Beauty and reflective judgment › Two Senses of Purposiveness

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated January 12, 20261 min read
PhilosophyAll chapters
Reading tools Notes & comments
Notes & comments
Part 12 of 12Art, Beauty, and Interpretation
Chapter 138Beauty and reflective judgment › Two Senses of Purposiveness
Reading section 7 of 8 · Two Senses of Purposiveness · 1 minSection 7 of 8 · 1 min

Section 7 of 8 · 1 min read

Beauty and reflective judgment › Two Senses of PurposivenessSection view · Sections in this chapter7 / 8 ↓

The fact that we judge a flower's parts as contributing to its life does not require finding it beautiful. The pleasure of judging it beautiful does not require knowing how it reproduces. Kant's first inquiry considers purposiveness in relation to the activity of the faculties in aesthetic reflection. The inquiry into natural purposes considers what we need to understand about the dependence of the parts and the whole in a living being. Both involve reflection. They license different claims about the thing judged and the way we meet it.

We can notice the difference by taking one object through several questions. The botanist asks what a part does in an organism, then looks for the process that lets it do it. The gardener may ask whether the same plant will grow where they want it. A person attending to the flower's appearance can ask whether its form invites a shareable pleasure. The inquiries can inform one another, but one kind of result cannot be assumed to decide the others. Kant's critique makes us specify what each judgment needs and what kind of agreement we can ask of someone who considers it with us.

Comments

Add to the conversation

A question, a correction, or an example from your own work.

No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!

Newsletter

Stay up to date

Get new articles, book updates, and notes on AI and technology.

Unsubscribe at any time. Privacy policy