Meaning through use › What a word does in a language-game

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated November 4, 20253 min read
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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 101Meaning through use › What a word does in a language-game
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Wittgenstein uses language-game for the simplified practices he asks us to imagine and for speech considered as part of an activity. A foreman gives an order. A worker reports what happened. A visitor asks what a tool is called. Each case makes sense against the background of what those people can do and expect of one another. To say that speaking a language is part of a form of life is to ask us to include activities in our account of speech. For example, giving an order on a building site normally has a point because the workers know what can be done with the material. Hearing the sound in isolation would tell you little about that. Investigations, §§7–8, 19 and 23.

Section 43 draws attention to use for a large class of cases where we talk about meaning. Wittgenstein expressly qualifies the remark. Take the word “here.” Someone can use it to indicate where to stand, to answer a roll call, or to offer an object that another person needs. To learn what was meant, it helps to know which exchange was taking place. We could try to find one item named “here” and ask which mental picture the three speakers have in common. An account of what the speakers are doing can make their particular uses intelligible before either question has been answered. Investigations, §§38–43.

How a model helps

The builders' exchange is a deliberately limited example. With only a few words and responses to keep track of, readers can see how knowing what to do belongs to knowing the language. The list of activities in §23 quickly expands the range to cases such as making up a story, making a joke, translating, and thanking someone.

Wittgenstein's list also says that some language-games come into being and others go out of use. This is one reason to resist giving each activity a fixed set of written rules. We know some familiar ways to make a request, and can recognize a new phrasing as a request in the right surroundings. Someone who asks “Any chance you could pass me that chisel?” has made an intelligible move without having learned it word for word. The regularity needed for understanding leaves room for this sort of variation. Investigations, §23.

An ostensive definition offers a small test. If you point to two nuts and say “two,” someone who already has a place for number words can take this as a lesson about their number. Another learner might take the same gesture as identifying the kind of nut or its color. The pointing is identical in both lessons. The role it takes on depends on other examples, questions, corrections, and what the learner already knows how to do. Wittgenstein uses that possibility to ask how much has to be in place before pointing and speaking counts as teaching a particular word. Investigations, §§28–31.

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