Community and the person who chooses › Possession and the Difference Principle
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Community and the person who chooses › Possession and the Difference PrincipleSection view · Sections in this chapter4 / 8 ↓
The disagreement becomes sharper in chapter 2, “Possession, Desert, and Distributive Justice”. Sandel examines whether the account of the person implicit in the original position fits a principle that regulates advantages from economic cooperation. Rawls's difference principle requires social and economic inequalities to work to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, within his other constraints. How should a theory of distinct persons explain why the distribution of natural talents and their benefits matters to those who do not have the same talents?
Consider someone with a capacity that earns more under one set of public rules than another. A theory might explain the income as a return that naturally belongs to that person before any question about institutions arises. Rawls instead asks which public rules should shape returns from citizens' cooperation. He regards the distribution of talents as a resource whose benefits can be shared through institutions. This concerns how returns are organized. It does not say that one citizen has a claim to own another citizen's talent.
Sandel asks what view of possession and community can justify that move. Suppose people are conceived as separate holders of attributes whose identity can be specified before any social ends are taken into account. The theory then has to explain how the deployment of those attributes belongs to a common undertaking whose advantages can be divided. Merely noting that a talent was unearned leaves open which people have claims to its benefits and why. The chapter's opening sets this as a test of how Rawls's conception of the person fits his distributive principle. Sandel compares it with Nozick's position to show that a dispute about what people should receive also depends on what it means for an attribute or benefit to be theirs.
One answer is that the relevant income would already depend on public institutions. A professional benefits from a system that recognizes credentials, enforces contracts, and makes cooperation reliable. The people who maintain the system have claims on its terms even if they need not share the professional's aims. The question for the exchange with Sandel is whether this institutional explanation does enough by itself, or whether the kind of undertaking envisaged already relies on something more shared. Framing the dispute this way leaves room to agree with the principle's conclusion and still disagree about its justification.
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