Kant's Critique of Judgment: Aesthetics and Teleology
Immanuel Kant's 1790 analysis of aesthetic and teleological judgment, and of how reflection can relate nature and freedom.
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Beauty and reflective judgment › Calling Something BeautifulFull chapter · Sections in this chapter1 / 8 ↓
Calling Something Beautiful
Two people walk past a row of trees in flower. One says that the flowers are beautiful. The other asks whether they would bear good fruit. Both attend to the same trees. One is reflecting on how they appear. The other is asking whether they will serve a purpose. The person who calls the flowers beautiful may also want the other person to look again and see some of what they see. That gives their claim an unusual character. It expresses a pleasure, yet it seems to invite agreement.
Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgment of 1790 asks what sort of judgment that could be. An ordinary claim about the trees can be tested by concepts and evidence. A prediction about their fruit might turn on the variety, climate, and conditions of cultivation. A judgment of taste seems to call on the person hearing it to take up the appearance for themselves. Facts about the tree can guide their attention. They cannot by themselves prove that the tree is beautiful.
The book also asks why we understand a living thing through the work its parts do for one another. These inquiries belong to the same critique because both concern the use of judgment under a principle of purposiveness. The principle has different roles in the two inquiries. The difference is easier to see once we understand the problem Kant gives judgment in the book's Introduction.
Determining and Reflecting
In the Introduction, §§II–IV, Kant distinguishes two ways of bringing particulars and universals together. When the relevant rule is given, judgment can determine whether a particular falls under it. If we know the conditions a triangle has to meet, we can examine a figure to decide whether it is one. When what is given is a particular whose relevant universal we still have to seek, the task is reflective.
Reflection is important to the study of nature as well as to aesthetics. General claims about nature's conformity to law do not give us every specific law governing what we encounter. The investigator has to look for a way to order the variety of cases in front of them. The judgment that reflects does so under an assumption of purposiveness for our faculties, expecting that experience can be investigated as an intelligible system. The assumption directs a search. It does not itself identify a particular empirical law or establish that nature was designed to be knowable by us.
Kant asks judgment to help connect two ways of thinking that his earlier critiques distinguish. We investigate nature through lawful relations. We also consider what freedom requires when we are deciding how to act. Whenever we act, we have to bring about effects in the world studied by natural inquiry. As the final part of the Introduction explains, purposiveness makes a transition between these ways of thinking possible for judgment. Kant does not thereby give a theoretical demonstration of how freedom causes events. The new task is to explain a way of judging that can make room for the connection.
Taste and Disinterested Pleasure
Kant distinguishes the beautiful from the agreeable and the good in §§1–5. When I enjoy a drink because I like its flavor and want more, my pleasure has to do with gratification. When I call a tool good because it works reliably, my judgment depends on what I take the tool to be for. The pleasure in a pure judgment of taste is disinterested. It does not depend on wanting the object to exist or on possessing or using it. I can admire a flower while leaving it where it is.
Disinterest can sound like indifference. In fact the person judging can attend very closely to the object. Kant's example of a palace in §2 distinguishes judgments we can make about the same thing. We may object to the resources spent on a palace and still ask about the satisfaction we take in its appearance. The ethical and political objections remain intelligible. They answer different questions from the question Kant isolates in a judgment of taste. Identifying the kind of satisfaction is a way of telling what grounds the judgment.
In §§6–9, Kant explains why judgments of beauty claim more than a statement about what one happens to like. When I call a particular thing beautiful, I speak as though the pleasure can be shared. Yet I cannot derive that pleasure, or somebody else's obligation to feel it, by listing the marks of a concept. If the judgment rests on a rule about which things to count as beautiful, we have changed the kind of warrant Kant is trying to explain.
He connects pleasure to a free play of imagination and understanding. As we attend to the appearance, the imagination brings its features into a relation the understanding can follow. The activity is not confined by a determinate concept specifying what each feature has to contribute. Kant takes the relation between the faculties to be communicable because these are capacities involved in cognition generally. The point is to explain why the claim to agreement has a basis even in a judgment that depends on how the object is experienced.
In §§18–22, Kant calls the necessity at issue exemplary. When we offer the judgment for agreement, we judge as though our response exemplifies a shared capacity for judgment. His appeal to a common sense concerns this capacity, rather than the opinions one would record in a poll. Other people can disagree, and any particular judgment can fail to attend to the object appropriately. The difference between claiming agreement and establishing it is part of the problem the book sets itself.
There is a question about explanation underneath the account. In §9, Kant asks whether the pleasure comes first and the judgment follows, or whether the judgment grounds the pleasure. If a pleasure came simply from the stimulation of the senses, asserting that it had occurred would tell someone else very little about why they should share it. Kant puts the communicable relation of the faculties at the center instead. His claim concerns what makes a pleasure appropriate to a judgment of taste. It need not say that we consciously work through an explanation before feeling anything.
§40 also associates common sense with being able to take account of the standpoints of others. This is more demanding than asking whether the people around us agree. Imagine that a certain design pleases you because you associate it with a place you know well. Others can share your memory only in a limited way. If you want to know what in the design can support a shared judgment, you can try attending to it without taking your own associations as the measure. You may continue to like it. The exercise makes it easier to see which grounds you can ask others to consider.
Form, Purpose, and Art
In §§10–12, the purposiveness encountered in a pure judgment of beauty is formal. The object appears suited to the activity of judging it even though a determinate end does not explain the satisfaction. Imagine following a repeated pattern on a wall. It can fit the activity of attending to the relation between its parts without serving a task you can specify. The pleasure at issue does not require deciding that the wall exists to bring about that relation.
Kant also distinguishes free and dependent beauty in §16. When we look at a flower we can judge its appearance without asking what a specimen of its kind should be like. We can also judge a building as a building of a particular kind, with a use that makes a difference to what we admire about its design. That second judgment is not pure in the same way. The concept of what the thing should be can enter it. This distinction prevents Kant's restriction on pure taste from becoming a claim that every appreciation of art or design is free from considerations of purpose.
Fine art brings the issue to a head. The work is made intentionally. Yet the viewer's appreciation cannot be secured by displaying the rule that produced it. In §§43–50, Kant calls the artist's productive talent genius. It makes work that can provide an example without being produced by mechanically applying a rule that already specifies the result. Mere novelty would be insufficient. The work needs to be exemplary, and Kant treats taste as a discipline on what genius produces. This gives a reason to distinguish the work of making something from the judgment by which it is assessed.
The Sublime
The sublime, §§23–29, makes a different relation between the faculties apparent. Kant distinguishes the mathematical sublime, which concerns magnitude, from the dynamical sublime, which concerns the might of nature. In the first, the imagination can continue apprehending parts without being able to hold together, in one sensible intuition, the whole magnitude it is asked to comprehend. The demand to think an absolute whole carries us beyond what the imagination can present.
In the dynamical case we encounter nature as fearsome without our being in a position of actual fear for our immediate safety. Imagine watching a violent sea from a secure place. Its force can show how little physical power we have against it. The response can also make us aware of principles by which we regard ourselves as capable of judging independently of nature's threat. Kant does not say our bodies become less vulnerable. The feeling has to do with a way we can understand our standing as rational beings even while recognizing that vulnerability.
This helps explain why he locates the sublime in the subject's response. The sea or the storm can occasion it. The distinctive feeling involves the inadequacy of sensible capacities and a recognition of reason's demand or standing. That combination can contain displeasure and satisfaction. Beauty and the sublime are thus both aesthetic judgments, but the harmony at issue in the first takes a different form from the tension the second brings into view.
Why an Organism Looks Like a Natural Purpose
In §§64–65, Kant asks how to judge a tree. A tree produces another tree of the same species. It grows by making materials from its surroundings part of its own organized life. Its parts also help produce and sustain one another. Think of leaves that help supply what the tree needs, as the tree's living processes enable it to put out and maintain leaves. The part's activity is intelligible through the whole, and the whole depends on what its parts do.
A watch also has parts whose roles are understood through the whole. Its wheels and springs are arranged for a purpose by someone who knows what it is meant to do. In Kant's comparison, those parts do not produce one another or organize themselves in the way parts of an organism do. A tree calls for a more specific kind of judgment than simply noticing that something could be useful. Kant calls the object thus judged a natural purpose.
The comparison can make teleology, reasoning in terms of ends, sound like an inference to a maker. Kant gives it a more limited status. In §§69–78, he treats purposive judgment as a principle of reflection for beings with our kind of understanding. It lets us inquire into what parts contribute to the organism, and how they depend on it, when a description in terms of external arrangement alone seems insufficient. It does not entitle us to establish that a designer made the organism. Nor does it license stopping the search for the processes by which it grows, repairs damage, or reproduces.
There is a difference between explaining what leaf production contributes to a plant's life and finding out which events produce a leaf. One inquiry can suggest questions for the other. Finding a mechanical cause still leaves a place for describing its organized role. Conversely, saying that a leaf contributes to the plant does not establish how the leaf develops. Kant doubts that our form of understanding can give a complete mechanical account of natural organization. That is a claim about the reach of the explanation as he conceives it, alongside an insistence that natural inquiry look for mechanisms wherever it can.
The apparent conflict between the two kinds of explanation is the subject of §70. One maxim directs the investigator to judge material productions according to mechanical laws. The other says that for certain productions, reflection requires a principle of final causes. Treat both as claims about what things absolutely can and cannot be made by mechanical laws, and a contradiction results. Kant distinguishes them from that pair of metaphysical claims. Read as maxims for reflection, they can guide different aspects of the inquiry. The instruction to look for mechanical causes does not establish that such a search is the only way an organized being can be made intelligible to us.
A description of the tree is therefore incomplete for several distinct reasons. One can miss facts about what events actually occur in it. One can also miss the relations through which those events matter to the life of the whole. Kant's argument about reflection keeps the second problem in view without presenting a purposive description as a new force active inside the tree. This is where the watch comparison earns its place: even though both objects can be described from the standpoint of what their parts do, understanding how the parts came to have those roles is a different task in each case.
Two Senses of Purposiveness
The fact that we judge a flower's parts as contributing to its life does not require finding it beautiful. The pleasure of judging it beautiful does not require knowing how it reproduces. Kant's first inquiry considers purposiveness in relation to the activity of the faculties in aesthetic reflection. The inquiry into natural purposes considers what we need to understand about the dependence of the parts and the whole in a living being. Both involve reflection. They license different claims about the thing judged and the way we meet it.
We can notice the difference by taking one object through several questions. The botanist asks what a part does in an organism, then looks for the process that lets it do it. The gardener may ask whether the same plant will grow where they want it. A person attending to the flower's appearance can ask whether its form invites a shareable pleasure. The inquiries can inform one another, but one kind of result cannot be assumed to decide the others. Kant's critique makes us specify what each judgment needs and what kind of agreement we can ask of someone who considers it with us.
Reading Kant
The J. H. Bernard translation uses the spelling Judgement. Use the numbered sections across editions. Introduction §§II–IV and IX frame the work. §§1–22 treat beauty and taste, §§23–29 the sublime, and §§43–50 art and genius. For the organism argument, read §§64–65 and then §§69–78 on the status of the principle and its relation to mechanical explanation. The readable full HTML transcription provides the same Bernard section numbers.
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