The problem of conscious experience › What a zombie is meant to show
PhilosophyAll chapters Reading tools Notes & comments
The problem of conscious experience › What a zombie is meant to showSection view · Sections in this chapter4 / 8 ↓
Chalmers asks a reader to consider a physical duplicate of a conscious person without any experiences. A duplicate would pull back its hand, learn to avoid hot mugs, and insist that the last one hurt. Its behavior matches because its physical structure and history match. The stipulation is that there is no felt pain. Chalmers extends the case to a world whose physical facts match ours in their entirety, which prevents facts outside the individual from doing the missing explanatory work. His claim is that a description of this world, though contrary to how he thinks our laws operate, is coherent. The Conscious Mind, chapter 3, §1, pp. 93–99.
What turns this into an argument about materialism? Suppose all the positive facts about the actual world were fixed simply by fixing its physical facts. A complete physical duplicate would then preserve all of them, including the presence and character of experience. A coherent counterexample would challenge that dependence. The burden is substantial. A reader's inability to find a contradiction at first glance could come from failing to understand the description. Chalmers argues that a closer examination of the physical facts leaves the phenomenal question open. A critic can grant that the story is easy to tell and challenge the judgment that every fact could be as described. The Conscious Mind, chapter 3, §1 and chapter 4, §§1–2.
There is a second issue. It looked possible before modern chemistry that the clear liquid in our lakes might turn out to have a composition other than H₂O. Once the word water is fixed to the substance we actually discovered, a counterfactual world whose lakes contain something else does not thereby contain water with different chemistry. Chalmers distinguishes assessing a scenario as though it were the actual world, which can change what a term picks out, from assessing it counterfactually once the actual referent is fixed. The example gives a physicalist a reason to wonder whether zombie conceivability just reflects a comparable difference between ways of describing the same physical state. Chalmers argues that the target phenomenal concept picks out the experienced character in a way that blocks the same reply. The modal step depends on that argument. An easy-to-picture description, taken alone, is insufficient. The Conscious Mind, chapter 2, §4 and chapter 4, §2, pp. 131–140.
A related approach asks what someone can know from the physical information. In Frank Jackson's example, discussed by Chalmers, Mary is a scientist who knows the physical facts about color vision while living without any experiences of color. She sees red after leaving her monochrome surroundings. If she could already infer every fact about experience from her knowledge, it is difficult to explain why the first exposure seems to tell her something. One response is that she acquires a new recognitional ability or a new way of encountering an old fact. Then her change can be real without showing that the facts she knew were incomplete in the relevant sense. The thought experiment is valuable because it asks each view to specify exactly what changes for Mary. The Conscious Mind, chapter 3, §1, pp. 103–106.
Comments
Add to the conversation
A question, a correction, or an example from your own work.
No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!