Consciousness, freedom, and bad faith › From Absence to Anguish
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Consciousness, freedom, and bad faith › From Absence to AnguishSection view · Sections in this chapter3 / 7 ↓
Asking a genuine question involves leaving room for a negative answer. In Part One, chapter 1, Sartre points out that we question things as well as people. If a watch stops, I can examine its workings to find out what has happened. Doing so means being open to the possibility that a part I suspect is broken will turn out to be intact. The missing friend is a particularly vivid case because there is no substitute face that will satisfy the search. Pierre's absence gives an ordinary room a particular character, and that character can change in a second if he opens the door.
The same capacity to go beyond what is given extends to my own conduct. Suppose I told someone yesterday that I would apologize. The past promise is a fact I have to reckon with as I approach the door. It can give me a reason to knock. But my familiarity with the promise is also what lets me know that it remains to be carried out. I can stand there considering whether the other person has had a chance to cool down. I could also use that consideration to postpone a difficult conversation. The pause is intelligible because each of these possibilities bears on the person I have been and what I am about to do.
In Part One, chapter 1, §V, Sartre approaches this issue through the case of someone walking beside a precipice. The terrain can cause fear: I see a danger that might befall me. Anguish concerns the conduct I realize is up to me as I face it. I can take precautions, but knowledge of the danger and even a powerful desire to avoid it do not take the next step for me. Sartre uses the distinction to show how a person can experience freedom directly, as the unsettled relation to a future action. By the same analysis, a confident and familiar action need not announce itself through anguish. The argument concerns what becomes apparent in these moments.
Sartre's vocabulary is more ambitious than saying that people deliberate or that predictions can go wrong. He argues that the relation between a person and a possibility belongs to the being of the for-itself. The person I have been is part of what makes my present action intelligible. I still have to take up that past in a new situation. Whether this relation has the consequences for freedom that Sartre claims will become harder to assess when we consider the conditions under which someone must act.
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