The subjective character of experience › Why Common Reductions Leave a Question Open

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated September 14, 20262 min read
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Part 7 of 12Mind, Self, and Experience
Chapter 83The subjective character of experience › Why Common Reductions Leave a Question Open
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One way to understand Nagel's argument is to ask how a familiar scientific identification can work. If we already have two ways of picking out one phenomenon, we may find a theory in which the same thing explains the observations involved in both. Even observers who cannot share a certain appearance might identify its cause through other evidence.

Nagel discusses what happens when we apply this strategy to the mind. Suppose the appearance of an external phenomenon has been explained as an effect on observers. We can use that explanation in a physical account of the external phenomenon without telling the whole story of what experiencing it is like. If the phenomenon we are trying to explain is the experience itself, we cannot permanently leave the experiential side with an observer waiting to be explained. Doing so postpones the original inquiry. What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, pp. 436 and 442–444

There is a temptation to say that the organism's own physical events explain the matter in the same way as the external event does. In that case we would need to see how identifying those events with the experience preserves the character for the organism. More information about a neural pattern may be relevant. Nagel points out that even finding an image of the thing being looked at inside the brain would not by itself tell an observer that the image is the experience. Whatever relation the information bears to the experience, that relation still needs an account. What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, p. 443 n. 10

This way of stating the problem avoids a stronger argument that would not follow. Two descriptions can pick out the same thing without a person who has one description being able to derive the other. A proof of nonidentity would need more than a difference in how we acquire the descriptions. Nagel is asking how enough understanding of the proposed identity could be made possible for this case. In particular, he doubts that a model borrowed unaltered from accounts of external objects will suffice.

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