Gadamer's Truth and Method: Philosophical Hermeneutics

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated June 15, 202614 min read

Hans-Georg Gadamer's 1960 study of understanding across history, from the role of prejudice to the fusion of horizons and the interpretation of law.

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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 107Understanding within a tradition › The Expectations We Bring to a Text
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The Expectations We Bring to a Text

Imagine reading a poem whose metaphors belong to a world you have never inhabited. You understand the first few lines well enough to think you know what kind of poem it is. Halfway through, a phrase that was easy to pass over starts to bother you. You go back. A word you had taken for a compliment may have been a rebuke, and the opening now sounds different. The later line changes the sense of the earlier one, even though the words on the page have stayed put.

Gadamer would recognize this as the work of understanding. We need an expectation about the whole before some details can make sense. Reading can then make us revise that expectation. A first reading is open to correction because it makes a specific proposal about what the lines are saying. If we only collect words, we never discover that a word might be a rebuke. If we force the poem to fit a settled idea, we never discover that we mistook the tone. The possibility of bringing a wrong expectation to the poem belongs to the same process that allows a better one to emerge. Truth and Method, pp. 266–69

This is the problem Hans-Georg Gadamer takes up in Truth and Method, first published in German in 1960. Part I asks about truth in the experience of art. Part II extends the question to historical understanding and the human sciences, and Part III takes up language. The problem of interpretation runs through all three. Gadamer wants to understand what enables us to recognize a claim made by something we did not create and whose significance we cannot settle in advance. Truth and Method, introduction, table of contents · Publication history

How an Expectation Changes

Start with the relation between the parts of a text and the whole. It is possible to understand a sentence only by guessing at its role in a larger passage. It is also possible to have a view of the passage only through the sentences that make it up. The two tasks continually inform each other. In his account of Heidegger, Gadamer draws on the idea that this movement belongs to the structure of understanding. A reader does not begin at a point free of interpretation and add interpretation later. The work is already under way as soon as the first sentence begins to make sense. Truth and Method, pp. 266–69, 293

Consider a short note from a family archive. Its writer tells somebody to come home when the river falls. You might take it as advice about when it will be safe to travel. A second letter mentions a dispute over a crossing that had become impassable to people without a permit. The weather was relevant, but so was the rule about the crossing. A reading of the first note may now require information about which routes the writer and recipient could use. Phrases that looked like background details become relevant because you have a more specific idea of what the note was doing.

Gadamer calls the initial expectation a fore-projection. The correction it undergoes can come from the materials being interpreted. In the letter example, the crossing records might defeat an ingenious guess about the writer's motives. The very possibility of such a correction shows that the reader's expectations work alongside demands made by the subject matter. Gadamer gives historical linguistic usage as one way to test a projection. It can matter that a word was used differently when the letter was written. Establishing that usage is real work, and its results limit a plausible interpretation. Truth and Method, pp. 267–69

The hermeneutic circle

A preliminary understanding of the whole lets the interpreter make sense of its parts. What the parts show can then change the understanding of the whole. This movement allows a reader to test an initial interpretation against what emerges from closer attention. Truth and Method, pp. 266–69, 293

Prejudice and Tradition

Gadamer uses prejudice in a broad sense. It is a prior judgment, which in a particular case may help us see something or cause us to miss it. A reader expecting praise sees the positive use of a word first. A reader familiar with the writer's irony may hear a rebuke immediately. The second prior judgment may guide better attention, but someone still has to investigate whether the irony fits this particular line. The general fact that both readers begin with expectations leaves a practical question about which expectation survives the encounter. Truth and Method, pp. 268–70, 276–77

In Gadamer's account, the Enlightenment's general suspicion of prejudice obscures the standing of this earlier work. We acquire words, questions, and habits of judgment through practices that existed before we joined them. Those inheritances make many of our judgments possible. They can also make a questionable assumption feel as obvious as the meaning of an ordinary word. Gadamer's purpose in rehabilitating prejudice is to make that double possibility visible. His argument gives a reader a reason to inquire into particular inherited assumptions, including the ones that make a first reading feel effortless. Truth and Method, pp. 269–83

Tradition matters to historical inquiry in a more specific way. The family letter was preserved and given a place among other papers. Someone catalogued it and chose which material counted as related. Later readers may have known it through an edition that grouped it with letters about floods. That history helps explain which questions occur to the reader in the first place. Gadamer calls attention to such effects of history, including the way an interpreter's own situation belongs to an ongoing history. Knowing how that situation was formed helps bring some of its assumptions into view. It leaves the reader situated within the very history being studied. Truth and Method, pp. 282–85, 299–302

This also explains why recognition and obedience are distinct questions about authority. Say an editor corrects your reading by showing a regional use of the word in three other letters. There is a reason to defer to what the editor knows. Another editor might appeal to a traditional reading without showing how it fits any of the disputed passages. The status of that reading gives you a reason to learn how it became established. Whether it is adequate to what the writer says is still a question. Gadamer allows that acknowledged authority can rest on someone's better judgment or insight. The example leaves room to ask whether the acknowledgment has been earned in this case. Truth and Method, Part II, “The Rehabilitation of Authority and Tradition”

What a Horizon Lets You See

A horizon is the range of things that can be seen from a particular standpoint. The image carries two ideas together. There are limits to what someone can see where they are. Moving can change those limits. For Gadamer, understanding a historical text involves learning to take seriously the questions and possibilities visible from a situation different from ours. It also requires recognizing a connection between that situation and the present in which we are asking about it. Historical distance can make the connection easier to notice, in part because familiar assumptions sometimes look different when another way of framing a problem has come into view. Truth and Method, pp. 297–98, 302–07

A present-day reader of the letters may begin with the assumption that river crossings are public infrastructure. Learning who needed permission to cross alters the sense of why this crossing mattered. It also gives the reader a question to bring back to the present. Which conventions about access still disappear behind a seemingly straightforward description of getting home? The past can become more intelligible through that route, while the initial way of describing the present has changed. There is no need to imagine the writer and the reader occupying separate worlds prior to the exchange. The letters, the language, and the history in which they have been preserved already connect them in particular ways. Truth and Method, pp. 302–07

Gadamer calls this movement a fusion of horizons. The two horizons are starting points that can be distinguished for the purposes of interpretation. Treating them as sealed worlds misses how they come into relation. The movement can change the interpreter's question while making a difference in the past more sharply visible. A reader who now hears the danger in the letter need not pretend to feel what its recipient felt. Their understanding includes the recognition that something in the situation was unfamiliar and continues to require explanation. Truth and Method, pp. 304–07

Understanding a Question

A sentence can serve as an answer to different questions. “We will wait for the river to fall” might answer when a family will travel or what they will do if the crossing is barred. To distinguish those possibilities, it helps to ask what was open for decision when the sentence was written. The same words can narrow the alternatives in different ways. One reading puts the departure date at issue. The other puts the choice of route at issue. The evidence in the rest of the letter may favor one over the other, or show that the questions were intertwined.

Gadamer treats the relation between question and answer as a feature of understanding. The reader needs to work back from what was said to the question for which it makes sense as an answer. The reconstructed question can in turn put something about the reader's own point of departure at issue. In the example, discovering a restriction at the crossing may show that the reader's original question about travel conditions was too narrow. Asking a better historical question and reading the note differently are two sides of that change. Truth and Method, Part II, “The Logic of Question and Answer”

Understanding a question also leaves open whether a text answered it well. A writer might have understood a crossing rule and still given bad advice about when to travel. A reader can recognize the problem and think the answer mistaken. Gadamer's emphasis on dialogue becomes specific here. Something said in the past can make a claim on our judgment because we can take seriously both the question and the possibility of answers different from the one we find. Agreement about what is under discussion gives a disagreement about the answer a definite subject. Truth and Method, Part II, “The Hermeneutic Priority of the Question” and “The Logic of Question and Answer”

What It Means to Apply What You Understand

Imagine that a town rule bans vehicles from a public garden. A court has to decide how that rule bears on a motorized wheelchair. Establishing how the word was used when the rule was made matters, as do other laws that apply to the town. Still, the interpretive task involves seeing which features of this case are relevant. It matters whether the point of the rule was to manage noise, protect a path from damage, or separate ordinary road traffic from a place where people walk. What the rule covers and how one describes the case can become clearer in relation to each other.

Gadamer uses legal interpretation to make application visible. The judge has the practical responsibility of deciding a case. A historian has a different job and still brings present questions to the effort to understand a law. In both settings, Gadamer says, application belongs to the act of understanding. What a general requirement amounts to can become visible in seeing what it asks of a concrete situation. This is an account of understanding, not a rule for deciding the wheelchair example. The legally controlling answer depends on facts and obligations that the example leaves open. Truth and Method, foreword to the second edition and Part II, “The Exemplary Significance of Legal Hermeneutics”

One can see the stakes by trying to explain the rule in ordinary words to a person approaching the garden. Suppose you paraphrase it as forbidding anything with wheels. A parent with a stroller may then ask what counts as a vehicle, a question that was concealed by the paraphrase. The need to answer shows what your choice of words committed you to. Returning to the original language may make you distinguish a broad feature shared by several cases from the feature that appears to govern the rule. The exchange brings part of the work of interpretation out into the open.

What Methods Can Establish

The book's opening interest in art points to a different example. Two performances of the same play can bring different features of it into view. A pause in one performance can let a scene sound hesitant where another makes it sound decisive. The work has a history and a degree of identity across these presentations. A performance also matters to what the audience can recognize in the work. Gadamer's discussion of play and presentation makes sense of why both thoughts can hold together. An account of a play that reported the words and movement onstage could still leave open what the timing made evident to its audience. Truth and Method, Part I, “Play as the Clue to Ontological Explanation” and “The Temporality of the Aesthetic”

Historical and critical methods can discipline a reading. The publication history can establish which version of a play was staged. An archive can establish when a restriction at a crossing took effect. Facts such as these change what interpretations can reasonably claim. They do not on their own decide what question someone was answering or which feature of a scene was brought into relief. Much of Gadamer's argument concerns the work that remains once such findings have been made. It would make little sense to throw away the archive on the ground that a date can never interpret a letter by itself. Truth and Method, introduction · pp. 282–85, 295

A harder question concerns inherited accounts that leave things outside the conversation. If most of the surviving family papers came from the people who controlled the crossing, a careful reading could still inherit their sense of whose journeys mattered. A second archive or a record preserved for a different purpose might bring other travelers into view. Gadamer's account helps explain how the first archive came to structure the questions. The case also asks something further of the historian. They must look for the conditions that allowed some people's versions of events to be preserved and others to go missing. What a reading can learn from the available record depends on being alert to how that record was made.

In the first poem, returning to a phrase turned an easy reading into a question. The poem was available to be reread because the words stayed in place. The reader could test a new hearing against those words and against what they learned of their use. That is one small case of the historical understanding Gadamer is trying to describe. It shows how a reader can bring inherited expectations to something, find them wanting in a particular respect, and come away better able to say what made the change necessary. Truth and Method, pp. 266–69, 296–98

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@misc{brenndoerfer2026gadamers, author = {Michael Brenndoerfer}, title = {Gadamer's Truth and Method: Philosophical Hermeneutics}, year = {2026}, url = {https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/gadamer-truth-method-hermeneutics-understanding-guide}, organization = {mbrenndoerfer.com}, note = {Accessed: 2026-11-19} }
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