Meaning and reference › Questions for the Account

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated May 19, 20262 min read
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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 98Meaning and reference › Questions for the Account
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An issue for Frege concerns how to tell when two people grasp the same sense. The difference between a private image and a shared sense tells us why a difference in visualization need not matter. It does not give a test for every case. Two people might agree on a name's bearer but offer different ways of identifying that bearer. Frege's note about Aristotle allows for such divergence in ordinary language. In a conversation where the exact thought matters, asking what someone means by the name is one way to discover whether there is a relevant difference. The possibility of asking that question also shows what the theory has to explain: objectivity does not make a particular speaker's contribution obvious in every situation. Frege, note at p. 27 and discussion at pp. 29–31

A related question concerns empty expressions in more regimented use. The distinction allows a grammatically well-formed expression to make sense without guaranteeing a referent. That flexibility is helpful in explaining how a story can be understood. In a system for reasoning about truth, we may want every admissible singular term to have a referent. Frege discusses a requirement of this sort for a logically adequate language. The two settings impose different demands. Permitting readers to follow a story without settling the status of its characters does not settle what expressions our formal inferences should allow. Frege, pp. 32–34 and 40–41

Indirect discourse creates another test. The account should explain when an apparent failure of substitution results from a change in reference and when the clause does a different job. Frege considers a construction about the discoverer of the elliptical form of planetary orbits. The dependent material helps pick out Kepler. A phrase that serves in this way cannot simply be replaced with any other string that happens to express a true proposition. Its grammatical role contributes to how the full sentence is put together. The distinction between sense and reference is a starting point for this analysis, but the structure of the particular report still matters. Frege, pp. 39–40 and 49–50

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