Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment: Reason and Domination
Horkheimer and Adorno’s 1947 book follows the links between reason and domination through myth, industrial entertainment, and antisemitism.
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What the sailors can hear
Odysseus wants to hear the Sirens and survive. He stops his crew's ears with wax and has them tie him to the mast. They keep rowing. He can hear the song, but they do not release him when he signals to them. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno use this episode to ask what has been secured by Odysseus's ingenious plan and what he and his crew have had to give up. Work, enjoyment, and command are distributed differently. The rowers keep the ship moving without being able to hear the song. The person who can hear has bound himself so he cannot act on it. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, “The Concept of Enlightenment,” pp. 25–28, and excursus I, pp. 45–48.
The two authors circulated an early version of the work as Philosophical Fragments in 1944. The book titled Dialectic of Enlightenment was published in Amsterdam in 1947. Its materials include an inquiry into enlightenment, a reading of the Odyssey, an essay on the culture industry, and elements of an account of antisemitism. The historical circumstances pressed a question on the authors. Why could societies with formidable powers of calculation, administration, and production turn those powers toward organized violence? Having more means of controlling things seemed an inadequate measure of becoming freer. Dialectic of Enlightenment, prefaces and editor's afterword.
Enlightenment in myth and myth in enlightenment
In the book, enlightenment covers more than the eighteenth-century philosophical movement. The opening uses it for an effort to overcome fear of an uncertain world through explanation and mastery. In the authors' reading of Francis Bacon, the link between knowledge and the ability to produce effects brings this effort into view. Finding how to act reliably can free people from dependence on authority or stories they have no means to test. That capacity can also make it tempting to value every piece of knowledge by what it allows someone to control. The concern is with what happens when that criterion governs the whole inquiry. Dialectic of Enlightenment, “The Concept of Enlightenment,” pp. 1–5.
The authors' first reversal is that myth already shares something with enlightenment. A myth names powers, relates events to one another, and can present an account of why something recurs. In that sense it organizes experience. Scientific inquiry supplies different grounds for thinking an explanation is true. The authors can recognize the difference and still ask why the practical demand that nature be intelligible links the two. Once a myth has told people what force caused a disaster, it becomes possible to imagine which acts could hold the force in check. That limited control is a reason to look for enlightenment within myth as well as after it. Dialectic of Enlightenment, preface to the original edition and “The Concept of Enlightenment,” pp. 3–8.
Their second reversal is that enlightenment can become mythological. Suppose a way of measuring things originally helped people compare them for a particular purpose. The measures become harder to question when they are taken as the only terms in which reality can be described. What is left out of the comparison can come to seem unreal or unimportant. What remains can appear as a set of rules people simply have to obey. The authors see a resemblance to mythical fate in this apparently modern compulsion. A system of thought once used to free people from fixed explanations can represent the order they already inhabit as the only order possible. Dialectic of Enlightenment, “The Concept of Enlightenment,” pp. 4–9 and 18–21.
The first claim concerns the explanatory work already done by myths. The second concerns how a rational procedure can become dogmatic when it treats its own categories as exhaustive. The authors' preface links these claims to a search for a conception of enlightenment that can examine its own relationship to domination.
Making unlike things comparable
Consider valuing a table and an hour of labor in money. They can be compared for the purpose of a transaction while remaining different in the way they are made, used, and experienced. The authors connect the rule of equivalence in exchange with intellectual procedures that abstract from differences and use a common unit. A common measure can accomplish a task exactly because some features of each of the things measured are left out. It becomes a problem when people take success at that task as a sufficient account of what either thing is or what anyone ought to do with it. Dialectic of Enlightenment, “The Concept of Enlightenment,” pp. 4–9.
The book asks how to tell whether the means people use are worth using for the ends they have. A service built to move people through a queue can be evaluated by average wait times. How the service should respond to someone who needs more attention is another question. Insisting that every consideration be entered on the same scale can displace that question before anyone has tried to answer it. As an illustration of the distinction between means and ends, the example also marks a limit. It matters which purposes people think the measure serves and whether they have ways to contest a decision. The mere fact that an institution takes measurements does not settle the character of the institution.
The Odysseus example makes the issue involve a person's relation to his own purposes. He anticipates that he will want the crew to release him once he hears the Sirens. He secures his project of survival by depriving his later self of the ability to change the plan. His crew also bear a cost. Their work moves the ship, but the conditions under which they labor close off the experience made available to him. Horkheimer and Adorno read the divided situation as an image of a relation between labor and enjoyment that outlasts the ancient story. They are offering an interpretation of the episode, not identifying Homeric society with an industrial economy. Dialectic of Enlightenment, “The Concept of Enlightenment,” pp. 25–28, and excursus I.
The comparison could be pushed against the interpretation itself. Someone could read tying oneself to the mast as an exercise of autonomy, since Odysseus chooses which of his purposes will govern his conduct. The same reading might still have to ask what the crew could choose and why recognition of the song is reserved for the commander. It helps to distinguish the practical intelligence of the plan from the claim that the arrangement through which it worked is the best account of freedom available. The text keeps both aspects before us so that the success of one is evidence to consider alongside the price paid for it.
The second excursus sharpens the question about how reason bears on ends. The authors put Kant’s account of enlightenment and rational self-rule beside the Marquis de Sade’s fiction of Juliette. The juxtaposition is deliberately unsettling. Juliette uses systematic thought and practiced self-control in pursuit of cruelty. In the authors’ argument, seeing that her plans are coordinated and effective tells us little about why the ends deserve to be pursued. Kant’s account of morality demands more than effective calculation, which makes the comparison a question about how that additional demand can be sustained under a restricted conception of reason. Treating the excursus as a claim that Kant personally defended Juliette’s ends would erase the distinction the argument needs. Dialectic of Enlightenment, excursus II, “Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality,” pp. 63–76.
What the culture industry makes familiar
The essay on the culture industry considers organized entertainment in the radio, film, and magazine businesses. Its subject is how producing art and amusement on an industrial and commercial basis can shape what people are offered and what they learn to expect. The authors point to recurrent devices, predictable plots, and the way the appearance of variety can coexist with a narrow range of successful forms. The point is not exhausted by asking whether several films are alike. It is about the forces that favor reproducible formats and the effect such formats can have on how audiences recognize and respond to what they see. Dialectic of Enlightenment, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” pp. 94–104.
Imagine a picture whose opening scenes quickly tell the viewer which character is likely to become the hero and which difficulties will be resolved by the end. Genre conventions can give an audience real pleasures. Horkheimer and Adorno ask what follows if the occasions for such recognition are organized so consistently that little is left for the viewer to discover. What begins as a way to understand the picture can become a way to sort out in advance everything that counts as an event. That is a stronger claim than saying that audiences find familiarity enjoyable. It concerns how the structure of production can shape the exercise of attention during a work. “The Culture Industry,” pp. 94–108.
The freedom promised by amusement also has a place in the argument. People can genuinely be tired of work and seek diversion. The authors see the forms that supply that diversion as organized by related requirements of efficiency, repetition, and adjustment to what has already worked. Their treatment of advertising makes the connection less metaphorical. Promotion can become a condition of commercial visibility and an expense that large businesses are better placed to absorb. The apparatus that distributes a work can influence which works survive long enough to reach the audience. This is a proposal about institutions as well as about individual taste. “The Culture Industry,” John Cumming translation.
The chapter makes a concrete distinction between speaking on a telephone and listening to the radio. On a call, the people connected can answer one another. In the broadcasting arrangement the authors examine, many listeners can hear the same material but cannot reply through the same channel. They can respond as participants through competitions or other opportunities already organized by the broadcaster. The example puts a direction on the relation between a producer and the public. It also gives a reader a way to test the argument in a new case. The question would be whether the opportunities for replying or producing material are distributed differently, and what opportunities the people who administer the service can keep or withdraw. “The Culture Industry,” John Cumming translation, opening discussion.
A reader can take the institutional analysis seriously while doubting the strength of the claims about audiences. Someone may follow a conventional story, enjoy its formula, and talk with friends about features that the makers did not expect them to notice. An example of independent reception would matter to a blanket verdict on viewers. It would leave open the separate question of what chance an unconventional work had of being produced or distributed in the first place. Conversely, showing how few firms control access would not settle how every audience receives what is available. Putting the two claims under different tests makes it possible to assess how far the authors' account reaches.
What it means to project a threat
One of the book's most serious inquiries concerns antisemitism. The authors try to explain how persecutors can treat their own fears and impulses as properties of the people they persecute. In the section on false projection, the person's expectation governs what they are willing to see, and the outsider becomes the supposed bearer of qualities the observer will not recognize in themselves. A political movement can organize that lens, identify targets, and present the resulting prejudice as evidence supporting further persecution. The authors' explanation concerns a mechanism of antisemitism. It does not suggest that people persecuted on those grounds bear the qualities attributed to them. Dialectic of Enlightenment, “Elements of Anti-Semitism,” VI, pp. 154–160.
The section ties the mechanism to a question about reflective thought. Recognizing something in the world already involves attention and judgment. The inquirer needs a way to distinguish the features they are bringing to the encounter from what is available to be learned about the object. Horkheimer and Adorno argue that prejudice makes that distinction harder and can convert a person's expectation into apparent confirmation. The argument differs from the claim that prejudice simply reflects lack of information. It also leaves room for readers to question how well the psychological theory, the political explanation, and the history hold together in a specific case. “Elements of Anti-Semitism,” VI, pp. 154–162.
Can reason examine itself?
A critic can ask how the authors are entitled to the distinction between good and bad uses of thought. The book itself uses reasoning to describe connections between practices, consider objections, and diagnose errors. If every rational operation were already an instance of domination, the criticism would have difficulty explaining why its conclusions deserve to be heard. The original preface gives one way of addressing that problem. It treats freedom as inseparable from enlightened thinking and says the work aims to prepare a positive concept of enlightenment that is capable of freeing itself from its ties to domination. The claim opens a task as much as it supplies an answer. How would one organize present practices so that their purposes remain open to examination? Dialectic of Enlightenment, original preface, pp. xiv–xviii.
Another criticism concerns the scale of the history. Connecting mythical fate, exchange, industrial entertainment, and persecution can reveal a recurrent way of imposing an order. It can also make differences between the cases hard to see. A comparison needs to give grounds for finding a feature in common and identify where the analogy breaks. An account of the entertainment business needs evidence about organization and access. An account of oppression needs a history of the particular powers and people involved. The authors themselves declined in the 1969 preface to stand by every formulation from the earlier period. That leaves room to take their questions seriously while asking which answers survive changes in the institutions they examined. Dialectic of Enlightenment, preface to the 1969 edition, pp. xi–xii.
The 1969 preface also distinguishes historical criticism from a verdict that assumes the same diagnosis must remain right at every date. A claim about how broadcasting, ownership, and reception were organized during the authors’ period can be tested against what those organizations made possible. It can then be applied to a later case only if enough of the relationships are still present. This restriction leaves the reader with a more specific inquiry than asking whether modern culture is better or worse. It asks which industrial practices allow an audience to do something with a work, and which allow the industry to anticipate that response and sell it back. Dialectic of Enlightenment, preface to the 1969 edition and “The Culture Industry”.
Go back to the ship after the Sirens can no longer be heard. The plan did what it was designed to do. The rowers brought the crew past the danger and Odysseus survived what he heard. A fuller assessment can also ask whose reasons were taken into account, who worked, and what it took to make the arrangement hold. Horkheimer and Adorno use enlightenment's genuine successes to raise questions that the measures of those successes can leave untouched.
Further reading
- Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, Edmund Jephcott translation. Begin with the original preface and “The Concept of Enlightenment,” then compare the Sirens and “Elements of Anti-Semitism,” section VI.
- “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” John Cumming translation. Compare the argument about familiar forms with the later treatment of advertising.
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