Names and necessity › A length fixed by a stick
PhilosophyAll chapters Reading tools Notes & comments
Names and necessity › A length fixed by a stickSection view · Sections in this chapter6 / 9 ↓
The lectures also discuss a contingent claim someone can know a priori. Suppose a person introduces “one meter” as a rigid designator for the length of a particular stick at a specified moment. The person making the stipulation does not need to measure the stick against a separate ruler to know it fits the unit introduced this way. If the stick had been heated or put under strain at that very moment, it could have had a different length. The unit in the counterfactual claim is the length fixed using the actual stick at the actual moment. It does not change as the hypothetical length of the stick changes. Naming and Necessity, lecture I, pp. 54–57.
This is a hypothetical way of fixing a standard. It is easy to mistake it for a synonymous definition that makes the phrase “one meter” mean whatever length this stick has in each situation. That would produce a different example. Kripke also makes the knowledge claim about the person who fixes the unit in this way. Someone who learned the unit elsewhere could have to measure a length to tell whether the stick had it. The contrast with Venus is instructive. Here the person can know the stated relation without further measurement, even though the stick could have been a different length. In the Venus example an empirical identification discloses a necessary relation. Naming and Necessity, lecture I, pp. 54–57.
Comments
Add to the conversation
A question, a correction, or an example from your own work.
No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!