Kripke's Naming and Necessity: Rigid Designation and Essentialism

Michael BrenndoerferNovember 1, 202613 min read

Saul Kripke’s lectures on how names refer, why some necessary truths are discovered empirically, and what people and things could have been.

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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 106Names and necessity › What could have happened to Nixon?
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What could have happened to Nixon?

Suppose Richard Nixon had lost the 1968 presidential election. We can ask what Nixon would have done next. We can also ask what the president of the United States in 1970 would have done. In that situation the questions could be about different people. The description picks out whoever occupies the office in the situation we are considering. The name, as we are using it, keeps our attention on Nixon even if he never occupied the office. A further claim, that people would still have called the man “Nixon,” would be a claim about their habits, which might also have been different. Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, lectures I–II excerpt.

Kripke calls expressions that function as the name does rigid designators. His 1970 Princeton lectures appeared in a collection in 1972 and as a book, Naming and Necessity, in 1980. He uses the difference between the name and the description to distinguish questions about how a term gets its reference, how we know a claim using it, and what could have happened to the person or thing it picks out. Most of the work of reading the lectures consists in keeping those questions apart in cases where they are easy to run together. Naming and Necessity, preface and lecture I.

A name and an office

If Nixon had lost, the description “the president of the United States in 1970” might have picked out Humphrey. In considering that possibility, you do not have to find someone in a distant setting who fits enough of the facts you happen to know about Nixon. You can stipulate that the situation concerns this person and then ask whether what you say about him could have been true. Nixon could have run a different campaign, held a different job, or gone by a different name. The requirement that we keep the person in view does not fix a list of his achievements in advance. Naming and Necessity, lecture I, pp. 43–49.

The same point helps explain why possible worlds enter the lectures. Kripke uses the language of possible worlds as a way to talk about how the world might have been. A counterfactual description can start with particular objects in the actual world. It may leave many other details unspecified. You could ask whether Nixon might have lost without saying who else would have run in a later election. There is still a substantive question whether the circumstances stipulated were possible. Being able to refer to Nixon in asking it does not guarantee that every story you can tell about him is possible. Naming and Necessity, lecture I, pp. 43–47.

Rigid designation

A rigid designator keeps its referent across the possible situations in which that object exists and does not designate a different object elsewhere. Rigidity does not require the object to exist in every possible world. The ordinary description “the president of the United States in 1970” can select different people across situations. A description that is explicitly tied to the actual holder of the office can be used rigidly.

That qualification about descriptions matters. Suppose we say “the person who actually won the 1968 election.” That expression can be used to keep referring to Nixon even while we say how that person's life might have differed. What makes an expression rigid is its behavior in the relevant modal claims. Grammatical form does not settle the issue. A bare description of an office can vary with the situation. Tying it to the actual office holder gives us a way to keep the person fixed. Naming and Necessity, preface, pp. 14–15.

Describing someone and referring to them

Kripke considers several views according to which a name works through the descriptions a speaker associates with it. A version gives the name a descriptive meaning. Another allows that its reference is fixed by a set of things the speaker believes about its bearer. Kripke treats Frege, Russell, and later theories of clusters as sources for different versions of the problem. A view on which a description fixes reference can allow that the name stays with the actual referent in other situations. It still has to explain whether speakers typically make the descriptive identification that the view requires. Naming and Necessity, lecture I, pp. 27–32, and lecture II, pp. 71–87.

Imagine a person who has heard the name “Gödel” and knows about the incompleteness theorem. Suppose a manuscript were discovered which showed that someone named Schmidt had proved the result and Gödel had taken credit for it. The person could then discover that something they had believed about Gödel was false. A theory on which “Gödel” just picks out whoever actually proved the theorem would have the person already referring to Schmidt. The intuitive judgment Kripke relies on is that the person has been referring to Gödel all along. The theory needs room for a name to refer successfully while the account its user gives of the referent is seriously mistaken. Naming and Necessity, lecture II, pp. 83–85.

The Gödel case attacks a proposed method of determining actual reference. The possibility that Aristotle might not have taught Alexander puts pressure on a different claim. If the name meant the same as that ordinary description, it would be hard to explain how it remains possible, of that very man, that he never taught Alexander. We can separate the tests by trying them on a plausible use of description. Someone can point to a newly discovered object by giving the description that first identified it, then give it a name. Having used the description to fix a referent leaves us free to ask how the object might have lacked the feature that was used to pick it out. Naming and Necessity, lecture I, pp. 29–31 and 54–60, and lecture II, pp. 71–78.

How a name reaches someone who never met its bearer

An alternative picture begins with an act of naming. Someone can name an object by pointing to it, or fix the reference of a name through a description. Other people can learn the name and pass it to others. They need not have met its bearer or be able to provide a description unique to that person. They can intend to use the name for the same person as the people they learned it from. A student who remembers just a little about Gödel can use the name through the history of that practice. The teacher and the student can have different beliefs and refer to the same person. Naming and Necessity, lecture II, pp. 90–97.

A merely causal connection can also be present when reference changes. A person may hear an account of Napoleon and decide to name a pet “Napoleon.” This introduces a separate use through an intentional change. More complicated cases can occur without the users realizing that reference has shifted. In the book's addenda Kripke discusses Gareth Evans's example involving “Madagascar.” In the reported origin story, a name for a place on the African mainland was applied to the island by someone who took himself to be preserving the earlier use. The example concerns what a shift like that would imply for the picture. The argument does not require the details of the origin story to be established. Naming and Necessity, lecture II, pp. 96–97, and addenda, pp. 162–164.

For this reason Kripke describes the account as a sketch. Intending to preserve a use and being connected to an earlier use do substantial work in the examples. A complete account would have to explain which links carry the reference, when a descriptive assignment can establish it, and when later use overtakes earlier history. Even so, the contrast with the view under criticism is clear enough to test. The person who learns a name can refer successfully without first working out a uniquely identifying description of its bearer. Naming and Necessity, lecture II, pp. 91–97.

An identity discovered in the sky

“Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” are names for the same object, Venus, introduced in connection with evening and morning appearances. The observations by which people learned that the two appearances were of the same body were empirical. Use the two names with their actual reference and ask whether there could be a situation in which Hesperus and Phosphorus are two different objects. Kripke's answer is that both rigidly pick out Venus and that Venus cannot be distinct from itself. The identity, if true, is necessary. Whether the two names have the same bearer is something people had to discover. Naming and Necessity, lecture II, pp. 100–105.

You can imagine having much the same evidence while observing two different celestial bodies. This would give you a situation in which observers might introduce two names by the same methods and succeed in naming different objects. It remains a distinct possibility from the one Kripke denies, in which the two actual names, interpreted as we use them, name Venus and Venus turns out to be distinct from Venus. The example separates what the evidence could have left open for an inquirer from what could have happened to the object. Kripke treats the first as a question about knowledge and the second as a question about necessity. Naming and Necessity, lecture II, pp. 102–105.

A length fixed by a stick

The lectures also discuss a contingent claim someone can know a priori. Suppose a person introduces “one meter” as a rigid designator for the length of a particular stick at a specified moment. The person making the stipulation does not need to measure the stick against a separate ruler to know it fits the unit introduced this way. If the stick had been heated or put under strain at that very moment, it could have had a different length. The unit in the counterfactual claim is the length fixed using the actual stick at the actual moment. It does not change as the hypothetical length of the stick changes. Naming and Necessity, lecture I, pp. 54–57.

This is a hypothetical way of fixing a standard. It is easy to mistake it for a synonymous definition that makes the phrase “one meter” mean whatever length this stick has in each situation. That would produce a different example. Kripke also makes the knowledge claim about the person who fixes the unit in this way. Someone who learned the unit elsewhere could have to measure a length to tell whether the stick had it. The contrast with Venus is instructive. Here the person can know the stated relation without further measurement, even though the stick could have been a different length. In the Venus example an empirical identification discloses a necessary relation. Naming and Necessity, lecture I, pp. 54–57.

The table, the gold, and the description

An object's essential properties are properties it could not have lacked in a situation in which it existed. Kripke asks whether the table in front of him might originally have been made from an entirely different block of wood or from ice. A different table could have occupied the room and looked like the actual one. He doubts that it would be this particular table. This illustrates a proposed constraint concerning origin. It leaves separate questions about what could happen to a table after it was made, whether it could have lost a part, and how much variation in manufacture the claim can tolerate. A critic can accept how names behave in counterfactual claims without accepting every proposed essential property. Naming and Necessity, lecture III, pp. 112–115 and 140–143.

He uses Elizabeth II as another example. She might have been separated from her family, acquired different habits, or never become queen. Her actual biography supplies many of the means by which we recognize her. The counterfactual inquiry can hold the person fixed and vary those facts. Kripke thinks there is a difference between letting that life proceed differently and supposing an otherwise similar woman originates from entirely different parents. A reader who resists the intuition can still ask what warrants either the identification or the distinction. The dispute is over the conditions for the possible life of this individual. Naming and Necessity, lecture III, pp. 112–114.

Kripke uses gold and water to consider what the necessities of identity could amount to in science. People can pick out samples of gold by ordinary features without knowing its atomic number. A substance that resembles the samples can later turn out to be something else. Given the identification of gold with the element of atomic number 79, Kripke argues that the resemblance of such a substance would not make it gold. His water case has the same shape. A different substance could fill the rivers and look and feel like water. It could even have attracted the name in a community with that history. In describing the situation with our term, Kripke takes us to be asking where the actual substance is and what it could do. Naming and Necessity, lecture III, pp. 123–129.

The important step concerns which successful discoveries identify what a kind is. Learning that a sample was found in a certain mine does not determine what the substance is. Learning about its atomic structure could do so, on Kripke's account. The conclusion does not make empirical investigation dispensable. One has to establish what the sampled substance is and which theoretical description identifies it. Nor does it make a description associated with a name synonymous with it. The consequences for possibility come from how the two expressions designate once the identity has been established. Naming and Necessity, lecture III, pp. 123–129 and 138–143.

Why the argument about pain is different

The final lecture asks whether a similar identity claim could say what pain is. A person feeling warmth usually has an ordinary way to identify an external phenomenon. Kripke argues that the same feeling could arise from a different physical source. Part of the apparent contingency in a theoretical identification of heat therefore concerns how a phenomenon was detected. A person could feel the same way while failing to encounter the external process in question. He questions whether pain can be treated in parallel. Feeling pain appears to be a way of being in the state itself. There is no straightforward second phenomenon to invoke that merely seems like pain in the relevant respect. Naming and Necessity, lecture III, pp. 144–155.

Take the identity thesis that pain is stimulation of C-fibers, using Kripke's example as a stand-in for a proposed physical identity. If both expressions designate rigidly, the identity would have to be necessary if true. The apparent possibility that the stimulation takes place without pain creates a challenge for the identity theorist. Kripke asks the identity theorist to explain that appearance and argues that the explanation used for heat is unavailable for pain. The adequacy of his distinction is contested. The argument asks for an explanation of how the identification could work and does not require treating C-fiber stimulation as a current scientific definition of pain. Naming and Necessity, lecture III, pp. 148–155.

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@misc{brenndoerfer2026kripkes-2, author = {Michael Brenndoerfer}, title = {Kripke's Naming and Necessity: Rigid Designation and Essentialism}, year = {2026}, url = {https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/kripke-naming-necessity-rigid-designation-essentialism-guide}, organization = {mbrenndoerfer.com}, note = {Accessed: 2026-11-19} }
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Michael Brenndoerfer (2026). Kripke's Naming and Necessity: Rigid Designation and Essentialism. Retrieved from https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/kripke-naming-necessity-rigid-designation-essentialism-guide
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Michael Brenndoerfer. "Kripke's Naming and Necessity: Rigid Designation and Essentialism." Accessed November 19, 2026. https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/kripke-naming-necessity-rigid-designation-essentialism-guide.
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