The subjective character of experience › The Subjective Character of Experience
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In Nagel's use of the phrase, the question of whether there is something it is like to be a creature is a question about whether it has conscious experience. Saying that there is something it is like to hear a note does not ask which other object the note resembles. It says that hearing it has a character for the being that hears it. Nagel calls this the subjective character of experience. What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, pp. 435–437 and 440, including note 6
Nagel's point of view can be shared in kind. Another person can understand something about how an experience appears to its subject without literally being that subject. A point of view may be easier or harder to take up depending on the similarity of the beings and the experience in question.
Notice what this leaves open. It may be possible to know that a creature hears or feels something while having little grasp of the character of its hearing or feeling. Nagel assumes that bats have experiences. He does not arrive at that assumption by first succeeding in imagining their sonar. Conversely, our failure to picture a kind of experience does not show that there is nothing to picture. In the essay he imagines an investigator of another species in much the same position with respect to us. Our concepts could be too limited for a task even when there is a fact we are trying to grasp. What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, pp. 437–441
To see why “subjective” does not mean “private to one individual,” consider asking another person to describe the quality of a familiar sound. We can understand much of the report because our sensory experience gives us common resources. We can also be wrong about what experience the speaker had. The important point is that we know what kind of claim the speaker is making. Nagel says that someone can state a fact about another person's experience. The fact remains tied to a type of viewpoint insofar as understanding it requires some ability to take up that viewpoint. What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, pp. 440–441
The bat case makes the limits of that ability conspicuous. Nagel suggests that knowing what human echolocation is like might help someone imagine roughly what it is like to use a bat’s more refined sonar. This is a prospect for partial understanding. His point is that the roughness of the imagined experience tracks how far the person can take up the bat's way of perceiving. He does not offer a proof that no human could ever learn anything about how bat experience is organized. What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, p. 441 n. 8
Nagel also invites us to consider acquiring a bat's constitution. Suppose a person could somehow change into the sort of creature that can occupy the relevant standpoint. If they then had bat experiences, they might learn something through the change. That would be a different route to understanding from reading a description while retaining their original way of perceiving. The scenario does not decide whether transformation is possible, or whether anyone could report what they learned afterward. It helps distinguish the claim that a viewpoint is involved in our conception of an experience from the claim that the relevant facts belong to an inaccessible realm. We can say what is missing from our perspective without pretending to know what future creatures or concepts could make available. What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, pp. 438–439, 441 n. 8
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