Universals and economical explanation › How a Sign Can Be Singular and Universal

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated June 2, 20263 min read
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Part 6 of 12Being, Change, and Possibility
Chapter 74Universals and economical explanation › How a Sign Can Be Singular and Universal
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We use singular in more than one way. It can mean one thing rather than several. If I write the word human once on a scrap of paper, there is one inscription. Its application is not limited to one person. The inscription can be a sign of many individuals. To describe its breadth of application is to say something about what it signifies, apart from how many signs are present on the paper. Ockham applies the same distinction to what occurs in a mind. A mental sign is numerically one, yet it is universal in so far as it is suited to stand for and be predicated of many. Summa Logicae, I.14

Ockham also considers a narrower use of singular. In that use, a singular sign is both numerically one and not suited to signify many. A general concept is singular in the first sense and fails the additional condition in the second. The apparent paradox therefore comes from using the same word for two tests. Count the sign and you get one. Ask what it can stand for and the answer can be many. Summa Logicae, I.14

A universal in Ockham's account

A universal is a sign that can be predicated of many. Being a universal in this sense does not require being a substance shared by the things the sign is true of. A general concept can itself belong to one mind. Summa Logicae, I.14–15

Written, spoken, and mental terms fit into this account in different ways. We learn what spoken and written terms signify through a convention. The same animals can be called dogs in English and chiens in French. Nothing about the animals requires those particular sounds or marks. Ockham says that mental terms signify naturally. Assigning an utterance to signify what a concept signifies does not ordinarily make the utterance a name for the concept. The person who says a dog is barking is usually talking about the animal. Ockham therefore distinguishes the source of the utterance's meaning from the object to which that meaning directs us. Summa Logicae, I.1

A natural sign, on this account, is not freely reassigned by convention in the manner of a word. In chapter 14 Ockham compares it to the way smoke indicates a fire. The comparison is about the nonconventional relation, not a claim that understanding a kind of thing is exactly the same process as detecting a fire. It does not give an account of how many instances a learner would need to encounter before forming a particular general concept. Summa Logicae, I.14

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