Rawls's A Theory of Justice: The Original Position and Fairness

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated October 20, 202513 min read

John Rawls's account of justice as fairness in A Theory of Justice (1971), from the original position and veil of ignorance to the two principles of justice.

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Part 10 of 12Justice and Political Authority
Chapter 121Fair terms of cooperation › Choosing the Rules Before Knowing Your Place
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Choosing the Rules Before Knowing Your Place

Imagine choosing how a society will run its elections and regulate its schools, jobs, and property. You will have a place in it. But you do not know what resources your family has, where you will live, what beliefs you will hold, or what opportunities your talents will give you. You know enough about societies in general to discuss how institutions work. You cannot use knowledge about your own position to obtain rules that favor it.

In A Theory of Justice, §§2–4, John Rawls develops this idea as the original position. He wants principles by which to assess the basic structure: the way the major institutions of a society organize the rights, opportunities, and prospects of its members. Two people can act honestly within the same set of rules while those rules make it much easier for one of them to succeed. The basic structure is the subject of the inquiry because it shapes people's prospects from the start.

Rawls first published the book in 1971. He presents justice as fairness as a development of social contract reasoning. The original agreement specifies principles for the main institutions of society. It does not ask the parties to sign up to a particular government or to reconstruct a historical bargain. Its conditions are meant to limit which advantages can affect the choice. If I could count on being a large landowner, I might favor an arrangement that entrenches large landholdings even if I could offer no reasons for it that someone born without land could accept.

Justice as Fairness

The fairness in the name refers to the way Rawls sets up the choice of principles. The parties face symmetrical restrictions on what they know about themselves. Their agreement is hypothetical. Its force depends on whether those restrictions and the resulting reasoning are defensible.

What the Parties Are Allowed to Know

The Original Position

In §24 of the revised edition, Rawls says that parties lack information about their social position, natural talents, particular conception of the good, and some facts about their society. They retain general knowledge of relevant matters, including economics, social organization, and human psychology. They can ask whether a rule will produce predictable behavior under certain institutional conditions. They cannot pick that rule because they know it rewards people of their own social class.

The fictional parties are rational and mutually disinterested in the argument. That restriction need not attribute selfishness to the citizens whose interests they represent. A citizen may care deeply about a community, a profession, or a religious practice. The party must choose without knowing which commitments that citizen has. Someone who later turns out to belong to a minority religion still has a reason to choose a public rule that leaves the person free to follow it. That person's particular commitment need never enter the argument for the rule.

The Two Principles of Justice

Rawls develops the two principles through the book. The wording below follows the substance of §§11 and 46 of the 1999 revised edition. The first principle requires an equal system of basic liberties compatible with the same system for everyone. These include political liberty, freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and thought, and protections associated with the rule of law. The claim concerns a scheme of liberties; how each is defined can matter to the exercise of the others.

The second principle concerns social and economic inequalities. Offices and positions must be open under fair equality of opportunity. Inequalities must also work to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, subject to a constraint on just savings across generations. This latter requirement about inequalities is the difference principle. The priorities matter. Basic liberties have precedence over the second principle, and fair opportunity has precedence over the difference principle. A higher aggregate income cannot by itself justify an infringement of a basic liberty or a failure of fair opportunity.

The Difference Principle

Compare feasible basic structures by asking how the least advantaged fare under each. An unequal arrangement can qualify when it improves their prospects relative to the alternatives. A gain to the least advantaged compared with the status quo does not settle the comparison if another feasible arrangement would improve their prospects further.

Primary Goods

In §15, Rawls uses primary goods as a way of assessing prospects across people with different plans of life. Social primary goods include rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth. He gives a special place to the social bases of self-respect. The point is to reason about means people can generally use, without estimating how happy they are with what they receive. The perspective is that of representative positions and the expectations associated with them. It cannot be reduced to finding the individual with the lowest current income.

The Choice Under Uncertainty

In §26, Rawls relates the case for his principles to maximin. That rule compares the least favorable outcome of each option and picks the option with the best such outcome. Suppose two arrangements have very different possible effects on your prospects. If the first could leave you without means to pursue a reasonable life, while the second guarantees enough even in its least favorable case, the guarantee can matter more than whatever extra gain the first makes possible.

The rule is unusual, and Rawls gives reasons tied to the original position for taking it seriously. The parties lack a reliable basis for assigning probabilities to their possible places. They have less reason to pursue gains above an acceptable minimum when secure access to the minimum is at stake. The outcomes allowed by some alternatives would be difficult to accept. Maximin is therefore neither a general instruction to avoid risk nor the difference principle restated. The former is a way of ranking decisions under particular uncertainty. The latter is a principle for comparing institutional arrangements.

Rawls contrasts his account with utilitarianism in §§5–6 and 27–29. An aggregate calculation can in principle count losses to some people as compensated by gains to others. The parallel with deciding when to endure a loss for a later gain in one's own life is limited. Different people bear the losses and enjoy the gains. Rawls's objection about the separateness of persons concerns how those distinct claims are treated. It is consistent with the idea that a utilitarian might oppose particular injustices in practice because of their consequences.

The argument also asks what people can commit themselves to after choosing. Once the veil is lifted, some citizens will occupy the less favorable positions. The question is whether they can live with the principles, knowing what those principles allow and that others know it too. If an agreement allows fundamental interests to be sacrificed in circumstances that would be unacceptable once known, there is a problem about the commitment the parties can reasonably make. Rawls uses this issue in §29 to compare the stability of the alternatives.

Applying the Priorities

Imagine two schemes of schooling. Both let every student apply for a competitive program. One gives pupils a comparable chance to develop the needed skills across neighborhoods. The other funds preparation almost entirely through parents who can pay. An admissions office could apply the same rule to every applicant under either scheme. Rawls's fair equality of opportunity, §§12 and 14, gives us reason to look earlier. It asks whether people with comparable abilities and motivation have similar prospects across social starting points. Learning that the official rule is the same for all does not answer that question.

Now hold liberty and fair opportunity fixed and consider three simplified ways of organizing pay. In the first, both representative groups have 40 units of an index of relevant goods. In the second, the least advantaged group has 50 and the better-off group 100. In the third, the least advantaged has 45 and the better-off has 140. The first has the smallest gap. If we give the two group scores equal weight, the third has the largest sum. The second gives the least advantaged group its best result. These figures are illustrative. Real prospects are harder to compare.

The basic liberties add a further constraint. Suppose a fourth proposal would lift the lowest index to 55 by suppressing the political meetings of one group. The economic comparison cannot by itself make this arrangement acceptable. In §39, Rawls explains that the relevant restrictions on a basic liberty have to be justified in terms of liberty. Protecting the opportunities for each side to speak at a crowded meeting is different from denying one side the right to meet because doing so makes the economy easier to manage. Applying the principle requires specifying how the liberties fit together, as well as noticing when an argument appeals to an advantage of a different kind.

Testing the Argument

The person who thinks a distribution is just because it arises from legitimate exchanges starts from a different question. Robert Nozick's chapter on distributive justice in Anarchy, State, and Utopia examines whether individuals are entitled to their holdings through acquisition, transfer, or rectification. Rawls instead asks which institutional background can set the terms of property, opportunity, and cooperation. That difference is visible in the position of a child born without access to resources. A series of transactions can be voluntary between the people making them and still invite a question about the institutions determining the child's prospects. Which question ought to come first is part of the disagreement.

Michael Sandel asks a different question in the Introduction to Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. If the chooser is described apart from particular attachments, what conception of the person supports that choice? Rawls's hypothetical parties and actual citizens serve different roles in the argument. Someone might still ask whether some commitments are so important to how citizens understand their claims that an account of justice should start with them in view. This question concerns what the original position represents and whether its abstraction is well suited to the job.

A further issue follows from the scope of the basic structure itself. Rawls includes the monogamous family in his examples in §2. Family circumstances are also among the sources of unequal opportunity he discusses in §§12 and 17. Recognizing that influence leaves further choices about how to assess the division of work and power within families. A child can be affected by public schools and by the time and resources available to the people caring for them. Similar apparent provisions outside the home can work differently when household arrangements change who can make use of them.

Rawls has a method for deciding whether the claims in his account survive such comparisons. In §§4 and 9, he describes bringing considered judgments, principles, and the description of the original position into reflective equilibrium. We can revise a judgment when we find it reflected an unfair advantage. We can revise a proposed principle or the assumptions about choice when they generate conclusions we have good reasons to reject. The coherence sought is a result of testing and adjustment, open to further reconsideration.

Using the Basic Structure as a Starting Point

Consider a city facing a series of decisions about access to public jobs. The pay scales, the locations of training programs, and the cost of qualifying for them can each look reasonable when assessed separately. If the programs require years of unpaid preparation, however, those details may work together to give applicants with family resources a much better chance. The original position gives a reason to assess the arrangement for someone who could be on either side of that difference. Fair opportunity tells us what kind of prospects to examine.

The argument leaves real work to do. It does not measure the effect of a particular training program or identify the best design for every city's labor market. It says what kind of information bears on the judgment. In the job example, a change in average wages reveals little about fairness if the changes in access are unknown. And even evidence that a change helps the least advantaged does not show it is preferable to other workable options. A useful comparison has to identify both the institutions involved and the alternatives.

From Principles to Decisions

A society cannot settle every law under the restrictions used to choose the principles. Suppose legislators are deciding how to make elections accessible. They may need to know where people live, what travel is available, and which arrangements local officials can implement. Denying them every fact about their society would make it hard to meet the liberties the principles require. But letting any decision turn on whether it favors the people making it would defeat the original reason for asking about justice.

The four-stage sequence in §31 explains how the argument can use different kinds of information at different points. First the parties choose the principles in the original position. A constitutional convention then works out a constitution in light of the principles, with more facts about the society at hand. Legislators consider particular laws under the constitution and the principles of justice. Finally, officials and citizens apply the public rules to individual cases with the necessary facts available. The veil is lifted in stages because an exercise in choosing principles and a decision under an existing law call for different information.

Take the principle of equal political liberty. It can guide the design of a constitution that protects voting and participation. The legislature still has to decide how registration works and where polling will take place. Officials then have to know an individual's circumstances when they apply the relevant rules. If one voter cannot reach a polling place, the question the official needs to answer will differ from the question the constitutional convention faced. The public claim to political liberty gives those tasks a connection without giving them identical instructions.

This sequence also changes what it would mean to criticize the result. A constitution might fail to secure a liberty. A statute could be inconsistent with an otherwise adequate constitution. A well-designed law could be applied selectively. Those are different failures, and correcting one might leave the others in place. Rawls's focus on the basic structure makes room for evaluating their cumulative effect. It also gives a reason to be specific about where a particular problem starts.

One can therefore use the original position to investigate rules without imagining that every citizen must forget their life whenever they make a political choice. Its conditions specify the first-stage task. Later inquiry needs much of the knowledge that the first stage withholds. Whether the resulting institutions work fairly is a further matter for evidence and public reasoning.

Reading Rawls

Start with Chapter I of the revised edition for the basic structure, the original position, and reflective equilibrium. The 1971 excerpts provide the original opening formulations. In the revised book, §§11–17 develop the principles, §§24–29 give the major steps of the choice argument, and §§39 and 46 explain the priorities and the later formulations in the book.

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BIBTEXAcademic
@misc{brenndoerfer2025rawlss, author = {Michael Brenndoerfer}, title = {Rawls's A Theory of Justice: The Original Position and Fairness}, year = {2025}, url = {https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/rawls-theory-justice-original-position-veil-ignorance-guide}, organization = {mbrenndoerfer.com}, note = {Accessed: 2026-11-19} }
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Michael Brenndoerfer (2025). Rawls's A Theory of Justice: The Original Position and Fairness. Retrieved from https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/rawls-theory-justice-original-position-veil-ignorance-guide
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Michael Brenndoerfer. "Rawls's A Theory of Justice: The Original Position and Fairness." 2026. Web. November 19, 2026. <https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/rawls-theory-justice-original-position-veil-ignorance-guide>.
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Michael Brenndoerfer. "Rawls's A Theory of Justice: The Original Position and Fairness." Accessed November 19, 2026. https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/rawls-theory-justice-original-position-veil-ignorance-guide.
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Michael Brenndoerfer (2025) 'Rawls's A Theory of Justice: The Original Position and Fairness'. Available at: https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/rawls-theory-justice-original-position-veil-ignorance-guide (Accessed: November 19, 2026).
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Michael Brenndoerfer (2025). Rawls's A Theory of Justice: The Original Position and Fairness. https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/rawls-theory-justice-original-position-veil-ignorance-guide
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