Sartre's Being and Nothingness: Existentialist Ontology
Jean-Paul Sartre's 1943 study of consciousness, bad faith, freedom, and our relations with others.
PhilosophyAll chapters Reading tools Notes & comments
Consciousness, freedom, and bad faith › Someone Is Missing From the CaféFull chapter · Sections in this chapter1 / 7 ↓
Someone Is Missing From the Café
Sartre imagines arriving at a café to meet Pierre. He is late, and Pierre may have gone. He scans the room. The tables and the people at them are present, as are the voices, lights, and clatter of saucers. Yet what stands out to him is that Pierre is missing. A customer who walked in at the same moment to buy a coffee would have no reason to notice anything about Pierre. The two people are in the same room, with the same visible furniture and customers. Only one of them has come to meet a friend.
In Being and Nothingness, Part One, chapter 1, §II, Sartre asks what happens between the first glance around the room and the judgment that Pierre is absent. The judgment is easy enough to explain. It says that a particular person is absent from the room. But by the time Sartre can say this, the room has already been taking shape for him as a place where Pierre fails to appear. As each face comes into view, it drops back into the general scene. Sartre treats that shifting foreground and background as part of the experience of absence.
This modest example gives an entry point into Sartre's 1943 book. A familiar question about perception becomes a question about being. If we meet absences in experience, what kind of being could make that possible? The answer takes him from the café to the structure of consciousness, then to the ways we understand ourselves, appear to other people, and act in circumstances we inherit.
Being in Itself and Being for Itself
Sartre calls his project phenomenological ontology. He starts from descriptions of experience, such as searching for a person or realizing that someone can see him, and asks what those experiences reveal about the being of whoever undergoes them. A psychological explanation could ask what visual cues make a particular face easy to pick out. Sartre wants to account for the experience in which it matters that a particular face never comes into view.
In the Introduction, §§III and VI, Sartre contrasts the being of consciousness with the being of what it encounters. Being-in-itself, être-en-soi, coincides with itself. Think of a saucer in the café. It may already have a crack, or a waiter may break it later. Its coincidence with itself concerns the way it is at all. The saucer can have a shape, position, and history. The question of what it might yet be occurs to someone who intends to use it, repair it, or replace it.
Being-for-itself, être-pour-soi, names the mode of being Sartre attributes to consciousness. When I am absorbed in what I am reading, the article is what I am attending to. I do not have to pause and inspect myself to live through the reading as something I am doing. If I then ask whether I have been following the argument closely, my activity becomes the object of reflection. The possibility of reflecting on an activity presupposes that I was already conscious in the act of reading. Sartre calls this earlier kind of self-awareness prereflective. It belongs to the reading itself.
In Part Two, chapter 1, §§I–II, Sartre calls this structure presence to self. Consciousness has a relation to itself without having to represent itself as an additional object. Sartre uses this to distinguish the for-itself from the self-coincidence he assigns to the in-itself. He also introduces the facticity of the for-itself. I find myself in circumstances I did not bring about, and the fact that I exist at all has a contingency I cannot explain by inspecting my purposes. Reading this page is something I do from the particular situation in which I find myself.
The difference matters back in the café. Pierre may be perfectly present somewhere else. The room is full of things and activity. Yet Sartre says that the expectation of finding him, together with the way the room actually is, lets his absence appear there. Nothingness in this sense belongs to the way a world can show up for a conscious being whose questions and undertakings give it a shape.
From Absence to Anguish
Asking a genuine question involves leaving room for a negative answer. In Part One, chapter 1, Sartre points out that we question things as well as people. If a watch stops, I can examine its workings to find out what has happened. Doing so means being open to the possibility that a part I suspect is broken will turn out to be intact. The missing friend is a particularly vivid case because there is no substitute face that will satisfy the search. Pierre's absence gives an ordinary room a particular character, and that character can change in a second if he opens the door.
The same capacity to go beyond what is given extends to my own conduct. Suppose I told someone yesterday that I would apologize. The past promise is a fact I have to reckon with as I approach the door. It can give me a reason to knock. But my familiarity with the promise is also what lets me know that it remains to be carried out. I can stand there considering whether the other person has had a chance to cool down. I could also use that consideration to postpone a difficult conversation. The pause is intelligible because each of these possibilities bears on the person I have been and what I am about to do.
In Part One, chapter 1, §V, Sartre approaches this issue through the case of someone walking beside a precipice. The terrain can cause fear: I see a danger that might befall me. Anguish concerns the conduct I realize is up to me as I face it. I can take precautions, but knowledge of the danger and even a powerful desire to avoid it do not take the next step for me. Sartre uses the distinction to show how a person can experience freedom directly, as the unsettled relation to a future action. By the same analysis, a confident and familiar action need not announce itself through anguish. The argument concerns what becomes apparent in these moments.
Sartre's vocabulary is more ambitious than saying that people deliberate or that predictions can go wrong. He argues that the relation between a person and a possibility belongs to the being of the for-itself. The person I have been is part of what makes my present action intelligible. I still have to take up that past in a new situation. Whether this relation has the consequences for freedom that Sartre claims will become harder to assess when we consider the conditions under which someone must act.
How Bad Faith Works
A person telling a deliberate lie can keep track of a truth they want others to overlook. In Part One, chapter 2, §I, Sartre asks what to make of an evasion carried out within a single consciousness. A person somehow has to be aware of what they are evading in order to sustain the evasion. Treating the mind as two people, one knowingly deceiving the other, leaves Sartre with the original question relocated inside the person. Bad faith describes a way of taking up the evidence of one's own situation that allows an uncomfortable implication to be passed over.
Consider the café waiter in chapter 2, §II. His movements have a deliberate precision. He goes about his duties with gestures that make it seem as though his whole being has settled into the occupation. He really is employed as a waiter, with customers who expect certain things of him and duties he can leave undone. The example turns on the difference between having and enacting this social role and trying to be it with the self-coincidence of an object. The job has meaning for him, which is why he can inhabit it in several ways. Sartre takes even the effort to be nothing but a waiter as one of those ways.
Bad faith can also exploit the other side of this relation. Imagine getting a colleague into trouble and then saying that one regrettable remark has nothing to do with who you are. There may be a point in insisting that the remark does not settle every question about your character. But it may also be true that the colleague has heard nearly the same thing from you before, and that your reputation now reflects a pattern you helped create. In the first case, the waiter tries to make his role exhaust what he can be. In the second, the person appeals to whatever they might yet be and lets that screen off what they have done.
Sartre calls the interplay here one of facticity and transcendence. The job and the past remark are among the facts at issue. Transcendence refers to the way consciousness goes beyond its present circumstances toward possibilities. In his analysis, each can be invoked just when the other is inconvenient. The appeal can be sincere enough in ordinary speech. That is part of the interest of Sartre's discussion of belief in chapter 2, §III. Someone in bad faith can attach themselves to an account of what they are while leaving it vague enough to avoid a reckoning with the whole situation. This differs from a calculated lie and also from being simply mistaken.
The Look of Another Person
In Part Three, chapter 1, §IV, “The Look”, Sartre describes someone absorbed in listening at a door and peering through a keyhole. From that position, the door and keyhole are means and obstacles in an activity already underway. Then there is a sound of footsteps. The person may suddenly experience themselves as a person caught spying. The movement from absorption to shame can take place before they turn around, identify anyone, or form an explicit judgment about the moral character of what they are doing.
Sartre emphasizes that another person can show up as a subject through the experience of being visible to them. I had access to the door from the point of view of what I was doing. The footsteps reveal that my crouching body and behavior are also part of a scene another person can take in from elsewhere. I encounter myself from a vantage point that I cannot occupy in quite the same way. Sartre develops the point further in a French passage on shame and the Look, where he distinguishes experiencing oneself as someone else's object from simply losing one's freedom. The possibilities that organize my activity can appear to me as existing outside my control, in the way that activity looks to someone else.
The book even considers what happens if I look down the corridor and find no one. The particular sound may have been a false alarm. The relation the alarm disclosed still makes sense. I understand what it would be to be seen there precisely because my way of acting is available to other people's attention. Their view can disclose something I had not noticed about how I appear. It can also turn on a mistake. The experience of exposure does not require granting every observer sound judgment.
This is what Sartre means by being-for-others. When I walk over to someone after an argument, for example, I may know my intention is to apologize, while they see someone approaching who has long been making demands on them. The history that gives my gesture its shape for them is also part of my history. I can explain myself, but I cannot choose what makes the gesture intelligible from their side. Sartre's keyhole scene isolates the moment this dimension of being becomes hard to overlook.
Shame can make the change especially abrupt, yet it helps to distinguish its structure in this analysis from a sense of guilt. Imagine a musician who suddenly realizes a colleague has been listening while they practice. The exposed gesture might be a mistake in a passage, or simply a way of trying out an unfamiliar phrasing. What changes is that the playing can now sound a certain way to somebody whose experience the musician cannot inhabit. The sense of exposure makes sense even where no one has been wronged.
How Far Freedom Reaches
In Part Four, chapter 1, §II, “Freedom and Facticity: The Situation”, Sartre examines the kind of resistance the world can offer to a project. A feature of a place can be an obstacle to one person and useful to another. A large rock may block a route if I want to cross a slope quickly. It offers a place to sit if I need to wait. My project gives the rock its significance in either case. Its weight and position help determine how successfully I can proceed. Interpreting the obstacle differently will never give me the physical strength to move it.
Sartre makes the distinction sharper through his example of someone in prison. In the Barnes translation, on pp. 483–484, he distinguishes getting out of prison from undertaking some action with release as its end. The first depends on circumstances well beyond the person's control. The second is what he is trying to capture by freedom. He also distinguishes such action from a passing wish; a project is expressed in what someone begins to do. This is a demanding claim because Sartre thinks freedom in his sense remains even under severe constraint. The examples give us a way to specify which claim to challenge. One can grant that a person relates to their circumstances through possibilities and still ask whether concrete opportunities for action can be too drastically curtailed for Sartre's description to carry all the weight he puts on it.
Freedom understood this way also complicates any move directly from the ontology to a judgment of responsibility. Imagine two people deciding whether to speak in the same room. One knows that the audience will listen or at worst disagree. The other has good reason to expect retaliation from somebody in the room. Each can understand what staying silent would mean, but speaking carries different risks for each. The ability to recognize speaking as a possibility gives us little basis on its own for judging either person's conduct. Any such judgment would have to address the circumstances in which each acts and the pressures the two people face.
What makes Sartre's treatment of freedom worth reading alongside the café is the way each example brings the person's orientation and the facts of the situation into view. Pierre's absence involves a real expectation and a room in which he is missing. At the keyhole, a person has purposes of their own and an appearance they cannot manage alone. In the analysis of action, an intention makes something count as an obstacle, while the obstacle can defeat it. The recurring question in Being and Nothingness is how these aspects belong to a single experience. Sartre's strongest descriptions allow us to see why the question remains alive even if we disagree with what he makes of freedom.
Reading Sartre
The section names above follow Hazel E. Barnes's translation of Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. The waiter is in Part One, chapter 2, §II, pp. 59–60. The keyhole and footsteps are in Part Three, chapter 1, §IV, pp. 259–260. Page numbers vary between editions, so the part, chapter, and section are the more reliable guides when using another translation.
Join the discussionAsk a question or share what you learned.
Keep exploring
Reference
Citation details
Cite or share this article.

Comments
Add to the conversation
A question, a correction, or an example from your own work.
No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!