Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism: Understanding Political Evil
Hannah Arendt's 1951 essential work for understanding twentieth-century political catastrophe as a novel form of evil, analyzing antisemitism, imperialism, and totalitarian movements.
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Understanding totalitarian domination › When Being Human Gives Someone Nowhere to AppealFull chapter · Sections in this chapter1 / 7 ↓
When Being Human Gives Someone Nowhere to Appeal
Suppose a person arrives at a border after losing the protection of their former government. They can say which rights they ought to have and produce witnesses who know what happened. Still, officials in each place can treat the facts as somebody else's responsibility. The problem becomes visible when the person tries to make a claim and no authority accepts that they have standing to press it. Arendt puts that predicament at the center of a chapter on statelessness in The Origins of Totalitarianism. Her question concerns the conditions under which a person can live somewhere, be heard and make a claim that others have to answer. Origins, Part Two, chapter IX
That chapter belongs to a book first published in 1951 whose three parts examine antisemitism, imperialism and totalitarianism. Arendt investigates how people could come to lose a place in a common world, then examines movements and governments that organize and intensify such losses. The three-part form allows different threads to come into view. The history of political antisemitism, rule by imperial bureaucracy and the condition of stateless people each requires its own account. A reader should ask at each transition what elements a totalitarian movement could use and what still has to happen for such a movement to form.
The book also changes across editions. The text linked here contains later prefaces as well as the concluding chapter “Ideology and Terror.” That chapter is a good guide to Arendt's distinction between a government that rules through fear and her more demanding concept of total domination. Its account of how people lose contact with a shared world also gives us a way to return to the border example. It is worth keeping the problems distinct. A person can lose the protection of a state under conditions that fall short of totalitarian government. Arendt investigates the larger significance of a world in which this deprivation can occur. Origins, table of contents and prefaces
Antisemitism and Imperialism as Political Problems
In the first part Arendt distinguishes modern political antisemitism from the history of religious hostility toward Jews. She examines the position of Jews in European nation-states alongside episodes in which a political movement could treat Jews as the explanation for conflicts they had not created. Her treatment of the Dreyfus affair follows struggles in and around the French army, the press, the courts and public politics. A political account needs to say how the accusation worked and who gave it consequence. The existence of prejudice can help explain why an accusation finds an audience. We still need to ask how people gain the means to turn that accusation into an organizing principle. Origins, Part One, chapters I–II and IV
The distinction does not make hostility less serious. It identifies a different question about what political institutions can do with it. Consider an official inquiry that is formally open to evidence but treats the accused person's ancestry as grounds for discounting any defense. Other participants may challenge the prejudicial inference, appeal to safeguards of the institution or try to expose misconduct. Whether such responses are possible depends on whether people can put evidence into circulation and be heard in a setting that retains some independence. Arendt's later inquiry into total domination takes such possibilities seriously because a regime can attack them systematically.
In the second part, Arendt examines expansion pursued as a principle of imperial politics, then discusses forms of rule organized around race and bureaucracy. These chapters describe ways of governing people while withholding equal membership in the political community whose officials make the decisions. The subject of a bureaucratic decree can face great coercive power without having access to the forms of public contest available to some members of the ruling nation. Arendt connects this separation to the history of empire. To make sense of the connection, distinguish the interest in continuing expansion from the apparatus used to govern people subjected to it. Origins, Part Two, chapters V and VII
The connection invites a further historical question. Different colonial settings had different institutions and ways of organizing resistance, and the fact that a later regime used elements familiar from an empire leaves work to do. Which practices continued? Where were ideas or methods changed when they were taken up in Europe? The reader can ask for specific links rather than treating a similarity as proof of a necessary sequence. This is also a way to identify a limit of Arendt's comparison. Her account of elements that can combine will need particular histories to establish how they did.
A Place Where a Person Can Have Rights
In chapter IX the stateless person confronts a difficulty deeper than the denial of one liberty. If a court can hear a claim, then a particular restriction can be challenged there. Someone who lacks an effective political and legal status may be unable to find an institution under any comparable obligation. In these circumstances they can lose the setting in which an injury becomes actionable and speech can produce a response. Arendt describes what is lost here as “the right to have rights.” Origins, Part Two, chapter IX, “The Perplexities of the Rights of Man”
Return to the border. One official could let the person in and provide temporary shelter. That would matter greatly. A question about standing remains if the same official or a successor can withdraw permission without hearing any argument. Now imagine that the person can contest a decision and compel an answer through some recognized process. They have a different position even if they lose the particular case. The example distinguishes whether a request is granted on one occasion from whether the person belongs to a setting in which they can make claims as a matter of right.
Arendt's distinction raises a problem for an appeal to rights held by a person simply as a human being. Their moral force does not automatically create the institutions that will recognize them. The practical question is what political arrangements could supply a dependable place to make a claim. One might defend universal rights by arguing for institutions that take responsibility when states withdraw protection. The reply has to say which authority is obliged to act and how the people affected can make that obligation effective. Arendt's problem persists as long as a person can fall between the authorities meant to provide protection.
Ask what happens when a person disputes an order. If someone can hear the objection as a claim that requires an answer, the person already has a form of standing. In Arendt's chapter on statelessness, part of the injury is the loss of a setting in which a claim can count in this way.
From a Movement to a System of Rule
The third part examines how a movement can create a world for its supporters before and after taking power. Arendt describes propaganda as doing more than persuading people of particular falsehoods. A movement can make its claims seem consistent with members' everyday experience by organizing their surroundings accordingly. It can distribute positions and authority on the assumption that a doctrine is true. Members can then encounter roles and apparent confirmation that the organization itself has produced. Arendt treats that connection between propaganda and organization as important to how a movement gains and maintains loyalty. Origins, Part Three, chapter XI
For instance, imagine an organization that identifies an allegedly disloyal group in advance. Its records include every incident in which a member of the group drew official attention. Similar conduct by other people goes unrecorded. Looking at those records could seem to confirm the original classification. If officials begin to intervene solely on the basis of the classification, those interventions can fill the records with new entries. The example is ours. It shows what additional work organization does in Arendt's description. The claim becomes built into what people can reliably see when they consult the organization's records.
Once such a movement takes power, the relationship of propaganda to violence changes. Arendt asks what happens when rulers can reorganize institutions and remove much of the public space in which contrary experiences might be shared. In the chapter on totalitarian government she distinguishes the visible state from party power and discusses the role of the secret police. Shifting responsibility between offices can make it difficult to know who can decide a case or challenge an order. The uncertainty can itself increase dependence on the movement. The book analyzes this mutability of power and authority as part of government, alongside the pursuit and punishment of people selected as enemies. Origins, Part Three, chapter XII
A familiar authoritarian ruler may use violence to frighten people out of opposition. Arendt's account extends beyond that purpose. A category such as the objective enemy can make someone a target regardless of what they have done or intended. When the governing doctrine determines the target in advance, actual compliance and proof of personal innocence offer little defense. A comparison with a government seeking to repress identifiable opponents makes the distinction clearer. The latter can have a recognizable stopping point once resistance is suppressed. Arendt asks why the movement's terror can continue and find new targets after organized resistance has been crushed. Origins, Part Three, chapter XII, “The Secret Police”
Ideology, Terror and the Destruction of Initiative
In “Ideology and Terror,” Arendt links ideology to an attempt to deduce what happens from a single premise about a supposed law of nature or history. Events then appear as consequences of that premise. An unexpected event need have little force as an objection, because the ideology gives the movement a way to redescribe it so that it belongs in the same explanation. The movement can claim, for instance, that contrary testimony shows how skillfully its enemies hide. The pattern reduces the independence of experience by supplying in advance what an apparent counterexample has to mean. Origins, Part Three, chapter XIII
Terror gives that account institutional consequences. People can be treated as carriers of processes that the rulers take themselves to be enforcing. If the citizen's action has no bearing on whether they fall under a category that the regime has already determined to eliminate, it becomes difficult to change one's situation by appeal, explanation or cooperation with others. Arendt studies the camps as sites where domination attacks legal standing, the ability to make morally meaningful choices and the capacity to act spontaneously. The chapter is about what such a system seeks to do to people. The analysis leaves room to notice the actual variations and acts of resistance that a historical account would have to address. Origins, Part Three, chapters XII–XIII
That discussion identifies several disabilities which can come apart. First a person can be placed beyond the ordinary reach of a legal remedy. A second injury concerns the possibility of an action with a recognizable moral meaning. The regime can destroy the settings in which someone could bear witness or can present a prisoner with choices in which the people they protect are made to pay for the decision. Arendt then asks what happens to individuality and the ability to begin something. She distinguishes these targets so that a description of injury can go beyond naming the infliction of pain. The historical examples are extreme. They give her a way to specify the sort of domination her concept is supposed to pick out. Origins, Part Three, chapter XII, “Total Domination”
Arendt also separates political isolation from loneliness. Someone can be isolated because they cannot act with others and still keep certain relationships and a dependable sense of the world in private life. Loneliness, in the stronger sense she examines, concerns losing a reliable relation to others and to the world in which one's experiences could be tested. It also differs from solitude, in which a person can be alone and continue to think and return to others. These distinctions help explain why the destruction of independent associations and the fabrication of a coherent world can matter together. A movement can present its account as the one dependable orientation to people whose other points of reference have become precarious.
Suppose two neighbors each see a fact that counts against an official explanation. So long as they can talk freely and compare what they observed, each has a way to test whether they misunderstood an event. If discussion is dangerous and accessible records have been remade to fit the explanation, the exercise becomes harder. This example does not require assuming that belief is entirely dictated by institutions. It shows a concrete way in which independent judgment can depend on the conditions for sharing experience. The book asks us to understand how those conditions can be removed.
How Far the Category Should Travel
Arendt treats Nazi Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union as central cases for her comparison. They remain different histories, involving different institutions, targets and crimes. A good use of her category begins with an exact proposed resemblance and then asks how far it goes. Does a policy punish decisions people actually made or select people in advance by membership? Can an institution test the doctrine against public evidence? Where can people form an association beyond the movement? A close comparison can identify how a given device works and where its role differs across cases. It gives us more to work with than placing different regimes under a single name.
An inaccurate comparison can also make us misdescribe institutions that still have some capacity to resist. Consider an administrative office that follows a false classification, yet publishes the rules it uses and answers written appeals. We can identify a serious injury even while tracing the avenues by which the rules could be exposed and changed. If another office uses a classification in secret and transfers complainants away from any recognizable jurisdiction, a different part of Arendt’s analysis becomes relevant. The political distinctions depend on what the institutions let people do in the face of a decision. Naming a similarity to one measure can be a beginning of a comparison. The inquiry still has to account for how that measure works with the institutions surrounding it.
The book's argument about membership can also be considered on its own. Start with the point at which a person loses the ability to make a claim that others must answer. Trace how that loss changes what the person can do with others and whose judgment they can appeal to. Those questions clarify the stakes of Arendt's contrast between an official power to decide and a political world in which different people can appear and give reasons. They also make it possible to read the part on statelessness alongside the part on totalitarian government without treating the first situation as sufficient for the second.
Further Reading
- Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Part Two, chapter IX. Read “The Perplexities of the Rights of Man” alongside the preceding discussion of minorities and stateless people.
- Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Part Three, chapters XI–XIII. Follow the treatment of propaganda and organization before taking up the secret police, total domination and the relation between ideology and terror.
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