The problem of conscious experience › What counts as an explanation?
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Consider a system that can tell ripe and unripe fruit apart. There are questions about how it detects surface color under changing illumination, how it learns to associate color with ripeness, and how it uses the association to pick a fruit. An explanation can identify the mechanisms that make those abilities possible. You could test a hypothesis about one mechanism by changing the lighting or by varying what the system has learned. The difficulty of designing those tests can be immense. Chalmers calls these problems easy because we can say what sort of explanation would answer them.
The distinction also applies to a mental state described in different ways. Psychologically, a pain can be described through its causal role in attention, avoidance, and what the person says about the injury. Phenomenally, pain is a sensation with a character of its own. The same person can be described in both ways. An account of one person's behavior after touching the mug can be true even if it says little about what distinguishes the sensation from an itch or a dull ache. Chalmers claims that even filling in the whole causal and functional account leaves the phenomenal question open. Whether it really does is the dispute. The Conscious Mind, chapters 1 and 3, especially pp. 11–16 and 106–111.
A functional explanation shows how a system performs an ability, such as distinguishing two colors or reporting something it sees. The hard problem asks why a process gives rise to experience at all and why it gives rise to that particular experience. Whether the second question would already be answered by a complete account of the relevant abilities is the point at issue.
Here is one reason to believe that a functional answer can suffice in other cases. Suppose we want to explain how a door opens when it detects an approaching person. Once we have described the sensor, the circuit that responds, and the motor, we understand how that device performs the task. A more detailed account can clarify how quickly it works or why it fails with a particular input. There is no further act of automatic opening still waiting to be explained. A physicalist can propose that consciousness fits that pattern. Chalmers thinks experience differs because it still makes sense to ask why the process feels painful or gives rise to the experience of seeing red. Chalmers, “Facing Up,” §3.
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