Ockham's Philosophical Writings: Nominalism and Parsimony
William of Ockham's presentation of nominalism and the principle of parsimony ('Ockham's Razor') that shaped late medieval and modern philosophy.
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One Term for Many Things
The same word can be true of Socrates and Plato. When we call each of them human, what makes the word apply to both? One answer is that they share a single thing, humanity, over and above the two people. William of Ockham offers a different account. A concept can be a single act or sign in a particular mind and still stand for many people. To decide whether this accounts for general language, we need to look at what terms do in actual propositions. Summa Logicae, I.12, I.14
This chapter takes its starting point from the logic and knowledge selections represented in Philosophical Writings, an English anthology translated and edited by Philotheus Boehner and revised by Stephen F. Brown. The anthology brings together excerpts from several works. The examples here come principally from Ockham's Summa Logicae, where he distinguishes the work performed by a sign from the kind of thing that sign is. That distinction gives us a concrete setting in which to study what later readers call Ockham's razor. Philosophical Writings, publisher's contents
How a Sign Can Be Singular and Universal
We use singular in more than one way. It can mean one thing rather than several. If I write the word human once on a scrap of paper, there is one inscription. Its application is not limited to one person. The inscription can be a sign of many individuals. To describe its breadth of application is to say something about what it signifies, apart from how many signs are present on the paper. Ockham applies the same distinction to what occurs in a mind. A mental sign is numerically one, yet it is universal in so far as it is suited to stand for and be predicated of many. Summa Logicae, I.14
Ockham also considers a narrower use of singular. In that use, a singular sign is both numerically one and not suited to signify many. A general concept is singular in the first sense and fails the additional condition in the second. The apparent paradox therefore comes from using the same word for two tests. Count the sign and you get one. Ask what it can stand for and the answer can be many. Summa Logicae, I.14
A universal is a sign that can be predicated of many. Being a universal in this sense does not require being a substance shared by the things the sign is true of. A general concept can itself belong to one mind. Summa Logicae, I.14–15
Written, spoken, and mental terms fit into this account in different ways. We learn what spoken and written terms signify through a convention. The same animals can be called dogs in English and chiens in French. Nothing about the animals requires those particular sounds or marks. Ockham says that mental terms signify naturally. Assigning an utterance to signify what a concept signifies does not ordinarily make the utterance a name for the concept. The person who says a dog is barking is usually talking about the animal. Ockham therefore distinguishes the source of the utterance's meaning from the object to which that meaning directs us. Summa Logicae, I.1
A natural sign, on this account, is not freely reassigned by convention in the manner of a word. In chapter 14 Ockham compares it to the way smoke indicates a fire. The comparison is about the nonconventional relation, not a claim that understanding a kind of thing is exactly the same process as detecting a fire. It does not give an account of how many instances a learner would need to encounter before forming a particular general concept. Summa Logicae, I.14
What a Term Stands For Here
Suppose you encounter a sentence about sheep. Are you reading about animals, a concept, or a word on a page? Something depends on its predicate. In the sentence “Every sheep is an animal,” sheep is being used for the animals the term signifies. In “‘Sheep’ has five letters,” the sentence is about a written word. Counting the letters would be beside the point in the first sentence and the right thing to do in the second. Ockham calls the standing-for relation a term has in a proposition supposition. Its role can vary with the proposition, even when its usual signification stays the same. His own examples use terms for a human being. Summa Logicae, I.63–64
There is a third case, illustrated by Ockham with a sentence saying that human being is a species. In that context the term stands for a concept. An individual person is an animal. A concept under which many people are considered can be a species in the logical classification. An inscription can have letters. Asking whether a species weighs as much as an individual person mixes the roles. The three uses are called personal, simple, and material supposition, in the order of the animals, the concept, and the writing in these examples. Personal supposition is not restricted to people, or even to things outside the mind. It applies when the term stands for what it signifies and is being used significatively. Summa Logicae, I.64
Ask what the predicate is being applied to. Could you point to an animal to show what the first sentence concerns? Would pointing to the animal establish the number of letters? The exercise separates the thing picked out by a term in a particular sentence from the physical mark that is part of the sentence.
This matters because a grammatical subject is easily mistaken for the name of a special object. If a discussion alternates between a person, a concept, and a word, it can seem as though a fourth thing must be involved, something those uses have in common. Ockham's account gives us a reason to identify the role before making that inference. Showing which use is involved explains why ordinary sentences about people can be true without treating the general term as the name of a common substance. It does not by itself show that there could be no other reason to posit common natures. Summa Logicae, I.63–64
The distinction also helps with Ockham's talk of first and second intentions. In a narrow sense a first intention is a mental name fitted to stand for what it signifies. Ockham's example is the concept applicable to every individual human. A second intention is exemplified by species or genus, which can be said of those first-order concepts. In effect, we can ask how a concept applies to people, or ask how the concept itself should be classified. Treating a second intention as if it answered the first question would give the wrong object of inquiry. Summa Logicae, I.12
Consider a second exercise. Someone says first that every sheep is an animal and then that sheep is a species. Place the two statements side by side and see what happens to the term sheep when you change the predicate. In the first statement, the term is used for individual animals. To make sense of the second with simple supposition, take the term to stand for the concept, and understand species as a classification of that concept. It would make little sense to infer that the animal you can see in the field is itself a species. The shift in what the term stands for prevents exactly that transfer. This illustrates the logical use of species here and does not settle how a present-day biologist should classify a population. Summa Logicae, I.12, 64
What Would a Shared Substance Explain?
In chapter 15 Ockham takes aim at the idea that a universal is a substance outside the mind. Consider a proposal on which one numerically identical nature is present as an essential part of several people. Ockham asks what would happen if God annihilated just one of them. If annihilating the person destroyed everything essential to that person, it would also destroy the nature that was supposed to be present in the others. The theory would forbid the annihilation of one individual without destroying the rest. Ockham takes that consequence to be unacceptable. Summa Logicae, I.15
The argument has important conditions. It concerns a nature that is one and the same across the individuals and counts as part of each one's essence. It also assumes that the annihilation of an individual would remove that individual's essential constituents. A critic could devise an account of commonality that rejects those conditions. Two animals might be structurally similar without one identical constituent being literally present in both. The result is a focused challenge to a particular explanation of commonality, and Ockham has other arguments in the same chapter. It is a mistake to use the example as an immediate refutation of every doctrine a later writer might call realism. Summa Logicae, I.15
Notice the relation between this argument and the account of terms. The argument points to a difficulty for a rival view of what exists. The account of terms shows how general predication can work without a shared substance. Either line of reasoning could be criticized independently. If a realist answers the annihilation argument, Ockham's explanation of general terms still deserves examination. If nominalist semantics works, the realist can still ask whether common natures are needed to explain something else, such as what makes some similarities more important than others.
The Razor in Use
A useful place to see Ockham's parsimony at work is his discussion of what a mental sign itself might be. He reports several proposals. The mind might construct an object distinct from its own act of understanding. The sign might be a quality in the mind distinct from that act. Or the act of understanding itself might do the work of a sign. For the last proposal he gives an argument from economy. If an act of understanding can both signify and stand for something, those functions do not require us to add a second item to the account. He leaves detailed examination of the alternatives for later. Summa Logicae, I.12
Before adding a further entity to an explanation, ask whether it does work the existing explanation cannot do. Ockham's example concerns the account of signification and supposition in mental discourse. Counting fewer entities is useful only after we specify what the account has to explain. Summa Logicae, I.12
Here is how the reasoning can fail. Suppose the additional mental object is meant to explain something beyond the ability to stand for a thing in a proposition. If the rival has a real case that the act alone cannot do that further work, then the two proposals are no longer equal with respect to what needs explaining. The appeal to parsimony cannot settle that disagreement. The crucial premise is the claim that the act can fulfil the relevant functions, and the opponent can ask what establishes it. Conversely, simply assigning the added object a label does not establish that it has a distinct role.
Ockham is often associated with a slogan about multiplying entities beyond necessity. Reading the argument in chapter 12 gives us a more useful exercise than memorizing a formula. Identify the act, identify the proposed addition, then write down the work the addition was supposed to perform. Only then ask whether the act itself could perform it. In this example there are two jobs to check, signifying something and being able to stand for it in the logical context at issue. If the candidate account leaves one job undone, the reason to cut the additional object has yet to be secured. Summa Logicae, I.12
Knowing That Something Is There
Ockham also distinguishes two ways of apprehending something. A shepherd could grasp what a sheep is while thinking about one on a hillside miles away. The fact that she can form the thought does not allow her to judge evidently whether there is a sheep on that hillside now. When she sees and recognizes a sheep nearby under ordinary conditions, her cognition can give her grounds to judge contingent facts about it, such as that it is present or stands near another animal. The difference concerns what judgments the cognition can ground. Ordinatio, I, prologue, q. 1, OTh I, pp. 31–32, translated excerpt
In the Ordinatio Ockham distinguishes intuitive cognition, by virtue of which one can know whether something exists and know contingent facts about it, from abstractive cognition, which does not give this kind of evident judgment about existence or nonexistence. Abstractive cognition here should not be reduced to forming a general idea by grouping several similar things. A person can think about a particular absent sheep without settling whether it currently exists. In the passage Ockham also distinguishes cognitions of things from the judgments those cognitions make possible. Seeing a thing's position relative to something else can ground a proposition about that relation. There is a difference between the apprehensions and the proposition for which they provide grounds. Ordinatio, I, prologue, q. 1, OTh I, pp. 31–32, translated excerpt
We can test the distinction by holding what is being thought about fixed. Suppose the shepherd thinks about one particular sheep while she is in the barn. Later she encounters the same sheep in a field and can judge where it is standing. The animal itself may be the same across the examples, and her ability to think about it does not depend on having a thing called sheephood in front of her. What changes is the basis for a particular judgment. The first situation allows her to think about the animal. The second, given ordinary conditions and adequate perception, supplies a ground for knowing a contingent fact about it.
What the Explanation Has to Earn
Ockham makes two distinctions that help a reader assess his economy. First, a general sign can stand for several things while itself being one. That gives him a way to explain general predication without a substance that exists in several different individuals. Second, an act of understanding can be assessed by the work it does as a sign. Before positing another mental item, we should identify the work that item alone could do. These are separate arguments even though they illustrate the same habit of asking what is doing the explanatory work. Summa Logicae, I.12, I.14–15
A question about why a term applies to an individual should leave us room to learn something about the individual. Showing how the term functions in a proposition does not supply a list of the facts it applies to. Nor does it settle by itself whether an individual is present. Ockham's separate treatment of cognition explains how such judgments can have grounds while leaving the analysis of general terms to logic. A reader who accepts one account can still ask whether the other succeeds. That separation makes it possible to locate a disagreement precisely, instead of appealing to simplicity before we understand what is at stake.
Further Reading
- William of Ockham, Philosophical Writings, translated and edited by Philotheus Boehner and revised by Stephen F. Brown. Compare the sections on epistemology, logic, and supposition.
- William of Ockham, Summa Logicae, I.14, I.15, and I.64. Read the distinction between singular and universal in chapter 14 before following the arguments against a shared substance in chapter 15. Chapter 64 shows how the account works in propositions.
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