Fair terms of cooperation › From Principles to Decisions
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Fair terms of cooperation › From Principles to DecisionsSection view · Sections in this chapter7 / 8 ↓
A society cannot settle every law under the restrictions used to choose the principles. Suppose legislators are deciding how to make elections accessible. They may need to know where people live, what travel is available, and which arrangements local officials can implement. Denying them every fact about their society would make it hard to meet the liberties the principles require. But letting any decision turn on whether it favors the people making it would defeat the original reason for asking about justice.
The four-stage sequence in §31 explains how the argument can use different kinds of information at different points. First the parties choose the principles in the original position. A constitutional convention then works out a constitution in light of the principles, with more facts about the society at hand. Legislators consider particular laws under the constitution and the principles of justice. Finally, officials and citizens apply the public rules to individual cases with the necessary facts available. The veil is lifted in stages because an exercise in choosing principles and a decision under an existing law call for different information.
Take the principle of equal political liberty. It can guide the design of a constitution that protects voting and participation. The legislature still has to decide how registration works and where polling will take place. Officials then have to know an individual's circumstances when they apply the relevant rules. If one voter cannot reach a polling place, the question the official needs to answer will differ from the question the constitutional convention faced. The public claim to political liberty gives those tasks a connection without giving them identical instructions.
This sequence also changes what it would mean to criticize the result. A constitution might fail to secure a liberty. A statute could be inconsistent with an otherwise adequate constitution. A well-designed law could be applied selectively. Those are different failures, and correcting one might leave the others in place. Rawls's focus on the basic structure makes room for evaluating their cumulative effect. It also gives a reason to be specific about where a particular problem starts.
One can therefore use the original position to investigate rules without imagining that every citizen must forget their life whenever they make a political choice. Its conditions specify the first-stage task. Later inquiry needs much of the knowledge that the first stage withholds. Whether the resulting institutions work fairly is a further matter for evidence and public reasoning.
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