Derrida's Writing and Difference: Structure, Sign, and Play
Jacques Derrida's 1967 collection of essays, with a close reading of “Structure, Sign, and Play” and companion essays on Foucault, Freud, and Levinas.
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Structure and the limits of a center › Where Does the Rule Belong?Full chapter · Sections in this chapter1 / 8 ↓
Where Does the Rule Belong?
Think of an ordinary word whose meaning changes when the surrounding sentence changes. In a travel account, a bank could be where the writer stops to withdraw money. In a description of a river, the same sounds pick out the ground beside the water. The difference is easy to handle when the rest of the sentence is clear. A harder question is how a system of such relations acquires its order. Does the explanation end with one term that gets its standing independently of the others? If it does, in what sense is that term part of the system it is supposed to explain?
Jacques Derrida puts that question to work in “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences.” The essay began as a paper at the 1966 Johns Hopkins symposium “The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man.” Derrida included it in the French collection L’Écriture et la différence in 1967. In Alan Bass's English translation, Writing and Difference, it is the next-to-last essay, followed by “Ellipsis.” The lecture is one entry into the collection. Its treatment of inherited concepts connects it to readings of Descartes, Levinas, and Freud that take up quite different problems. Johns Hopkins symposium archive · Writing and Difference, contents
What a Center Is Asked to Do
Derrida starts from a familiar way of thinking about structure. An account can connect and order many elements by giving them a point of reference. What happens to one element can depend on where it stands with respect to the others. The center both makes such an order possible and limits which substitutions can occur. If elements were exchangeable in every circumstance, the specific order that the analysis sets out to explain would disappear. The center gives the exchange of elements a scope. “Structure, Sign, and Play,” opening pages
A group of people agreeing to play a board game will let one piece stand for another if a piece goes missing. There are also limits on what any substitute can do. A coin used in place of a lost pawn inherits the pawn's permitted moves. Changing the rule that specifies the pawn's moves would be a different sort of change. The game supplies a way to see a difference between substitutions licensed by an order and a change that alters the order itself. The point of the example is the difference in roles. The rules of a board game are conventions that players can amend, so the example does not give us a permanent center. It helps show what an explanation would have to say if it assigned one rule exemption from every transformation it permits elsewhere.
Derrida's paradox concerns that exemption. The center is in the structure in so far as its organizing effects are felt throughout the structure. Classical thought places the center outside the range of substitutable elements, because it asks the center to secure the rules according to which any of those elements can change. The center is indispensable to the account but cannot have the same kind of standing as what it accounts for. Derrida argues that this tension can be read in the concept of a centered structure itself. “Structure, Sign, and Play,” opening pages
The opening next sketches a history in which different names occupy that privileged position. A philosophical system looks for a principle that can organize what depends on it while securing its own standing. Derrida's examples include essence, consciousness, God, and the human being. He is interested in what these very different terms can be made to do in a system. Tracing the repeated demand for a center lets him ask what becomes visible when the position is treated as a function rather than as a point permanently occupied by any of those names. “Structure, Sign, and Play,” passage on successive determinations of the center
Derrida uses play for the possibility of substitutions within a field. The center limits play in the classical account. If what occupies the center can itself be understood through differences and substitutions, its organizing role is still a question the inquiry has to explain. “Structure, Sign, and Play,” opening pages
The Case That Straddles Nature and Culture
The lecture gives the issue a specific setting in its reading of Claude Lévi-Strauss. In The Elementary Structures of Kinship, Lévi-Strauss initially associates nature with the universal and spontaneous and culture with rules that can vary among societies. Then he raises the prohibition of incest. He treats it as universal in the sense relevant to his argument, while also treating it as a rule. Particular rules differ, which relatives they concern among the differences. The resulting difficulty belongs to the terms of the distinction as Lévi-Strauss has set it up. If universality is a sign of nature and being a rule is a sign of culture, the same case activates both tests. “Structure, Sign, and Play,” discussion of The Elementary Structures of Kinship
One response would be to treat this as an odd case to file under whichever description worked best. Derrida gives it greater force. The rule is a case the inquiry needs in order to account for kinship, and it unsettles the conceptual division with which the inquiry began. It is possible, he suggests, that the case escapes the categories that make it look exceptional, rather than being an ordinary fact that happens to fall into both. If so, the contrast between nature and culture is something to investigate as well as something to use. That is a different task from deciding which side should win an argument over the correct category. “Structure, Sign, and Play,” discussion of the prohibition
An example of our own helps locate the difficulty. Suppose a school distinguishes regular classes from optional clubs by asking whether attendance is required. It also allows students to choose some of their required classes. If a student asks whether a course is optional, answering yes because its subject can be chosen would miss the requirement that a course of that kind must be taken. The discovery might make the school distinguish a choice among options from a choice whether to participate at all. In Derrida's kinship passage, what comes under scrutiny is a philosophical distinction that had been asked to ground the entire inquiry. The school example only shows how a case can make the work done by a familiar distinction visible.
What Can Be Built with Inherited Terms
Derrida observes that Lévi-Strauss can continue to use the nature-and-culture distinction for particular purposes even after identifying its limits. Here the account turns to Lévi-Strauss's figure of the bricoleur, someone who makes use of the materials and tools already at hand. A tool may have been made for another purpose. It may still help with the work, especially once the person using it knows what it will and will not do. The history of the tool matters to how it can be used. “Structure, Sign, and Play,” discussion of The Savage Mind and bricolage
Derrida extends this idea to the language of criticism itself. The concepts with which we question an inherited way of thinking also have histories. The critic cannot begin by creating every term and rule of grammar afresh. Derrida calls that imagined stance of the engineer a myth in the passage on bricolage. The comparison is with the claim to originate a language completely, not with the tasks of actual engineers. A critical argument can work within an inherited vocabulary if it pays attention to how the use it makes of a term changes the work that term does. “Structure, Sign, and Play,” passages on the criticism of metaphysics and on bricolage
Put those two points together in Lévi-Strauss's case. Separating nature and culture might still sharpen a question about how one kinship rule differs from another. It would be a further step to say the separation supplies a permanent foundation for all the questions under study. The distinction could need revising precisely because it helped the analyst recognize the example that strains it. Using it effectively in one part of the inquiry gives us a reason to see what its limits are elsewhere. “Structure, Sign, and Play,” discussions of nature and culture and bricolage
What Counts as the Whole of a Myth?
Derrida also turns to The Raw and the Cooked, where Lévi-Strauss describes what happens when a reader tries to take apart the themes of a myth. Separating them can make them easier to study, until a supposed part turns out to connect to several others in ways the initial division could not show. Following the new connections changes what counts as a useful division. The analyst can present an account of how the themes hang together, but Lévi-Strauss cautions against treating that account as the recovery of a single unity that was waiting whole at the bottom of the inquiry. Derrida gives this passage room because the resistance to finding that unity changes the form the account can take. “Structure, Sign, and Play,” discussion of The Raw and the Cooked
Suppose one version of a story has someone break a promise to get home, while another has the promise keep them from going home. The promise may initially look central to the comparison. A third story might replace it with a boundary someone cannot cross without permission. The comparison can then take up permission, obligation, or what returning home means in each story. A reader can make a good case for connecting some details without deciding that one theme supplies the original form from which the others descend. The exercise is to follow exactly what each comparison makes clearer and which relations it leaves unexplained.
This raises a question about what empirical material can do. Derrida observes that Lévi-Strauss sets out structural accounts based on a finite set of myths and offers them as hypotheses open to correction by subsequent evidence. A new variant can change the account. The possibility of correction uses a working distinction between the evidence currently in hand and the claims the analyst makes about it. It leaves open the status of the distinction between the discourse about the myths and the mythical activity that the discourse says it is trying to follow. “Structure, Sign, and Play,” passage on empiricism and structural ethnography
Reading Elsewhere in the Collection
In “Cogito and the History of Madness,” Derrida asks about the language in which a historian can describe the exclusion of madness. He quotes Michel Foucault's formulation of the task as an archaeology of the silence imposed on madness. Derrida asks what happens when that silence becomes the subject of an orderly history. The historian still speaks a language in which a reader can understand the claim, and much of the surviving evidence comes from the practices through which madness was governed or prohibited. The question about the sources is inseparable from the question about who or what can speak through the resulting history. “Cogito and the History of Madness,” opening discussion of Foucault’s project
The essay also makes a narrower demand of Foucault's reading of Descartes. Derrida distinguishes interpreting what the passage in Descartes says from establishing the relation between that passage and a larger historical structure. A claim at the second level depends on what the first level of reading establishes. Even a persuasive account of a period may leave open whether a particular line supports it. This example gives the collection's attention to language a concrete consequence. An argument about an institution, an age, or a philosophy still has to establish what can be read in the words that support it. “Cogito and the History of Madness,” opening questions
A different issue arises in “Freud and the Scene of Writing.” Freud uses the Mystic Writing-Pad to picture a problem about memory. A surface capable of receiving fresh marks has to remain available to new impressions, while earlier impressions can leave lasting traces. In Freud's chosen device, lifting the sheet makes the visible marks disappear from its surface, while impressions remain beneath it. Derrida pays attention to the changing metaphors with which Freud describes the relation between present perception and its traces. He asks what a machine would need to be like in order to represent psychical writing, including where the model has to be supplemented. The device matters because putting a theory into the form of a model lets us inspect which relations the theory needs the model to preserve. “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” passages on the 1895 Project and the “Note on the Mystic Writing-Pad”
The approach in “Violence and Metaphysics” is distinct again. Derrida follows Levinas's attempt to say what is demanded by a relation to another person without absorbing that person into a totality that could exhaust who they are. In one passage he considers the language of exteriority. The claim is about a kind of otherness that cannot be specified by giving a distance in physical space. The word outside nevertheless draws on a spatial distinction. Simply forbidding spatial words would not provide the language the inquiry is looking for. The reading asks how a distinction already at work in language can help say something that its usual application would fail to capture. “Violence and Metaphysics,” discussion of exteriority and interiority
What links these examples is a discipline of following a particular argument closely enough to identify which terms, sources, or models it needs. There is no single diagnosis that substitutes for studying the passage. The nature-and-culture problem, the problem of writing a history of silence, and the problem of modeling memory each put different demands on the inherited terms. The essays provide ways to see those demands by working through the argument in front of us.
Two Ways of Understanding Interpretation
At the end of “Structure, Sign, and Play,” Derrida describes two approaches to interpretation. One seeks a truth or origin beyond the movement of signs, as though a recovered presence could close the work of interpretation. The other affirms play and allows the ongoing substitutions to become the subject of interpretation. Derrida associates this second possibility with Nietzsche. Earlier in the lecture he identifies a current in Lévi-Strauss that longs for a lost immediacy even while the analysis of myth and kinship puts established centers into question. “Structure, Sign, and Play,” final pages
Derrida calls the two orientations irreconcilable while observing that both may be lived at once. The final paragraph leaves open what their difference might make possible. It does not announce a finished new science. The same reader may sometimes ask how a distinction entered an argument and at other times try to identify what it became capable of doing once it was there. The question the chapter leaves working is where an inquiry asks for a final term outside the relations it uses to explain things, and what that move rules in or out. “Structure, Sign, and Play,” final pages
Further Reading
- Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, translated by Alan Bass. Start with “Structure, Sign, and Play” and compare the argument of “Cogito and the History of Madness.”
- Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences”. The university-hosted conference essay has its own pagination.
- Jacques Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness”. This course excerpt contains the Bass translation used in the chapter.
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