Consciousness, freedom, and bad faith › Being in Itself and Being for Itself

Michael BrenndoerferNovember 1, 20263 min read
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Part 7 of 12Mind, Self, and Experience
Chapter 92Consciousness, freedom, and bad faith › Being in Itself and Being for Itself
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Sartre calls his project phenomenological ontology. He starts from descriptions of experience, such as searching for a person or realizing that someone can see him, and asks what those experiences reveal about the being of whoever undergoes them. A psychological explanation could ask what visual cues make a particular face easy to pick out. Sartre wants to account for the experience in which it matters that a particular face never comes into view.

In the Introduction, §§III and VI, Sartre contrasts the being of consciousness with the being of what it encounters. Being-in-itself, être-en-soi, coincides with itself. Think of a saucer in the café. It may already have a crack, or a waiter may break it later. Its coincidence with itself concerns the way it is at all. The saucer can have a shape, position, and history. The question of what it might yet be occurs to someone who intends to use it, repair it, or replace it.

Being-for-itself, être-pour-soi, names the mode of being Sartre attributes to consciousness. When I am absorbed in what I am reading, the article is what I am attending to. I do not have to pause and inspect myself to live through the reading as something I am doing. If I then ask whether I have been following the argument closely, my activity becomes the object of reflection. The possibility of reflecting on an activity presupposes that I was already conscious in the act of reading. Sartre calls this earlier kind of self-awareness prereflective. It belongs to the reading itself.

In Part Two, chapter 1, §§I–II, Sartre calls this structure presence to self. Consciousness has a relation to itself without having to represent itself as an additional object. Sartre uses this to distinguish the for-itself from the self-coincidence he assigns to the in-itself. He also introduces the facticity of the for-itself. I find myself in circumstances I did not bring about, and the fact that I exist at all has a contingency I cannot explain by inspecting my purposes. Reading this page is something I do from the particular situation in which I find myself.

The difference matters back in the café. Pierre may be perfectly present somewhere else. The room is full of things and activity. Yet Sartre says that the expectation of finding him, together with the way the room actually is, lets his absence appear there. Nothingness in this sense belongs to the way a world can show up for a conscious being whose questions and undertakings give it a shape.

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