Beauty and reflective judgment › Why an Organism Looks Like a Natural Purpose
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Beauty and reflective judgment › Why an Organism Looks Like a Natural PurposeSection view · Sections in this chapter6 / 8 ↓
In §§64–65, Kant asks how to judge a tree. A tree produces another tree of the same species. It grows by making materials from its surroundings part of its own organized life. Its parts also help produce and sustain one another. Think of leaves that help supply what the tree needs, as the tree's living processes enable it to put out and maintain leaves. The part's activity is intelligible through the whole, and the whole depends on what its parts do.
A watch also has parts whose roles are understood through the whole. Its wheels and springs are arranged for a purpose by someone who knows what it is meant to do. In Kant's comparison, those parts do not produce one another or organize themselves in the way parts of an organism do. A tree calls for a more specific kind of judgment than simply noticing that something could be useful. Kant calls the object thus judged a natural purpose.
The comparison can make teleology, reasoning in terms of ends, sound like an inference to a maker. Kant gives it a more limited status. In §§69–78, he treats purposive judgment as a principle of reflection for beings with our kind of understanding. It lets us inquire into what parts contribute to the organism, and how they depend on it, when a description in terms of external arrangement alone seems insufficient. It does not entitle us to establish that a designer made the organism. Nor does it license stopping the search for the processes by which it grows, repairs damage, or reproduces.
There is a difference between explaining what leaf production contributes to a plant's life and finding out which events produce a leaf. One inquiry can suggest questions for the other. Finding a mechanical cause still leaves a place for describing its organized role. Conversely, saying that a leaf contributes to the plant does not establish how the leaf develops. Kant doubts that our form of understanding can give a complete mechanical account of natural organization. That is a claim about the reach of the explanation as he conceives it, alongside an insistence that natural inquiry look for mechanisms wherever it can.
The apparent conflict between the two kinds of explanation is the subject of §70. One maxim directs the investigator to judge material productions according to mechanical laws. The other says that for certain productions, reflection requires a principle of final causes. Treat both as claims about what things absolutely can and cannot be made by mechanical laws, and a contradiction results. Kant distinguishes them from that pair of metaphysical claims. Read as maxims for reflection, they can guide different aspects of the inquiry. The instruction to look for mechanical causes does not establish that such a search is the only way an organized being can be made intelligible to us.
A description of the tree is therefore incomplete for several distinct reasons. One can miss facts about what events actually occur in it. One can also miss the relations through which those events matter to the life of the whole. Kant's argument about reflection keeps the second problem in view without presenting a purposive description as a new force active inside the tree. This is where the watch comparison earns its place: even though both objects can be described from the standpoint of what their parts do, understanding how the parts came to have those roles is a different task in each case.
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