area in a painting and say it is a storm. The speaker is identifying a part of the work as a storm in the scene. The dark area is also visibly paint. Both judgments can be right. The first tells the listener how something physically present functions in the work. It can have consequences for understanding other marks, because what is depicted as a storm helps determine what counts as shelter, reflected light, or distance in the same scene. “The Artworld,” pp. 576–579.

The essay makes the point using two imagined pictures in a science library. They each consist of a black horizontal line on a white ground. In Newton’s First Law the line is the path of an isolated particle. In Newton’s Third Law it marks the boundary where masses press against one another. Identifying the line in one way or the other changes how the ground and edges are understood. A path can pass through a continuous space that extends beyond the frame. A boundary can separate two masses whose shapes make the edges matter differently. A copyist could reproduce every line while leaving the copy’s user with the task of finding out what sort of work it reproduces. “The Artworld,” pp. 577–579.

Danto’s fictional observer Testadura sees the painted oblong and line perfectly well. Looking closer would supply more information about the surface. To understand the work he needs to learn how someone can identify its painted features as parts of what it presents. The observer’s question is especially revealing because no additional patch of paint holds the answer. A title, an artist’s explanation, and familiarity with the ways pictures use lines can give him reasons to see what a particular identification makes available. Some identifications fit together. Others conflict. Calling the line a boundary between masses changes what one can coherently say about the surrounding white areas. Thus interpretation has consequences others can inspect and discuss. “The Artworld,” pp. 578–580.

The examples also show why knowing the subject of a work is an incomplete answer. A sentence in a textbook can refer to Newton’s first law. It makes the reference in a different way from the fresco. In the imagined fresco, the arrangement of a line across a field can make the viewer attend to what it would mean for a path to continue through space. Someone who knew the title but ignored the relation of the line to the whole would miss part of how the work bears its subject. Interpretation is an inquiry into how something is presented, as well as what it concerns.

A more concrete impetus for “The Artworld” was Andy Warhol’s exhibited boxes based on familiar product packaging. In the 1964 essay Danto points out that the commercial cartons and the objects Warhol showed used different materials. Warhol had copies of the cartons made in plywood. The museum record for his Brillo Box (Soap Pads) lists paint and silkscreen ink on wood. Painting a carton and making a painted wooden object resemble a commercial carton are different activities. The philosophical question survives awareness of that difference. If the manufacturer also made a box in plywood, making the container heavier or more durable would hardly make it a work of art. Danto likewise asks why Warhol could not have used the manufacturer’s carton. The real objects motivate a thought experiment that holds their appearance constant. “The Artworld,” pp. 580–581 and Museum of Modern Art, catalogue checklist, items 25–26.

Commercial packaging already carries meanings. It can communicate the product inside and attract attention through color and typography. Warhol’s use of those features opens another question about what the familiar appearance is doing in a work made for exhibition. A viewer could ask why the boxes are presented in groups, why packaging is made to persist in wood, or why the presentation makes something usually discarded available for sustained attention. These are possible lines of interpretation, each requiring further support from the works and their situation. The article’s question about what makes the package and the work differ comes before a judgment about which reading of Warhol is best.

Danto’s answer refers to histories and theories of art that enable a viewer to recognize certain appearances as available to be used in certain ways. It matters that an artist can work with an existing commercial image, that ordinary products can be brought into an argument about representation, and that audiences can follow those moves. The history of art helps supply those possibilities. A similar object made at a time when those practices did not exist might be identifiable in other ways. This is a substantive claim about what makes an interpretation possible. Learning that a director put the object in a gallery can be evidence about its circumstances. The location, on its own, conveys little about the possibilities the artist used. “The Artworld,” pp. 581–584.

In the 1981 book, Danto considers the snow shovel chosen by Marcel Duchamp. A familiar industrial design can support a gesture about what selection and exhibition can do. Imagine a physically similar implement centuries earlier, before it was familiar in the relevant ways. It could be a puzzling shape with a handle, and its maker and audience would have different possibilities for what to do with it. The difference cannot be recovered by comparing measurements. To understand the later gesture, it matters that one can recognize the sort of thing being selected and see what a decision to treat it as a potential work puts into question. Chapter 1, anthology extract, pp. 38–39.

What makes an interpretation answerable

The opening chapter ties being a work to an interpretation that constitutes it as such. In the case of Kierkegaard’s Mood, a single color has a part in an imagined attempt at psychological portraiture. Taking the same color as the ground of an unfinished Giorgione would call for a different account, with different evidence and implications. These are positions a viewer can ask someone to explain. What reasons connect the color to that subject? What could the artist and audience have been doing with that material? Which claims would we have to give up if evidence about the commission, maker, or setting changed? The work’s relation to interpretation makes these questions possible and gives them something to be about. Chapter 1, anthology extract, pp. 35–39.

This approach leaves a genuine difficulty about how much historical knowledge a viewer needs. Someone who encounters the red gallery after losing the labels might recognize a flat, repetitive treatment and imagine several purposes for it. Their attention to the appearance can be careful even if their first conjectures are mistaken. Later they may learn that one picture was conceived as a landscape and reconsider how the artist could have meant an evenly colored area to present a place. That later experience can improve the earlier one without requiring the viewer to dismiss all first impressions. A question for Danto’s approach is how interpretation guides this process, especially when the available evidence supports several readings.

There is also a question about the limits of the thought experiment. If a classifier cannot use surface appearance alone, it follows that a classification can depend on something beyond it. That gives a reason to consider a work’s subject and its history. Many ordinary things also have subjects, purposes, or histories that exceed what one can gather by looking. A shipping label addresses a recipient and a scientific chart presents quantities. Understanding these things requires background knowledge too. A more complete theory has to account for how a work presents something in a way that can be understood and assessed as art. The book goes on to examine aesthetic appreciation, artistic identification, representation, and the use of metaphor, expression, and style. The opening experiment gives those investigations a shared problem. 1981 volume, chapters 4–7 and table of contents.

Danto also imagines people with a rich appreciation of the look of natural things who lack the practice of interpreting objects as art. They can respond to the color of a mineral or the appearance of a sunset. If they were to select artworks for preservation, they might favor glittering surfaces and ornamented frames and pass over things whose significance required them to recognize a subject or a way of presenting it. The experiment grants them sensitivity to what they see. It asks what further learning would make an artistic achievement available to their aesthetic attention. A person can sincerely admire the red in the gallery while still having much to learn about how to appreciate Kierkegaard’s Mood as a portrait. Chapter 1, anthology extract, pp. 37–38.

Return to the imagined exhibition and give one viewer a catalogue. If the catalogue is any good, it will invite the viewer to return to the pictures with questions. How can an apparently featureless patch of red stage the aftermath of a story? How can the identical color stand for the mood of a person? Where, in a very plain geometric canvas, do the size and shape of the painted area matter? An answer has to bring the work and the circumstances of its making into the same account. That demand explains why an attentive viewer may have more to see after learning about the work, even though the surface has remained exactly as it was.

Join the discussionAsk a question or share what you learned.

Comments

Add to the conversation

A question, a correction, or an example from your own work.

No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!

A different angle
All writing
Philosophy

Adorno's Aesthetic Theory: Autonomous Art and Critique

Theodor Adorno's 1970 dense magnum opus defending autonomous art against commodification and developing a dialectical theory of modern art.

14 min read
Philosophy

Hegel's Lectures on Aesthetics: Art, Form, and Spirit

How Hegel thinks art gives ideas a perceptible form, from symbolic architecture and classical sculpture to romantic painting, music, and poetry.

13 min read
Philosophy

Benjamin's The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction

Walter Benjamin examines how photography and film change a work’s aura, who can see it, and how it can be used. The essay first appeared in French in 1936.

14 min read

About the author

Reference

Citation details

Cite or share this article.

BIBTEXAcademic
@misc{brenndoerfer2026dantos, author = {Michael Brenndoerfer}, title = {Danto's The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: What Makes Art Art?}, year = {2026}, url = {https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/danto-transfiguration-commonplace-artworld-aesthetics-guide}, organization = {mbrenndoerfer.com}, note = {Accessed: 2026-11-19} }
APAAcademic
Michael Brenndoerfer (2026). Danto's The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: What Makes Art Art?. Retrieved from https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/danto-transfiguration-commonplace-artworld-aesthetics-guide
MLAAcademic
Michael Brenndoerfer. "Danto's The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: What Makes Art Art?." 2026. Web. November 19, 2026. <https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/danto-transfiguration-commonplace-artworld-aesthetics-guide>.
CHICAGOAcademic
Michael Brenndoerfer. "Danto's The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: What Makes Art Art?." Accessed November 19, 2026. https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/danto-transfiguration-commonplace-artworld-aesthetics-guide.
HARVARDAcademic
Michael Brenndoerfer (2026) 'Danto's The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: What Makes Art Art?'. Available at: https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/danto-transfiguration-commonplace-artworld-aesthetics-guide (Accessed: November 19, 2026).
SimpleBasic
Michael Brenndoerfer (2026). Danto's The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: What Makes Art Art?. https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/danto-transfiguration-commonplace-artworld-aesthetics-guide
Newsletter

Stay up to date

Get new articles, book updates, and notes on AI and technology.

Unsubscribe at any time. Privacy policy