Meaning through use › Knowing how to go on

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated November 4, 20253 min read
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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 101Meaning through use › Knowing how to go on
Reading section 4 of 7 · Knowing how to go on · 3 minSection 4 of 7 · 3 min

Section 4 of 7 · 3 min read

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Wittgenstein imagines teaching a pupil how to continue numerical series using commands such as “+2.” The pupil performs as expected through 1,000. Asked to continue, the pupil writes 1,004, 1,008, and 1,012 and thinks the instruction has been followed. Repeating the examples used in training may do little to clear up the difficulty. The pupil might naturally take the instruction to require adding two for a while, four for a while after that, then six. Wittgenstein asks us to account for how a person learns to go on the way we intended and what warrants saying someone has gone wrong. Investigations, §185.

It is tempting to add a sentence explaining what the first instruction really meant. That can be useful if the pupil grasps the additional words. It leaves the general question about what makes an application of the rule correct. If every statement about what a rule means had to be applied by consulting one more statement, there would be no point at which the process yielded a move. Section 201 calls attention to the paradox that whatever one did could be made to agree with a rule under some interpretation. The answer there is that grasp of a rule can be displayed in following it and in recognizing departures from it. Interpreting an instruction in other words is one thing we learn how to do within those practices. Investigations, §§198–202.

A chess example helps indicate what the explanation requires. A beginner can learn how a bishop moves by looking at a diagram, reading an instruction, or being shown moves on a board. A parent or a friend might have to correct the beginner the first time another piece blocks the bishop. After enough practice that person can identify a legal move on an unfamiliar board without first consulting a second rule. They are doing something for which there are standards they can get wrong. If everyone where they usually play misunderstands the bishop's move, they can still learn from other players that they have been playing a variant. The example helps separate a background of shared practice from the notion that local agreement automatically makes a particular move correct.

There is an interpretive question about how to take Wittgenstein's emphasis on custom and institution. Shared training helps explain why an instruction gets applied the same way in many new cases. That account of how the practice is learned can leave open the question of what doing it correctly is. In §198 Wittgenstein raises that difference himself through the example of a signpost. Learning to respond to a sign is part of the story. Something about the place of the sign and that response in an established practice also matters. The later remarks challenge the thought that we can isolate the right way of going on in a single inner act. They give readers a reason to look closely at what learning and correcting involve before making a stronger claim about what sort of community a rule requires. Investigations, §§198–206.

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