The problem of conscious experience › What causes a judgment about experience?

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated September 22, 20262 min read
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Part 7 of 12Mind, Self, and Experience
Chapter 86The problem of conscious experience › What causes a judgment about experience?
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Imagine that a physical duplicate writes “I feel pain” just as you do. On the zombie description, its physical activity explains the writing without any pain being felt. This raises an objection directed at Chalmers's own view. If the physical facts already explain why you write those words, how does your pain matter? Taking physical causation to be closed makes the issue especially sharp. If felt qualities add no causal influence, it becomes hard to see how we know anything about them or even how our words come to concern them. The Conscious Mind, chapter 4, §4 and chapter 5, §§1–3.

Chalmers acknowledges the pressure. He considers whether conscious properties might matter causally in a way that a simple statement of the physical closure principle misses. He also argues that knowledge of a present experience may depend on a kind of acquaintance with it. What makes the judgment yours and connected to this pain can depend on your having the experience even if the bodily production of the words can be accounted for physically. The critic can still demand an explanation of the usual connection between accurate judgments and their phenomenal objects. This problem makes the book more than a defense of taking experience seriously. A theory that treats experience as fundamental still has to explain how we know about it. The Conscious Mind, chapter 5, §§4–7.

A physicalist can agree that we must explain the feeling of pain and challenge the demand for a new kind of law. They might argue that recognizing a sensation from the inside and describing its processes from the outside give us access to the same state in different ways. A successful account of that proposal would explain why the state appears to escape its own physical description. Conversely, Chalmers needs proposed laws to do more than repeat the observation that experiences follow physical changes. He wants them to constrain which changes have effects and why their patterns look the way they do. Think back to the hot mug. For either theory to become more than a label for the sensation, it must explain why that particular contact yields that particular sort of experience.

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