Chalmers's The Conscious Mind: The Hard Problem of Consciousness
In The Conscious Mind (1996), David Chalmers argues that functional explanations leave open why physical processes feel like anything and proposes laws linking those processes to experience.
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The problem of conscious experience › The feeling and what a system doesFull chapter · Sections in this chapter1 / 8 ↓
The feeling and what a system does
Touch the side of a hot mug and you may pull your hand away before you have a clear idea of how hot it was. A neuroscientist could ask how signals from your hand reach the nervous system, what coordinates the movement, and how you come to remember what happened. David Chalmers asks a further question. Why does any part of that process feel the way it does? A complete account of how a person detects heat and avoids it would have answered several questions about the event. Chalmers wants to know whether that account also explains the sensation.
Chalmers called this the hard problem of consciousness in his 1995 essay “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.” His book The Conscious Mind (1996) gives a sustained case for taking the problem as a distinct explanatory task and proposes a way to pursue it. Chalmers accepts that the physical basis of an experience can be studied and that differences in the brain have consequences for what a person experiences. He disputes the idea that the full description of that basis already determines all the facts about experience without an additional principle. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” §§2–3. The Conscious Mind, introduction.
What counts as an explanation?
Consider a system that can tell ripe and unripe fruit apart. There are questions about how it detects surface color under changing illumination, how it learns to associate color with ripeness, and how it uses the association to pick a fruit. An explanation can identify the mechanisms that make those abilities possible. You could test a hypothesis about one mechanism by changing the lighting or by varying what the system has learned. The difficulty of designing those tests can be immense. Chalmers calls these problems easy because we can say what sort of explanation would answer them.
The distinction also applies to a mental state described in different ways. Psychologically, a pain can be described through its causal role in attention, avoidance, and what the person says about the injury. Phenomenally, pain is a sensation with a character of its own. The same person can be described in both ways. An account of one person's behavior after touching the mug can be true even if it says little about what distinguishes the sensation from an itch or a dull ache. Chalmers claims that even filling in the whole causal and functional account leaves the phenomenal question open. Whether it really does is the dispute. The Conscious Mind, chapters 1 and 3, especially pp. 11–16 and 106–111.
A functional explanation shows how a system performs an ability, such as distinguishing two colors or reporting something it sees. The hard problem asks why a process gives rise to experience at all and why it gives rise to that particular experience. Whether the second question would already be answered by a complete account of the relevant abilities is the point at issue.
Here is one reason to believe that a functional answer can suffice in other cases. Suppose we want to explain how a door opens when it detects an approaching person. Once we have described the sensor, the circuit that responds, and the motor, we understand how that device performs the task. A more detailed account can clarify how quickly it works or why it fails with a particular input. There is no further act of automatic opening still waiting to be explained. A physicalist can propose that consciousness fits that pattern. Chalmers thinks experience differs because it still makes sense to ask why the process feels painful or gives rise to the experience of seeing red. Chalmers, “Facing Up,” §3.
Two kinds of dependence
The pivotal idea in the book is supervenience. One set of facts supervenes on another when the first cannot vary without some variation in the second. To assess an example, ask what you would have to hold fixed. A displayed chessboard arrangement depends on which pieces occupy which squares. The same arrangement can be shown on a physical board or in software. Once every piece and its square are fixed, that displayed arrangement cannot vary. The question in the book is whether fixing all the physical facts fixes the facts about experience in a comparable way.
Chalmers distinguishes logical supervenience, holding across logically possible worlds, from natural supervenience, holding across worlds that obey the relevant laws of nature. He argues that consciousness probably supervenes naturally on the physical. On that proposal two physically identical creatures in our world would have the same experiences, because the same psychophysical laws apply to both. He also argues that the connection is not logical. The facts of physics taken by themselves leave intelligible what-ifs in which conscious experience differs. The two claims can coexist because one depends on what our laws connect and the other concerns what is entailed once the physical facts alone have been stated. The Conscious Mind, chapter 2, §§1 and 3–4, and chapter 4, §1.
That distinction matters for a research program. A reliable relationship between a neural activity and seeing red may support an account of when someone will experience a change in color. The relationship can be perfectly dependable under the laws even if the experience is not deducible from the physical description alone. Chalmers therefore treats the study of neural correlates as a way to constrain the theory. From his perspective, a law saying which physical changes go with which experiences could make a major contribution even if one could still ask why the world has that law.
What a zombie is meant to show
Chalmers asks a reader to consider a physical duplicate of a conscious person without any experiences. A duplicate would pull back its hand, learn to avoid hot mugs, and insist that the last one hurt. Its behavior matches because its physical structure and history match. The stipulation is that there is no felt pain. Chalmers extends the case to a world whose physical facts match ours in their entirety, which prevents facts outside the individual from doing the missing explanatory work. His claim is that a description of this world, though contrary to how he thinks our laws operate, is coherent. The Conscious Mind, chapter 3, §1, pp. 93–99.
What turns this into an argument about materialism? Suppose all the positive facts about the actual world were fixed simply by fixing its physical facts. A complete physical duplicate would then preserve all of them, including the presence and character of experience. A coherent counterexample would challenge that dependence. The burden is substantial. A reader's inability to find a contradiction at first glance could come from failing to understand the description. Chalmers argues that a closer examination of the physical facts leaves the phenomenal question open. A critic can grant that the story is easy to tell and challenge the judgment that every fact could be as described. The Conscious Mind, chapter 3, §1 and chapter 4, §§1–2.
There is a second issue. It looked possible before modern chemistry that the clear liquid in our lakes might turn out to have a composition other than H₂O. Once the word water is fixed to the substance we actually discovered, a counterfactual world whose lakes contain something else does not thereby contain water with different chemistry. Chalmers distinguishes assessing a scenario as though it were the actual world, which can change what a term picks out, from assessing it counterfactually once the actual referent is fixed. The example gives a physicalist a reason to wonder whether zombie conceivability just reflects a comparable difference between ways of describing the same physical state. Chalmers argues that the target phenomenal concept picks out the experienced character in a way that blocks the same reply. The modal step depends on that argument. An easy-to-picture description, taken alone, is insufficient. The Conscious Mind, chapter 2, §4 and chapter 4, §2, pp. 131–140.
A related approach asks what someone can know from the physical information. In Frank Jackson's example, discussed by Chalmers, Mary is a scientist who knows the physical facts about color vision while living without any experiences of color. She sees red after leaving her monochrome surroundings. If she could already infer every fact about experience from her knowledge, it is difficult to explain why the first exposure seems to tell her something. One response is that she acquires a new recognitional ability or a new way of encountering an old fact. Then her change can be real without showing that the facts she knew were incomplete in the relevant sense. The thought experiment is valuable because it asks each view to specify exactly what changes for Mary. The Conscious Mind, chapter 3, §1, pp. 103–106.
Naturalistic dualism and the proposal for laws
Chalmers's positive view treats experiences as fundamental features. Enough physical information can let us predict a system's actions. For a nonreductive theory, an additional set of psychophysical laws would determine which experiences accompany the physical processes. A property dualist can hold that an experiencing person is the same embodied person who moves and speaks. The dualism concerns the kinds of properties a complete account needs. For Chalmers, calling it naturalistic means that the regularities connecting physical processes and experience are part of the natural order and can be investigated. The Conscious Mind, chapter 4, §§1 and 6.
A candidate principle draws on relations between experiences. Pick a particular orange and ask whether it looks more like a nearby red or a distant green. Patterns of reported similarity could reflect a structure in what people experience. They could also reveal a structure in the information a person can use to guide comparison and action, which Chalmers calls awareness in a technical, functional sense. His proposal is that the structures tend to correspond. The comparison makes sense even if an explanation of the functional structure does not exhaust what the colors are like. It gives the theorist a way to use what people say and do while retaining an independent explanatory role for experience. The Conscious Mind, chapter 6, §§2–4.
Chalmers also asks whether information could have two aspects, physical and phenomenal. A relation among states can be physically realized in how a system responds to differences. It might also be realized in relations among experiences. The double-aspect idea approaches a fundamental law by seeking a common structure. It leaves substantial work to do. A proposal would need to specify which physical realizations are relevant and why they yield the experiences they do. An unrestricted version raises the possibility of rudimentary experiences in very simple systems. Chalmers distinguishes that possibility from the better-established parts of his own argument and leaves the issue open. The Conscious Mind, chapter 8, §§2 and 4–6.
Can a difference in hardware change the experience?
The book contains an argument for a surprisingly strong connection between experience and causal organization. The principle of organizational invariance says that two systems with the same sufficiently fine-grained functional organization would have qualitatively matching experiences, given that one does. Imagine a series of replacements in a person's nervous system. Each replacement reproduces the relevant causal interactions of the neural part it takes over. We stipulate that the changes preserve the person's ability to respond, remember, and make judgments. If different materials could remove experience while leaving the organization intact, the person on the way to that endpoint might undergo a substantial loss of sensory vividness and have no corresponding change in judgment or behavior. Chalmers calls that possibility fading qualia. The Conscious Mind, chapter 7, §§1–3.
A more pointed case puts two alternative circuits behind a switch, either of which preserves the overall organization. If the circuits yield different color experiences, flipping the switch could alternate what the person sees. The person would be unable to notice or describe the changes, since any such alteration would be a functional difference that the setup rules out. These would be dancing qualia. Chalmers takes this kind of dissociation to be deeply implausible. The argument gives a reason to doubt that a material change that preserves the relevant organization will change experience in our world. It does not show a contradiction in the idea of a zombie world with no experiences to begin with. Chalmers, “Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia,” §§3–5.
Here the details matter for a discussion of AI. If fine-grained causal organization does determine experience under our laws, a silicon system could in principle have the same experience as a biological system. A system that gives the same answers to a few questions has not thereby been shown to share the requisite organization. Chalmers goes further than a general observation about computer behavior in the book. He argues that some implemented computations would suffice for consciousness, given an account of implementation and of the class of computations in question. This is an application of the organizational claim. It gives no simple test for attributing experience to a technology on the basis of an impressive conversation. The Conscious Mind, chapter 9, §§1–3.
What causes a judgment about experience?
Imagine that a physical duplicate writes “I feel pain” just as you do. On the zombie description, its physical activity explains the writing without any pain being felt. This raises an objection directed at Chalmers's own view. If the physical facts already explain why you write those words, how does your pain matter? Taking physical causation to be closed makes the issue especially sharp. If felt qualities add no causal influence, it becomes hard to see how we know anything about them or even how our words come to concern them. The Conscious Mind, chapter 4, §4 and chapter 5, §§1–3.
Chalmers acknowledges the pressure. He considers whether conscious properties might matter causally in a way that a simple statement of the physical closure principle misses. He also argues that knowledge of a present experience may depend on a kind of acquaintance with it. What makes the judgment yours and connected to this pain can depend on your having the experience even if the bodily production of the words can be accounted for physically. The critic can still demand an explanation of the usual connection between accurate judgments and their phenomenal objects. This problem makes the book more than a defense of taking experience seriously. A theory that treats experience as fundamental still has to explain how we know about it. The Conscious Mind, chapter 5, §§4–7.
A physicalist can agree that we must explain the feeling of pain and challenge the demand for a new kind of law. They might argue that recognizing a sensation from the inside and describing its processes from the outside give us access to the same state in different ways. A successful account of that proposal would explain why the state appears to escape its own physical description. Conversely, Chalmers needs proposed laws to do more than repeat the observation that experiences follow physical changes. He wants them to constrain which changes have effects and why their patterns look the way they do. Think back to the hot mug. For either theory to become more than a label for the sensation, it must explain why that particular contact yields that particular sort of experience.
Further reading
- David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (1996). The main arguments about materialism are in chapters 2–4. Chapters 6–8 develop constraints and candidates for a positive theory.
- David J. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness” (1995). Sections 2 and 3 introduce the hard problem and the role of functional explanation.
- David J. Chalmers, “Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia” (1995). The paper presents the replacement cases and spells out the scope of their conclusions.
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