Nagel's What Is It Like to Be a Bat?: The Problem of Consciousness
Thomas Nagel uses the case of a bat to ask how a physical account could explain the character of an experience for the being that has it.
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The subjective character of experience › Imagining a Bat's FlightFull chapter · Sections in this chapter1 / 8 ↓
Imagining a Bat's Flight
Try to imagine finding an insect in the dark by sending out a sound and hearing it return. You can invent a scene. Perhaps each echo seems like a point appearing on a map. Perhaps it feels more like hearing something change in pitch. Those are ways for you to make sense of the exercise. How would you tell whether either resembles how the surroundings appear to a bat?
Thomas Nagel uses this difficulty to make his argument concrete in What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, pp. 438–439. You can imagine fitting out a human body with wings or having it move through a dim room. Projecting yourself into the scene answers a question about how life with those movements might appear to you. Nagel wants to understand how a bat's life appears to the bat. The resources of your imagination come in large part from experience you already have. Rearranging that material may leave you with an image that answers the wrong question.
This problem matters even if your interest is human experience. Consider a scientist who can describe everything going on in a human being by using concepts available to observers with very different senses. Can that scientist's description tell us what a person experiences in a way that preserves its character for the person? On Nagel's account, the difficulty lies in understanding how such a description could account for that character at all. For this purpose the bat makes a general puzzle easier to see.
The Subjective Character of Experience
In Nagel's use of the phrase, the question of whether there is something it is like to be a creature is a question about whether it has conscious experience. Saying that there is something it is like to hear a note does not ask which other object the note resembles. It says that hearing it has a character for the being that hears it. Nagel calls this the subjective character of experience. What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, pp. 435–437 and 440, including note 6
Nagel's point of view can be shared in kind. Another person can understand something about how an experience appears to its subject without literally being that subject. A point of view may be easier or harder to take up depending on the similarity of the beings and the experience in question.
Notice what this leaves open. It may be possible to know that a creature hears or feels something while having little grasp of the character of its hearing or feeling. Nagel assumes that bats have experiences. He does not arrive at that assumption by first succeeding in imagining their sonar. Conversely, our failure to picture a kind of experience does not show that there is nothing to picture. In the essay he imagines an investigator of another species in much the same position with respect to us. Our concepts could be too limited for a task even when there is a fact we are trying to grasp. What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, pp. 437–441
To see why “subjective” does not mean “private to one individual,” consider asking another person to describe the quality of a familiar sound. We can understand much of the report because our sensory experience gives us common resources. We can also be wrong about what experience the speaker had. The important point is that we know what kind of claim the speaker is making. Nagel says that someone can state a fact about another person's experience. The fact remains tied to a type of viewpoint insofar as understanding it requires some ability to take up that viewpoint. What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, pp. 440–441
The bat case makes the limits of that ability conspicuous. Nagel suggests that knowing what human echolocation is like might help someone imagine roughly what it is like to use a bat’s more refined sonar. This is a prospect for partial understanding. His point is that the roughness of the imagined experience tracks how far the person can take up the bat's way of perceiving. He does not offer a proof that no human could ever learn anything about how bat experience is organized. What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, p. 441 n. 8
Nagel also invites us to consider acquiring a bat's constitution. Suppose a person could somehow change into the sort of creature that can occupy the relevant standpoint. If they then had bat experiences, they might learn something through the change. That would be a different route to understanding from reading a description while retaining their original way of perceiving. The scenario does not decide whether transformation is possible, or whether anyone could report what they learned afterward. It helps distinguish the claim that a viewpoint is involved in our conception of an experience from the claim that the relevant facts belong to an inaccessible realm. We can say what is missing from our perspective without pretending to know what future creatures or concepts could make available. What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, pp. 438–439, 441 n. 8
What Objectivity Lets Us Keep
Imagine an investigator with no visual experience studying lightning. We can tell the investigator where and when a flash appeared to us. They need never learn to see the bright streak themselves to investigate where and when the event occurred. The process of making a description accessible beyond a human visual standpoint leaves room for more than one way of observing the same event. It also leaves the character of our particular visual experience for a separate account.
Nagel uses a version of this example in What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, pp. 442–444. The lightning itself is accessible through investigation even to an observer who cannot grasp how it looks to us. An account of the event can set aside the appearance and investigate what produced it. The event does not become a different subject just because we proceed that way.
That is a strength of objective inquiry. Rather than requiring every investigator to use our eyes and share our visual experiences, we can compare measures and consequences that different investigators have reason to accept. Nagel treats increasing objectivity as a direction inquiry can take. He does not assume that the process culminates in an absolutely viewpoint-free description. The contrast rests on becoming less dependent on a particular kind of standpoint. What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, pp. 442–443
Now suppose the question has changed. The investigator wants to understand how the lightning appeared to a particular creature. What could be investigated in the earlier example without sharing the visual appearance was the lightning. Here the experience itself is the subject. Setting aside the character the event had for the creature can therefore set aside part of what our new inquiry is supposed to explain. That is the asymmetry Nagel asks us to consider.
This does not discredit a scientific account of perception. We might learn about the order in which processes occur and discover how changes in an organism affect what it can discriminate. Nagel's further question is how such an account could give us a conception of how those processes constitute an experience. That task is different from jointly explaining how a stimulus arrives and what a creature does afterward.
Why Common Reductions Leave a Question Open
One way to understand Nagel's argument is to ask how a familiar scientific identification can work. If we already have two ways of picking out one phenomenon, we may find a theory in which the same thing explains the observations involved in both. Even observers who cannot share a certain appearance might identify its cause through other evidence.
Nagel discusses what happens when we apply this strategy to the mind. Suppose the appearance of an external phenomenon has been explained as an effect on observers. We can use that explanation in a physical account of the external phenomenon without telling the whole story of what experiencing it is like. If the phenomenon we are trying to explain is the experience itself, we cannot permanently leave the experiential side with an observer waiting to be explained. Doing so postpones the original inquiry. What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, pp. 436 and 442–444
There is a temptation to say that the organism's own physical events explain the matter in the same way as the external event does. In that case we would need to see how identifying those events with the experience preserves the character for the organism. More information about a neural pattern may be relevant. Nagel points out that even finding an image of the thing being looked at inside the brain would not by itself tell an observer that the image is the experience. Whatever relation the information bears to the experience, that relation still needs an account. What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, p. 443 n. 10
This way of stating the problem avoids a stronger argument that would not follow. Two descriptions can pick out the same thing without a person who has one description being able to derive the other. A proof of nonidentity would need more than a difference in how we acquire the descriptions. Nagel is asking how enough understanding of the proposed identity could be made possible for this case. In particular, he doubts that a model borrowed unaltered from accounts of external objects will suffice.
What Nagel Says About Physicalism
It is easy to turn the problem into a declaration that physicalism must be false. Nagel explicitly distinguishes his conclusion from that one in What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, pp. 445–447. A theory can be intelligible as a broad statement before we possess much understanding of how it might be true. We understand what an identity claim asks us to hold, but understanding the role of the word “is” does little to show how physical concepts and concepts for experience might pick out the same events.
The point can be put as a requirement for an explanation. Suppose you name a physical process, present evidence that it occurs in cases of a certain taste, and say that the two are identical. The evidence may warrant taking the connection seriously. It would still be reasonable to ask how the process so described is the taste with that character for the person. Repeating the identity adds no account of how we are meant to understand it. Nagel's discussion leaves room for a future theory that gives us new conceptual resources to make sense of such relations.
A physicalist can reply that the present distance between the two kinds of concepts need not reveal a difference in the kinds of things they concern. That is a relevant reply to an argument from our present ignorance to nonidentity. It leaves Nagel's constructive task in place. We may know how to add more measurements to an account of a perceptual system. The difficult proposal is a theory that makes it intelligible why its operations are also an experience for a subject.
Another critic could argue that the complete explanation of an organism's capacities, judgments and reports already covers the thing that needs explaining. The question for this critic is why that description also captures the subjective character with which Nagel began. Perhaps the critic has a reason to redescribe that character. Nagel's opening criticism is directed at accounts that proceed without making their treatment of it clear. That demand gives the ensuing debate a specific burden on either side. A defender of his view should say what the proposed account leaves out. A critic should say how the account includes it or why the supposed missing feature has been misidentified. What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, pp. 435–437
Could We Describe Experience More Objectively?
Near the end, Nagel proposes exploring an objective phenomenology. The aim would be to describe features of experience in terms a being could understand even if it cannot have that experience. If such a project succeeded in part, an investigator might learn more than they can from vague comparisons between the senses. The new description would still have to concern the character of an experience. The purpose is to achieve greater precision without pretending that the viewpoint has ceased to matter. What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, pp. 449–450
Imagine trying to explain two things about the way a sound is perceived. You might convey which parts of a melody are experienced as repeating, even when the listener lacks a way of grasping its precise sound. Or you might describe how a pattern separates into foreground and background as attention shifts. These examples are suggestions about the kind of partial description one could try. They do not establish that the structural relations exhaust what hearing the melody is like. The distinction between specifying one feature and conveying the experience in full is central to Nagel's proposal.
The prospect of partial understanding also helps locate the limit of the bat story. If you can compare two patterns of sonar use, you have some information about the bat's sensory world. If you acquire a way to talk about how those patterns might be organized in experience, perhaps you can understand a further aspect. The bare fact that a human observer can say something informative does not yet settle whether the new descriptions preserve the phenomenon completely or provide an account of its physical nature. It does give us a clearer idea of the work a better theory would have to do.
Putting the Distinction to Work
Return to the two investigations about lightning. One tracks a public event, and one asks how it appears. To apply Nagel's method to a new example, say which investigation you are doing before you decide what would complete it. For instance, suppose you explain why two listeners make the same judgment about a melody. That could establish a pattern of discrimination. A question about whether the two listeners' experiences have the same character calls for a further step. You need a reason that connects the shared judgment with the feature of experience about which you are making a claim.
The method also keeps an inquiry open when there is no obvious way to adopt another being's standpoint. You can distinguish what you can ascertain, what you have reason to believe, and which feature of the experience you are unable to characterize. Those distinctions are more informative than a choice between assuming you already understand a creature and assuming that you can understand nothing about it.
The best use of the bat is to keep our attention on the phenomenon that an account of consciousness must preserve. A detailed theory of what a creature can do may narrow the possibilities. Nagel asks what would let a theory of that sort, or a more remote physical theory, make sense of the experience itself. The article's lasting question is what would count as completing that explanation.
Further Reading
- Thomas Nagel, What Is It Like to Be a Bat? (1974), The Philosophical Review, pp. 435–450. Read pp. 438–441 for the bat and the type of point of view, pp. 442–444 for the comparison with reductions of external phenomena, and pp. 445–450 for the status of physicalism and the proposed objective phenomenology.
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