Simple substances and a complex world › Why the Histories Agree
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Simple substances and a complex world › Why the Histories AgreeSection view · Sections in this chapter6 / 10 ↓
The cup example now looks different. If I reach for a drink, I can explain the act by the end I was pursuing and the means I chose. My arm and the cup can also be described through their motions and the physical changes that follow from them. In sections 78 and 79 Leibniz invokes the agreement of these two orders. He places appetitions, ends, and means on the side of souls and motions and efficient causes on the side of bodies. The two ways of describing the incident have different explanatory roles. Monadology, §§78–81
Here is a limited comparison. Imagine listening to two recordings of a conversation which were made from different places in the room. At playback neither recording receives information from the other, yet a dropped cup seems to interrupt the two at corresponding moments. The comparison is useful for thinking about agreement without exchange at the time of playback. The recordings have a common causal source and use material equipment. Leibniz's monads are simple, and the agreement among them has its reason in God's ordering of one universe. The recordings cannot explain how this stronger claim is supposed to work. Monadology, §§51–57
Nor does agreement require the histories to be identical. In one person's experiences, the decision to reach can stand out. Another person may hear the crash and have very little idea what led to it. In the town comparison, each point of view makes a different part of a shared order easier to distinguish. The distinctness of a finite monad's perceptions is limited, though what it expresses is much wider. Monadology, §§56–62
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