Names and necessity › A name and an office

Michael BrenndoerferNovember 1, 20262 min read
PhilosophyAll chapters
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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 106Names and necessity › A name and an office
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If Nixon had lost, the description “the president of the United States in 1970” might have picked out Humphrey. In considering that possibility, you do not have to find someone in a distant setting who fits enough of the facts you happen to know about Nixon. You can stipulate that the situation concerns this person and then ask whether what you say about him could have been true. Nixon could have run a different campaign, held a different job, or gone by a different name. The requirement that we keep the person in view does not fix a list of his achievements in advance. Naming and Necessity, lecture I, pp. 43–49.

The same point helps explain why possible worlds enter the lectures. Kripke uses the language of possible worlds as a way to talk about how the world might have been. A counterfactual description can start with particular objects in the actual world. It may leave many other details unspecified. You could ask whether Nixon might have lost without saying who else would have run in a later election. There is still a substantive question whether the circumstances stipulated were possible. Being able to refer to Nixon in asking it does not guarantee that every story you can tell about him is possible. Naming and Necessity, lecture I, pp. 43–47.

Rigid designation

A rigid designator keeps its referent across the possible situations in which that object exists and does not designate a different object elsewhere. Rigidity does not require the object to exist in every possible world. The ordinary description “the president of the United States in 1970” can select different people across situations. A description that is explicitly tied to the actual holder of the office can be used rigidly.

That qualification about descriptions matters. Suppose we say “the person who actually won the 1968 election.” That expression can be used to keep referring to Nixon even while we say how that person's life might have differed. What makes an expression rigid is its behavior in the relevant modal claims. Grammatical form does not settle the issue. A bare description of an office can vary with the situation. Tying it to the actual office holder gives us a way to keep the person fixed. Naming and Necessity, preface, pp. 14–15.

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