The subjective character of experience › Putting the Distinction to Work
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Return to the two investigations about lightning. One tracks a public event, and one asks how it appears. To apply Nagel's method to a new example, say which investigation you are doing before you decide what would complete it. For instance, suppose you explain why two listeners make the same judgment about a melody. That could establish a pattern of discrimination. A question about whether the two listeners' experiences have the same character calls for a further step. You need a reason that connects the shared judgment with the feature of experience about which you are making a claim.
The method also keeps an inquiry open when there is no obvious way to adopt another being's standpoint. You can distinguish what you can ascertain, what you have reason to believe, and which feature of the experience you are unable to characterize. Those distinctions are more informative than a choice between assuming you already understand a creature and assuming that you can understand nothing about it.
The best use of the bat is to keep our attention on the phenomenon that an account of consciousness must preserve. A detailed theory of what a creature can do may narrow the possibilities. Nagel asks what would let a theory of that sort, or a more remote physical theory, make sense of the experience itself. The article's lasting question is what would count as completing that explanation.
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