Universals and economical explanation › What a Term Stands For Here
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Suppose you encounter a sentence about sheep. Are you reading about animals, a concept, or a word on a page? Something depends on its predicate. In the sentence “Every sheep is an animal,” sheep is being used for the animals the term signifies. In “‘Sheep’ has five letters,” the sentence is about a written word. Counting the letters would be beside the point in the first sentence and the right thing to do in the second. Ockham calls the standing-for relation a term has in a proposition supposition. Its role can vary with the proposition, even when its usual signification stays the same. His own examples use terms for a human being. Summa Logicae, I.63–64
There is a third case, illustrated by Ockham with a sentence saying that human being is a species. In that context the term stands for a concept. An individual person is an animal. A concept under which many people are considered can be a species in the logical classification. An inscription can have letters. Asking whether a species weighs as much as an individual person mixes the roles. The three uses are called personal, simple, and material supposition, in the order of the animals, the concept, and the writing in these examples. Personal supposition is not restricted to people, or even to things outside the mind. It applies when the term stands for what it signifies and is being used significatively. Summa Logicae, I.64
Ask what the predicate is being applied to. Could you point to an animal to show what the first sentence concerns? Would pointing to the animal establish the number of letters? The exercise separates the thing picked out by a term in a particular sentence from the physical mark that is part of the sentence.
This matters because a grammatical subject is easily mistaken for the name of a special object. If a discussion alternates between a person, a concept, and a word, it can seem as though a fourth thing must be involved, something those uses have in common. Ockham's account gives us a reason to identify the role before making that inference. Showing which use is involved explains why ordinary sentences about people can be true without treating the general term as the name of a common substance. It does not by itself show that there could be no other reason to posit common natures. Summa Logicae, I.63–64
The distinction also helps with Ockham's talk of first and second intentions. In a narrow sense a first intention is a mental name fitted to stand for what it signifies. Ockham's example is the concept applicable to every individual human. A second intention is exemplified by species or genus, which can be said of those first-order concepts. In effect, we can ask how a concept applies to people, or ask how the concept itself should be classified. Treating a second intention as if it answered the first question would give the wrong object of inquiry. Summa Logicae, I.12
Consider a second exercise. Someone says first that every sheep is an animal and then that sheep is a species. Place the two statements side by side and see what happens to the term sheep when you change the predicate. In the first statement, the term is used for individual animals. To make sense of the second with simple supposition, take the term to stand for the concept, and understand species as a classification of that concept. It would make little sense to infer that the animal you can see in the field is itself a species. The shift in what the term stands for prevents exactly that transfer. This illustrates the logical use of species here and does not settle how a present-day biologist should classify a population. Summa Logicae, I.12, 64
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