The subjective character of experience › What Nagel Says About Physicalism

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated September 14, 20262 min read
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Part 7 of 12Mind, Self, and Experience
Chapter 83The subjective character of experience › What Nagel Says About Physicalism
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It is easy to turn the problem into a declaration that physicalism must be false. Nagel explicitly distinguishes his conclusion from that one in What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, pp. 445–447. A theory can be intelligible as a broad statement before we possess much understanding of how it might be true. We understand what an identity claim asks us to hold, but understanding the role of the word “is” does little to show how physical concepts and concepts for experience might pick out the same events.

The point can be put as a requirement for an explanation. Suppose you name a physical process, present evidence that it occurs in cases of a certain taste, and say that the two are identical. The evidence may warrant taking the connection seriously. It would still be reasonable to ask how the process so described is the taste with that character for the person. Repeating the identity adds no account of how we are meant to understand it. Nagel's discussion leaves room for a future theory that gives us new conceptual resources to make sense of such relations.

A physicalist can reply that the present distance between the two kinds of concepts need not reveal a difference in the kinds of things they concern. That is a relevant reply to an argument from our present ignorance to nonidentity. It leaves Nagel's constructive task in place. We may know how to add more measurements to an account of a perceptual system. The difficult proposal is a theory that makes it intelligible why its operations are also an experience for a subject.

Another critic could argue that the complete explanation of an organism's capacities, judgments and reports already covers the thing that needs explaining. The question for this critic is why that description also captures the subjective character with which Nagel began. Perhaps the critic has a reason to redescribe that character. Nagel's opening criticism is directed at accounts that proceed without making their treatment of it clear. That demand gives the ensuing debate a specific burden on either side. A defender of his view should say what the proposed account leaves out. A critic should say how the account includes it or why the supposed missing feature has been misidentified. What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, pp. 435–437

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