Fair terms of cooperation › The Choice Under Uncertainty

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated October 20, 20252 min read
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Part 10 of 12Justice and Political Authority
Chapter 121Fair terms of cooperation › The Choice Under Uncertainty
Reading section 3 of 8 · The Choice Under Uncertainty · 2 minSection 3 of 8 · 2 min

Section 3 of 8 · 2 min read

Fair terms of cooperation › The Choice Under UncertaintySection view · Sections in this chapter3 / 8 ↓

In §26, Rawls relates the case for his principles to maximin. That rule compares the least favorable outcome of each option and picks the option with the best such outcome. Suppose two arrangements have very different possible effects on your prospects. If the first could leave you without means to pursue a reasonable life, while the second guarantees enough even in its least favorable case, the guarantee can matter more than whatever extra gain the first makes possible.

The rule is unusual, and Rawls gives reasons tied to the original position for taking it seriously. The parties lack a reliable basis for assigning probabilities to their possible places. They have less reason to pursue gains above an acceptable minimum when secure access to the minimum is at stake. The outcomes allowed by some alternatives would be difficult to accept. Maximin is therefore neither a general instruction to avoid risk nor the difference principle restated. The former is a way of ranking decisions under particular uncertainty. The latter is a principle for comparing institutional arrangements.

Rawls contrasts his account with utilitarianism in §§5–6 and 27–29. An aggregate calculation can in principle count losses to some people as compensated by gains to others. The parallel with deciding when to endure a loss for a later gain in one's own life is limited. Different people bear the losses and enjoy the gains. Rawls's objection about the separateness of persons concerns how those distinct claims are treated. It is consistent with the idea that a utilitarian might oppose particular injustices in practice because of their consequences.

The argument also asks what people can commit themselves to after choosing. Once the veil is lifted, some citizens will occupy the less favorable positions. The question is whether they can live with the principles, knowing what those principles allow and that others know it too. If an agreement allows fundamental interests to be sacrificed in circumstances that would be unacceptable once known, there is a problem about the commitment the parties can reasonably make. Rawls uses this issue in §29 to compare the stability of the alternatives.

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