Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: Language Games and Private Language

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated November 4, 202513 min read

In Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein examines how language is used, how people follow rules, and what gives words for experiences their meaning.

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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 101Meaning through use › What the builder means by “slab”
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What the builder means by “slab”

One builder calls out “Slab!” and another hands over a piece of stone. In a different setting, someone might say “slab” while pointing at a museum display, or while looking at an invoice and wondering what was ordered. Each use draws on the meaning of the word. You can also see that a learner who correctly labels a piece of stone has yet to show that they know what to do when someone calls for one. Ludwig Wittgenstein starts the Philosophical Investigations with an example of two builders because everything the little exercise needs is on view. There are a few signs, some building stones, people who have been trained to use the signs, and something they get done together. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§1–8.

The book, published posthumously in 1953, begins with Augustine's account of learning words by hearing them used as others point or act. Wittgenstein keeps that possibility in view and tests how far it takes us. Pointing can teach a person how to name an object. It can help teach a color, a direction, or a number too. Which role it serves depends on what the learner and the teacher are doing. A child who can respond to “Slab!” by bringing the stone has learned a use that could be hard to convey by saying what object the word names. Investigations, §§1–6 and 28–32.

In the preface Wittgenstein asks that the new thoughts be read against his earlier book. The Tractatus investigated how a proposition can represent a possible arrangement of things. The Investigations introduces ordinary activities where an account of representation explains only part of what is happening. It also revisits the idea that analysis must end with genuine names for absolutely simple objects. Instead of deciding what the simple parts of a chair really are, it asks when wood pieces count as parts, when molecules do, and what we are asking when we say that something is composite. Investigations, preface and §§39–48.

What a word does in a language-game

Wittgenstein uses language-game for the simplified practices he asks us to imagine and for speech considered as part of an activity. A foreman gives an order. A worker reports what happened. A visitor asks what a tool is called. Each case makes sense against the background of what those people can do and expect of one another. To say that speaking a language is part of a form of life is to ask us to include activities in our account of speech. For example, giving an order on a building site normally has a point because the workers know what can be done with the material. Hearing the sound in isolation would tell you little about that. Investigations, §§7–8, 19 and 23.

Section 43 draws attention to use for a large class of cases where we talk about meaning. Wittgenstein expressly qualifies the remark. Take the word “here.” Someone can use it to indicate where to stand, to answer a roll call, or to offer an object that another person needs. To learn what was meant, it helps to know which exchange was taking place. We could try to find one item named “here” and ask which mental picture the three speakers have in common. An account of what the speakers are doing can make their particular uses intelligible before either question has been answered. Investigations, §§38–43.

How a model helps

The builders' exchange is a deliberately limited example. With only a few words and responses to keep track of, readers can see how knowing what to do belongs to knowing the language. The list of activities in §23 quickly expands the range to cases such as making up a story, making a joke, translating, and thanking someone.

Wittgenstein's list also says that some language-games come into being and others go out of use. This is one reason to resist giving each activity a fixed set of written rules. We know some familiar ways to make a request, and can recognize a new phrasing as a request in the right surroundings. Someone who asks “Any chance you could pass me that chisel?” has made an intelligible move without having learned it word for word. The regularity needed for understanding leaves room for this sort of variation. Investigations, §23.

An ostensive definition offers a small test. If you point to two nuts and say “two,” someone who already has a place for number words can take this as a lesson about their number. Another learner might take the same gesture as identifying the kind of nut or its color. The pointing is identical in both lessons. The role it takes on depends on other examples, questions, corrections, and what the learner already knows how to do. Wittgenstein uses that possibility to ask how much has to be in place before pointing and speaking counts as teaching a particular word. Investigations, §§28–31.

Picture chess, a game of catch, and a child bouncing a ball alone. Competition helps characterize chess and some games of catch. Winning matters to chess, but may have no part in what the child is doing. Games can involve amusement, luck, skill, or a win, with a feature that matters in one case absent from another. Wittgenstein calls these intersecting similarities family resemblances. He asks us to look at what the examples share before assuming there is a set of defining features hidden beneath ordinary practice. Investigations, §§65–67.

Imagine trying to teach someone ten games in one afternoon. You might show one, describe how another differs, and tell your student to watch what the players are doing in a third. They could learn to use the word properly without being able to finish a different task, writing down a definition that decides every conceivable case. This does not make familiar cases indeterminate. You may be able to settle some cases easily and have reason to disagree about others. A rule for a contest or a survey could set a boundary for a particular purpose. That does not establish that ordinary use depends on a hidden boundary of exactly that sort. Investigations, §§68–71.

The comparison with family members is easy to push too far. Two relatives can look alike through their eyes, others through their expressions, and still others through how they walk. Their relation as relatives can have a separate explanation. The comparison illustrates how similarities can cross without a single distinctive feature appearing everywhere. As a philosophical method it invites inspection of examples. It gives us no reason to announce before the inquiry that every concept works this way.

Knowing how to go on

Wittgenstein imagines teaching a pupil how to continue numerical series using commands such as “+2.” The pupil performs as expected through 1,000. Asked to continue, the pupil writes 1,004, 1,008, and 1,012 and thinks the instruction has been followed. Repeating the examples used in training may do little to clear up the difficulty. The pupil might naturally take the instruction to require adding two for a while, four for a while after that, then six. Wittgenstein asks us to account for how a person learns to go on the way we intended and what warrants saying someone has gone wrong. Investigations, §185.

It is tempting to add a sentence explaining what the first instruction really meant. That can be useful if the pupil grasps the additional words. It leaves the general question about what makes an application of the rule correct. If every statement about what a rule means had to be applied by consulting one more statement, there would be no point at which the process yielded a move. Section 201 calls attention to the paradox that whatever one did could be made to agree with a rule under some interpretation. The answer there is that grasp of a rule can be displayed in following it and in recognizing departures from it. Interpreting an instruction in other words is one thing we learn how to do within those practices. Investigations, §§198–202.

A chess example helps indicate what the explanation requires. A beginner can learn how a bishop moves by looking at a diagram, reading an instruction, or being shown moves on a board. A parent or a friend might have to correct the beginner the first time another piece blocks the bishop. After enough practice that person can identify a legal move on an unfamiliar board without first consulting a second rule. They are doing something for which there are standards they can get wrong. If everyone where they usually play misunderstands the bishop's move, they can still learn from other players that they have been playing a variant. The example helps separate a background of shared practice from the notion that local agreement automatically makes a particular move correct.

There is an interpretive question about how to take Wittgenstein's emphasis on custom and institution. Shared training helps explain why an instruction gets applied the same way in many new cases. That account of how the practice is learned can leave open the question of what doing it correctly is. In §198 Wittgenstein raises that difference himself through the example of a signpost. Learning to respond to a sign is part of the story. Something about the place of the sign and that response in an established practice also matters. The later remarks challenge the thought that we can isolate the right way of going on in a single inner act. They give readers a reason to look closely at what learning and correcting involve before making a stronger claim about what sort of community a rule requires. Investigations, §§198–206.

A diary that only its writer could understand

A diary in a personal code can be private in the familiar sense. You may be the only one with the key, and a reader might rightly feel that it was never meant to be read. Wittgenstein asks about a stronger sort of privacy. Could the words get their meaning from items accessible in principle only to the person who uses them? Imagine a diarist who concentrates on a recurring sensation and decides to write “S” each time it comes back. Nothing else, such as a way of communicating about it, any connection with observable circumstances, or a shared convention, is allowed to play a role in giving the sign its meaning. Investigations, §§243 and 256–258.

Days later, something seems to the diarist to be the same sensation. Suppose they write “S.” What would count as remembering the agreement correctly? It is one thing to consult a record of which symbol was chosen and discover that your memory was wrong. In this case the only proposed test is whether the current impression seems right to the same person who is checking it. Wittgenstein asks whether an impression can serve as the standard to which that very impression is answerable. He uses the example of remembering a timetable. Calling up a picture of the page can guide you, but its usefulness relies on there being a way in which the image could be accurate or mistaken. Investigations, §§258–261 and 265.

Compare the ordinary word “pain.” When a child cries out after getting hurt, an adult can teach the child a phrase to use on such occasions. The child learns to ask for help, to describe the place that hurts, and later to tell a story about getting hurt. Wittgenstein suggests a role for a pain utterance as an expression that can replace a cry. That role makes room for using the word when one is alone and for speaking about a pain nobody else can feel. The target of the diary example is the proposed source of the sign's standard of use. It does not require us to treat a person's pain as exhausted by what a bystander sees. In §304, Wittgenstein explicitly challenges the choice between conceiving of the sensation as a private object and saying there is nothing there. Investigations, §§244–246 and 304.

The beetle in the box

In §293 Wittgenstein imagines that everyone has a box closed to everyone else. A person calls what is inside “beetle,” and no one could check what another person has. If the word nevertheless has a working use in their common language, the boxes could contain different items, or none, without that use necessarily changing. The case asks how a hidden item could fix the grammar of the shared word. Investigations, §293.

The diary and the boxes put pressure on different parts of the same picture. The diary tests whether an act of private naming can put in place a standard of correctness. The boxes allow ordinary use and ask whether such use would depend on privately inspecting an object. Suppose the group had ways of learning when to use “beetle” that survived an exchange of boxes. Whatever helped them explain the word to a newcomer would have to come from the practice left in place. This is why the existence of a sensation and the role it plays in an explanation of language are separate questions.

What philosophical clarification does

When people have become proficient at a use, there can be little need to articulate its rules. A philosophical question can arise when we extract a word from these circumstances and treat it as if all uses must have the same shape. Wittgenstein illustrates this when he asks what a name and what pointing do in ordinary situations after asking what it would be to name something by sheer attention alone. In §116 he describes bringing words back from metaphysical to everyday use. In §133 he speaks of different methods of treatment. Different confusions may need different examples to relieve them. Investigations, §§38, 116 and 133.

A critic can accept how informative these descriptions are and still ask for a wider theory about why several uses resemble one another or how rules acquire normative force. Wittgenstein's practice of clarification puts some pressure on what we mean by asking for such a theory. If a teacher says a child understands, they can say how the child responds when given a fresh task, how the learner corrects an error, and what sorts of explanation the learner can use. The question is whether there is a substantial additional phenomenon to explain once these details are clear. What starts as an abstract demand for a theory can turn into a more particular question about one of those capacities.

Return to the two builders. To find out what one means by calling for the slab, we can watch the other learn which stones are needed, what to bring when the call is made, and what happens when the wrong stone comes back. Being able to explain those things can be a large part of being able to say what the words mean. Looking at the rest of language under that light leaves room for explanations as different as the activities themselves.

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@misc{brenndoerfer2025wittgensteins, author = {Michael Brenndoerfer}, title = {Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: Language Games and Private Language}, year = {2025}, url = {https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/wittgenstein-philosophical-investigations-language-games-guide}, organization = {mbrenndoerfer.com}, note = {Accessed: 2026-11-19} }
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Michael Brenndoerfer. "Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: Language Games and Private Language." 2026. Web. November 19, 2026. <https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/wittgenstein-philosophical-investigations-language-games-guide>.
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Michael Brenndoerfer. "Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: Language Games and Private Language." Accessed November 19, 2026. https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/wittgenstein-philosophical-investigations-language-games-guide.
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