Names and necessity › Describing someone and referring to them

Michael BrenndoerferNovember 1, 20262 min read
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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 106Names and necessity › Describing someone and referring to them
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Kripke considers several views according to which a name works through the descriptions a speaker associates with it. A version gives the name a descriptive meaning. Another allows that its reference is fixed by a set of things the speaker believes about its bearer. Kripke treats Frege, Russell, and later theories of clusters as sources for different versions of the problem. A view on which a description fixes reference can allow that the name stays with the actual referent in other situations. It still has to explain whether speakers typically make the descriptive identification that the view requires. Naming and Necessity, lecture I, pp. 27–32, and lecture II, pp. 71–87.

Imagine a person who has heard the name “Gödel” and knows about the incompleteness theorem. Suppose a manuscript were discovered which showed that someone named Schmidt had proved the result and Gödel had taken credit for it. The person could then discover that something they had believed about Gödel was false. A theory on which “Gödel” just picks out whoever actually proved the theorem would have the person already referring to Schmidt. The intuitive judgment Kripke relies on is that the person has been referring to Gödel all along. The theory needs room for a name to refer successfully while the account its user gives of the referent is seriously mistaken. Naming and Necessity, lecture II, pp. 83–85.

The Gödel case attacks a proposed method of determining actual reference. The possibility that Aristotle might not have taught Alexander puts pressure on a different claim. If the name meant the same as that ordinary description, it would be hard to explain how it remains possible, of that very man, that he never taught Alexander. We can separate the tests by trying them on a plausible use of description. Someone can point to a newly discovered object by giving the description that first identified it, then give it a name. Having used the description to fix a referent leaves us free to ask how the object might have lacked the feature that was used to pick it out. Naming and Necessity, lecture I, pp. 29–31 and 54–60, and lecture II, pp. 71–78.

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