The problem of conscious experience › The feeling and what a system does
PhilosophyAll chapters Reading tools Notes & comments
The problem of conscious experience › The feeling and what a system doesSection view · Sections in this chapter1 / 8 ↓
Touch the side of a hot mug and you may pull your hand away before you have a clear idea of how hot it was. A neuroscientist could ask how signals from your hand reach the nervous system, what coordinates the movement, and how you come to remember what happened. David Chalmers asks a further question. Why does any part of that process feel the way it does? A complete account of how a person detects heat and avoids it would have answered several questions about the event. Chalmers wants to know whether that account also explains the sensation.
Chalmers called this the hard problem of consciousness in his 1995 essay “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.” His book The Conscious Mind (1996) gives a sustained case for taking the problem as a distinct explanatory task and proposes a way to pursue it. Chalmers accepts that the physical basis of an experience can be studied and that differences in the brain have consequences for what a person experiences. He disputes the idea that the full description of that basis already determines all the facts about experience without an additional principle. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” §§2–3. The Conscious Mind, introduction.
Comments
Add to the conversation
A question, a correction, or an example from your own work.
No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!