The subjective character of experience › What Objectivity Lets Us Keep

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated September 14, 20262 min read
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Part 7 of 12Mind, Self, and Experience
Chapter 83The subjective character of experience › What Objectivity Lets Us Keep
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Imagine an investigator with no visual experience studying lightning. We can tell the investigator where and when a flash appeared to us. They need never learn to see the bright streak themselves to investigate where and when the event occurred. The process of making a description accessible beyond a human visual standpoint leaves room for more than one way of observing the same event. It also leaves the character of our particular visual experience for a separate account.

Nagel uses a version of this example in What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, pp. 442–444. The lightning itself is accessible through investigation even to an observer who cannot grasp how it looks to us. An account of the event can set aside the appearance and investigate what produced it. The event does not become a different subject just because we proceed that way.

That is a strength of objective inquiry. Rather than requiring every investigator to use our eyes and share our visual experiences, we can compare measures and consequences that different investigators have reason to accept. Nagel treats increasing objectivity as a direction inquiry can take. He does not assume that the process culminates in an absolutely viewpoint-free description. The contrast rests on becoming less dependent on a particular kind of standpoint. What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, pp. 442–443

Now suppose the question has changed. The investigator wants to understand how the lightning appeared to a particular creature. What could be investigated in the earlier example without sharing the visual appearance was the lightning. Here the experience itself is the subject. Setting aside the character the event had for the creature can therefore set aside part of what our new inquiry is supposed to explain. That is the asymmetry Nagel asks us to consider.

This does not discredit a scientific account of perception. We might learn about the order in which processes occur and discover how changes in an organism affect what it can discriminate. Nagel's further question is how such an account could give us a conception of how those processes constitute an experience. That task is different from jointly explaining how a stimulus arrives and what a creature does afterward.

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