Beauty and reflective judgment › Taste and Disinterested Pleasure

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated January 12, 20264 min read
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Part 12 of 12Art, Beauty, and Interpretation
Chapter 138Beauty and reflective judgment › Taste and Disinterested Pleasure
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Kant distinguishes the beautiful from the agreeable and the good in §§1–5. When I enjoy a drink because I like its flavor and want more, my pleasure has to do with gratification. When I call a tool good because it works reliably, my judgment depends on what I take the tool to be for. The pleasure in a pure judgment of taste is disinterested. It does not depend on wanting the object to exist or on possessing or using it. I can admire a flower while leaving it where it is.

Disinterest can sound like indifference. In fact the person judging can attend very closely to the object. Kant's example of a palace in §2 distinguishes judgments we can make about the same thing. We may object to the resources spent on a palace and still ask about the satisfaction we take in its appearance. The ethical and political objections remain intelligible. They answer different questions from the question Kant isolates in a judgment of taste. Identifying the kind of satisfaction is a way of telling what grounds the judgment.

In §§6–9, Kant explains why judgments of beauty claim more than a statement about what one happens to like. When I call a particular thing beautiful, I speak as though the pleasure can be shared. Yet I cannot derive that pleasure, or somebody else's obligation to feel it, by listing the marks of a concept. If the judgment rests on a rule about which things to count as beautiful, we have changed the kind of warrant Kant is trying to explain.

He connects pleasure to a free play of imagination and understanding. As we attend to the appearance, the imagination brings its features into a relation the understanding can follow. The activity is not confined by a determinate concept specifying what each feature has to contribute. Kant takes the relation between the faculties to be communicable because these are capacities involved in cognition generally. The point is to explain why the claim to agreement has a basis even in a judgment that depends on how the object is experienced.

In §§18–22, Kant calls the necessity at issue exemplary. When we offer the judgment for agreement, we judge as though our response exemplifies a shared capacity for judgment. His appeal to a common sense concerns this capacity, rather than the opinions one would record in a poll. Other people can disagree, and any particular judgment can fail to attend to the object appropriately. The difference between claiming agreement and establishing it is part of the problem the book sets itself.

There is a question about explanation underneath the account. In §9, Kant asks whether the pleasure comes first and the judgment follows, or whether the judgment grounds the pleasure. If a pleasure came simply from the stimulation of the senses, asserting that it had occurred would tell someone else very little about why they should share it. Kant puts the communicable relation of the faculties at the center instead. His claim concerns what makes a pleasure appropriate to a judgment of taste. It need not say that we consciously work through an explanation before feeling anything.

§40 also associates common sense with being able to take account of the standpoints of others. This is more demanding than asking whether the people around us agree. Imagine that a certain design pleases you because you associate it with a place you know well. Others can share your memory only in a limited way. If you want to know what in the design can support a shared judgment, you can try attending to it without taking your own associations as the measure. You may continue to like it. The exercise makes it easier to see which grounds you can ask others to consider.

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