Names and necessity › The table, the gold, and the description

Michael BrenndoerferNovember 1, 20263 min read
PhilosophyAll chapters
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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 106Names and necessity › The table, the gold, and the description
Reading section 7 of 9 · The table, the gold, and the description · 3 minSection 7 of 9 · 3 min

Section 7 of 9 · 3 min read

Names and necessity › The table, the gold, and the descriptionSection view · Sections in this chapter7 / 9 ↓

An object's essential properties are properties it could not have lacked in a situation in which it existed. Kripke asks whether the table in front of him might originally have been made from an entirely different block of wood or from ice. A different table could have occupied the room and looked like the actual one. He doubts that it would be this particular table. This illustrates a proposed constraint concerning origin. It leaves separate questions about what could happen to a table after it was made, whether it could have lost a part, and how much variation in manufacture the claim can tolerate. A critic can accept how names behave in counterfactual claims without accepting every proposed essential property. Naming and Necessity, lecture III, pp. 112–115 and 140–143.

He uses Elizabeth II as another example. She might have been separated from her family, acquired different habits, or never become queen. Her actual biography supplies many of the means by which we recognize her. The counterfactual inquiry can hold the person fixed and vary those facts. Kripke thinks there is a difference between letting that life proceed differently and supposing an otherwise similar woman originates from entirely different parents. A reader who resists the intuition can still ask what warrants either the identification or the distinction. The dispute is over the conditions for the possible life of this individual. Naming and Necessity, lecture III, pp. 112–114.

Kripke uses gold and water to consider what the necessities of identity could amount to in science. People can pick out samples of gold by ordinary features without knowing its atomic number. A substance that resembles the samples can later turn out to be something else. Given the identification of gold with the element of atomic number 79, Kripke argues that the resemblance of such a substance would not make it gold. His water case has the same shape. A different substance could fill the rivers and look and feel like water. It could even have attracted the name in a community with that history. In describing the situation with our term, Kripke takes us to be asking where the actual substance is and what it could do. Naming and Necessity, lecture III, pp. 123–129.

The important step concerns which successful discoveries identify what a kind is. Learning that a sample was found in a certain mine does not determine what the substance is. Learning about its atomic structure could do so, on Kripke's account. The conclusion does not make empirical investigation dispensable. One has to establish what the sampled substance is and which theoretical description identifies it. Nor does it make a description associated with a name synonymous with it. The consequences for possibility come from how the two expressions designate once the identity has been established. Naming and Necessity, lecture III, pp. 123–129 and 138–143.

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