Structure and the limits of a center › Reading Elsewhere in the Collection
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In “Cogito and the History of Madness,” Derrida asks about the language in which a historian can describe the exclusion of madness. He quotes Michel Foucault's formulation of the task as an archaeology of the silence imposed on madness. Derrida asks what happens when that silence becomes the subject of an orderly history. The historian still speaks a language in which a reader can understand the claim, and much of the surviving evidence comes from the practices through which madness was governed or prohibited. The question about the sources is inseparable from the question about who or what can speak through the resulting history. “Cogito and the History of Madness,” opening discussion of Foucault’s project
The essay also makes a narrower demand of Foucault's reading of Descartes. Derrida distinguishes interpreting what the passage in Descartes says from establishing the relation between that passage and a larger historical structure. A claim at the second level depends on what the first level of reading establishes. Even a persuasive account of a period may leave open whether a particular line supports it. This example gives the collection's attention to language a concrete consequence. An argument about an institution, an age, or a philosophy still has to establish what can be read in the words that support it. “Cogito and the History of Madness,” opening questions
A different issue arises in “Freud and the Scene of Writing.” Freud uses the Mystic Writing-Pad to picture a problem about memory. A surface capable of receiving fresh marks has to remain available to new impressions, while earlier impressions can leave lasting traces. In Freud's chosen device, lifting the sheet makes the visible marks disappear from its surface, while impressions remain beneath it. Derrida pays attention to the changing metaphors with which Freud describes the relation between present perception and its traces. He asks what a machine would need to be like in order to represent psychical writing, including where the model has to be supplemented. The device matters because putting a theory into the form of a model lets us inspect which relations the theory needs the model to preserve. “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” passages on the 1895 Project and the “Note on the Mystic Writing-Pad”
The approach in “Violence and Metaphysics” is distinct again. Derrida follows Levinas's attempt to say what is demanded by a relation to another person without absorbing that person into a totality that could exhaust who they are. In one passage he considers the language of exteriority. The claim is about a kind of otherness that cannot be specified by giving a distance in physical space. The word outside nevertheless draws on a spatial distinction. Simply forbidding spatial words would not provide the language the inquiry is looking for. The reading asks how a distinction already at work in language can help say something that its usual application would fail to capture. “Violence and Metaphysics,” discussion of exteriority and interiority
What links these examples is a discipline of following a particular argument closely enough to identify which terms, sources, or models it needs. There is no single diagnosis that substitutes for studying the passage. The nature-and-culture problem, the problem of writing a history of silence, and the problem of modeling memory each put different demands on the inherited terms. The essays provide ways to see those demands by working through the argument in front of us.
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