What makes something a work of art › The cases of Giorgione and J
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What makes something a work of art › The cases of Giorgione and JSection view · Sections in this chapter2 / 5 ↓
The canvas prepared by Giorgione has a provenance that would interest an art historian. It can give information about material, studio practice, or the intended work. The work that he would have painted on it never came into existence in Danto’s example. Treating the prepared canvas as evidence of an artist’s activity leaves room for the distinction between what he did and the painting he never made. An object can inherit interest from its place in someone’s practice without inheriting the identity of the work that practice was meant to produce. The example also complicates a simple rule that whatever the artist puts into a gallery is an artwork. In the thought experiment several objects share a location while serving very different purposes within the display. Chapter 1, anthology extract, pp. 35–37.
A visitor Danto calls J objects to the exhibition’s apparent injustice. The red-painted surface has the same appearance as its neighbors. Why should it receive a lesser status? J paints a further red canvas and insists on its inclusion as a work. Danto allows it into the show and calls it empty in the sense of lacking artistic richness. That is different from saying a crate is empty because its contents were removed. It is also different from remarking that a bare red surface has nothing painted over it. Criticism of J already treats the canvas as a work that can have a point and try to accomplish something. Calling it a thin work is one way to take its proposal seriously enough to assess it. Chapter 1, anthology extract, pp. 36–37.
J’s work also helps separate judgments of classification from judgments of merit. Two people might agree which exhibit is meant to be a work and disagree about whether it is any good. They could point to the same red coating for different reasons. One thinks the severe restriction makes the protest exact. The other thinks the gesture has left the protest too thinly developed. The disagreement is intelligible because they are assessing the same broad enterprise. The color description alone leaves the enterprise unstated. What interests Danto is how someone gets from that description to an identification of what the thing is doing.
Danto makes the use of a title part of the example. J calls the work Untitled, which can itself indicate how a viewer is being asked to approach it. The designation differs from a registrar saying that a title is unknown or was never assigned. J says the painting is about nothing. Danto considers several ways of understanding that answer. A work could take absence as its subject, or it could be presented in a way intended to discourage the assignment of a subject at all. A bare thing lacks a subject in a further sense. The similarities in how these cases can be described conceal the differences between a particular subject, a choice about how a work is to be taken, and an object for which there is no such choice to explain. Chapter 1, anthology extract, pp. 36–37.
J eventually declares the original bare expanse a work of art, following the precedent of Duchamp’s selections. Danto grants that the declaration succeeds in the example. The same thing that had been included for comparison can now have a part in a new artistic act. What has changed needs to be explained. J’s touch alone would not settle the matter, since he can paint a fence simply to give it a new coat. The case helps distinguish the ability to do something on a particular historical occasion from the proposition that those words would have the same effect in any setting. Chapter 1, anthology extract, p. 37.
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