The problem of conscious experience › Naturalistic dualism and the proposal for laws

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated September 22, 20262 min read
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Part 7 of 12Mind, Self, and Experience
Chapter 86The problem of conscious experience › Naturalistic dualism and the proposal for laws
Reading section 5 of 8 · Naturalistic dualism and the proposal for laws · 2 minSection 5 of 8 · 2 min

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The problem of conscious experience › Naturalistic dualism and the proposal for lawsSection view · Sections in this chapter5 / 8 ↓

Chalmers's positive view treats experiences as fundamental features. Enough physical information can let us predict a system's actions. For a nonreductive theory, an additional set of psychophysical laws would determine which experiences accompany the physical processes. A property dualist can hold that an experiencing person is the same embodied person who moves and speaks. The dualism concerns the kinds of properties a complete account needs. For Chalmers, calling it naturalistic means that the regularities connecting physical processes and experience are part of the natural order and can be investigated. The Conscious Mind, chapter 4, §§1 and 6.

A candidate principle draws on relations between experiences. Pick a particular orange and ask whether it looks more like a nearby red or a distant green. Patterns of reported similarity could reflect a structure in what people experience. They could also reveal a structure in the information a person can use to guide comparison and action, which Chalmers calls awareness in a technical, functional sense. His proposal is that the structures tend to correspond. The comparison makes sense even if an explanation of the functional structure does not exhaust what the colors are like. It gives the theorist a way to use what people say and do while retaining an independent explanatory role for experience. The Conscious Mind, chapter 6, §§2–4.

Chalmers also asks whether information could have two aspects, physical and phenomenal. A relation among states can be physically realized in how a system responds to differences. It might also be realized in relations among experiences. The double-aspect idea approaches a fundamental law by seeking a common structure. It leaves substantial work to do. A proposal would need to specify which physical realizations are relevant and why they yield the experiences they do. An unrestricted version raises the possibility of rudimentary experiences in very simple systems. Chalmers distinguishes that possibility from the better-established parts of his own argument and leaves the issue open. The Conscious Mind, chapter 8, §§2 and 4–6.

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