Meaning through use › A diary that only its writer could understand
PhilosophyAll chapters Reading tools Notes & comments
Meaning through use › A diary that only its writer could understandSection view · Sections in this chapter5 / 7 ↓
A diary in a personal code can be private in the familiar sense. You may be the only one with the key, and a reader might rightly feel that it was never meant to be read. Wittgenstein asks about a stronger sort of privacy. Could the words get their meaning from items accessible in principle only to the person who uses them? Imagine a diarist who concentrates on a recurring sensation and decides to write “S” each time it comes back. Nothing else, such as a way of communicating about it, any connection with observable circumstances, or a shared convention, is allowed to play a role in giving the sign its meaning. Investigations, §§243 and 256–258.
Days later, something seems to the diarist to be the same sensation. Suppose they write “S.” What would count as remembering the agreement correctly? It is one thing to consult a record of which symbol was chosen and discover that your memory was wrong. In this case the only proposed test is whether the current impression seems right to the same person who is checking it. Wittgenstein asks whether an impression can serve as the standard to which that very impression is answerable. He uses the example of remembering a timetable. Calling up a picture of the page can guide you, but its usefulness relies on there being a way in which the image could be accurate or mistaken. Investigations, §§258–261 and 265.
Compare the ordinary word “pain.” When a child cries out after getting hurt, an adult can teach the child a phrase to use on such occasions. The child learns to ask for help, to describe the place that hurts, and later to tell a story about getting hurt. Wittgenstein suggests a role for a pain utterance as an expression that can replace a cry. That role makes room for using the word when one is alone and for speaking about a pain nobody else can feel. The target of the diary example is the proposed source of the sign's standard of use. It does not require us to treat a person's pain as exhausted by what a bystander sees. In §304, Wittgenstein explicitly challenges the choice between conceiving of the sensation as a private object and saying there is nothing there. Investigations, §§244–246 and 304.
In §293 Wittgenstein imagines that everyone has a box closed to everyone else. A person calls what is inside “beetle,” and no one could check what another person has. If the word nevertheless has a working use in their common language, the boxes could contain different items, or none, without that use necessarily changing. The case asks how a hidden item could fix the grammar of the shared word. Investigations, §293.
The diary and the boxes put pressure on different parts of the same picture. The diary tests whether an act of private naming can put in place a standard of correctness. The boxes allow ordinary use and ask whether such use would depend on privately inspecting an object. Suppose the group had ways of learning when to use “beetle” that survived an exchange of boxes. Whatever helped them explain the word to a newcomer would have to come from the practice left in place. This is why the existence of a sensation and the role it plays in an explanation of language are separate questions.
Comments
Add to the conversation
A question, a correction, or an example from your own work.
No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!