Reason and domination › Making unlike things comparable
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Reason and domination › Making unlike things comparableSection view · Sections in this chapter3 / 7 ↓
Consider valuing a table and an hour of labor in money. They can be compared for the purpose of a transaction while remaining different in the way they are made, used, and experienced. The authors connect the rule of equivalence in exchange with intellectual procedures that abstract from differences and use a common unit. A common measure can accomplish a task exactly because some features of each of the things measured are left out. It becomes a problem when people take success at that task as a sufficient account of what either thing is or what anyone ought to do with it. Dialectic of Enlightenment, “The Concept of Enlightenment,” pp. 4–9.
The book asks how to tell whether the means people use are worth using for the ends they have. A service built to move people through a queue can be evaluated by average wait times. How the service should respond to someone who needs more attention is another question. Insisting that every consideration be entered on the same scale can displace that question before anyone has tried to answer it. As an illustration of the distinction between means and ends, the example also marks a limit. It matters which purposes people think the measure serves and whether they have ways to contest a decision. The mere fact that an institution takes measurements does not settle the character of the institution.
The Odysseus example makes the issue involve a person's relation to his own purposes. He anticipates that he will want the crew to release him once he hears the Sirens. He secures his project of survival by depriving his later self of the ability to change the plan. His crew also bear a cost. Their work moves the ship, but the conditions under which they labor close off the experience made available to him. Horkheimer and Adorno read the divided situation as an image of a relation between labor and enjoyment that outlasts the ancient story. They are offering an interpretation of the episode, not identifying Homeric society with an industrial economy. Dialectic of Enlightenment, “The Concept of Enlightenment,” pp. 25–28, and excursus I.
The comparison could be pushed against the interpretation itself. Someone could read tying oneself to the mast as an exercise of autonomy, since Odysseus chooses which of his purposes will govern his conduct. The same reading might still have to ask what the crew could choose and why recognition of the song is reserved for the commander. It helps to distinguish the practical intelligence of the plan from the claim that the arrangement through which it worked is the best account of freedom available. The text keeps both aspects before us so that the success of one is evidence to consider alongside the price paid for it.
The second excursus sharpens the question about how reason bears on ends. The authors put Kant’s account of enlightenment and rational self-rule beside the Marquis de Sade’s fiction of Juliette. The juxtaposition is deliberately unsettling. Juliette uses systematic thought and practiced self-control in pursuit of cruelty. In the authors’ argument, seeing that her plans are coordinated and effective tells us little about why the ends deserve to be pursued. Kant’s account of morality demands more than effective calculation, which makes the comparison a question about how that additional demand can be sustained under a restricted conception of reason. Treating the excursus as a claim that Kant personally defended Juliette’s ends would erase the distinction the argument needs. Dialectic of Enlightenment, excursus II, “Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality,” pp. 63–76.
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