Meaning and reference › Why the Reference of a Sentence Is Its Truth Value
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Think of two declarative sentences, one saying that the morning star is illuminated by the sun and the other saying so of the evening star. Frege uses this pair to test a proposal about what a sentence refers to. If we change a component to one with the same reference, the sentence's ordinary reference should stay the same. Yet a person who does not know that both names pick out Venus might accept one claim and reject the other. It is therefore possible for the thought to change while the reference stays fixed. Frege concludes that the thought cannot do both jobs. Frege, pp. 32–33
What does stay the same under this substitution, assuming the expressions function in their ordinary way? In this example the truth value stays the same. If the object is illuminated by the sun, it is illuminated regardless of which name we used to speak about it. The test has a different result from a test of cognitive significance. A listener may need to know something additional to see why a differently worded claim is true. Frege uses this contrast to explain his proposal that the ordinary reference of a declarative sentence is its truth value, while its sense is the thought. The substitution test motivates the proposal. The detailed treatment of clauses in the rest of the essay examines how it can work across more complicated examples. Frege, pp. 32–35 and 36–39
Saying that two true sentences have the same reference in Frege's account gives one answer to what they share. Their thoughts can still differ. Knowing only that both are true leaves you without the information each sentence expresses.
The issue becomes pressing when a name fails to refer. Frege considers a sentence about Odysseus arriving in Ithaca while asleep. It expresses a thought that can be followed in a story. Whether Odysseus is a bearer to whom the name refers matters when we ask for the sentence's truth in the ordinary way. Frege connects our interest in the reference of constituent names with our interest in truth. The thought can be available even when failure of an embedded name's reference prevents the sentence from having an ordinary truth value. His point concerns how the parts contribute, whether or not we are concerned with belief in the story. Frege, pp. 32–33
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