Consciousness, freedom, and bad faith › The Look of Another Person
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Consciousness, freedom, and bad faith › The Look of Another PersonSection view · Sections in this chapter5 / 7 ↓
In Part Three, chapter 1, §IV, “The Look”, Sartre describes someone absorbed in listening at a door and peering through a keyhole. From that position, the door and keyhole are means and obstacles in an activity already underway. Then there is a sound of footsteps. The person may suddenly experience themselves as a person caught spying. The movement from absorption to shame can take place before they turn around, identify anyone, or form an explicit judgment about the moral character of what they are doing.
Sartre emphasizes that another person can show up as a subject through the experience of being visible to them. I had access to the door from the point of view of what I was doing. The footsteps reveal that my crouching body and behavior are also part of a scene another person can take in from elsewhere. I encounter myself from a vantage point that I cannot occupy in quite the same way. Sartre develops the point further in a French passage on shame and the Look, where he distinguishes experiencing oneself as someone else's object from simply losing one's freedom. The possibilities that organize my activity can appear to me as existing outside my control, in the way that activity looks to someone else.
The book even considers what happens if I look down the corridor and find no one. The particular sound may have been a false alarm. The relation the alarm disclosed still makes sense. I understand what it would be to be seen there precisely because my way of acting is available to other people's attention. Their view can disclose something I had not noticed about how I appear. It can also turn on a mistake. The experience of exposure does not require granting every observer sound judgment.
This is what Sartre means by being-for-others. When I walk over to someone after an argument, for example, I may know my intention is to apologize, while they see someone approaching who has long been making demands on them. The history that gives my gesture its shape for them is also part of my history. I can explain myself, but I cannot choose what makes the gesture intelligible from their side. Sartre's keyhole scene isolates the moment this dimension of being becomes hard to overlook.
Shame can make the change especially abrupt, yet it helps to distinguish its structure in this analysis from a sense of guilt. Imagine a musician who suddenly realizes a colleague has been listening while they practice. The exposed gesture might be a mistake in a passage, or simply a way of trying out an unfamiliar phrasing. What changes is that the playing can now sound a certain way to somebody whose experience the musician cannot inhabit. The sense of exposure makes sense even where no one has been wronged.
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