Community and the person who chooses › Reflection, Community, and the Good
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Community and the person who chooses › Reflection, Community, and the GoodSection view · Sections in this chapter6 / 8 ↓
In chapter 4, “Justice and the Good”, Sandel considers how Rawls's account of the good fits his account of the subject. A person can take a commitment seriously while being capable of reconsidering it. The issue is whether reconsideration always takes the form of standing back from an attachment and choosing to retain it. In the opening example, the person who takes responsibility can understand their family relationship more clearly through the deliberation. Seeing a responsibility in that relationship changes how they understand the choice in front of them.
A shared practice can play a similar role. A community might be useful to people because it helps them achieve aims they have picked independently. It can also help them see purposes they would scarcely have recognized apart from participating in it. Consider people who learn to care for a public space by organizing with their neighbors to keep it usable. The value of the undertaking may become part of how they understand their role in that place. The fact that they might later object to the group's decisions does not make this influence on their aims disappear.
This also leaves a hard question for appeals to community. Suppose members disagree about what a tradition requires, with some arguing that arrangements taken for granted have long excluded them. Their attachments can supply reasons to stay and contest the practice. The same attachments give us no assurance that the familiar interpretation deserves their deference. Showing that a commitment helps make a person who they are tells us something about deliberation. It leaves open what a defensible public rule ought to be. Sandel registers his unease with the blanket communitarian label in the preface to the 1998 second edition. The debate contains more than one question, and the label does not settle his answer to each.
A public library offers a variation on this distinction. One reason to support it is that each user gains access to something they want. The benefits can be counted even if no two users share an aim. Another reason concerns the practice that develops when people sustain a place where anyone can learn, ask for help, and contribute what they know. Some of the people involved may come to value the practice through participation in it. The second account introduces a reason the first does not describe, even if both favor the same decision about funding.
Part of the dispute is how such a shared good could bear on politics. A library committee could make a service genuinely public by asking who is still unable to use it and what their exclusion does to the undertaking. Calling the service a common good does not automatically make it so. Some participants may speak as though established members' interests are the only ones at stake. A defensible description of what is shared needs to leave room for questions about those people as well. They may care about aspects of the library that regular users have taken for granted. To find out what counts as public use, the organizers have to listen to those perspectives.
Conversely, people may value a common practice and still want a legal boundary around how far its organizers may dictate their lives. A person who learns to value public discussion has gained a reason to defend it. They have not thereby given the group authority over everything they say. The disagreement about the place of justice concerns how to describe both considerations at once. A theory that recognizes commitments and collective goods still needs to say how people can question their terms. A theory that protects individuals still needs to explain what kind of joint life its protections make possible.
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